Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region

A CSCAP Reader

Edited by
Desmond Ball
Kwa Chong Guan
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INTRODUCTION
ASSESSING TRACK 2 DIPLOMACY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

DESMOND BALL AND KWA CHONG GUAN

This book is intended to provide a critical assessment of the role of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization in the region. It describes CSCAP’s formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its declared Track 1 counterpart. It also identifies and analyses perceived weaknesses in CSCAP’s organization and failures in its processes, some of which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades.

CSCAP was set up in 1992–1993 to provide “a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”. It was described at the time as “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters”, and as “one of the most important developments in regional security since

the end of the Cold War.” It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. CSCAP is now a generally recognized feature of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Its achievements since 1992–1993 have been extraordinary. These are described in Chapter 2.

Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The ARF is the centrepiece of the institutionalization of multilateral security dialogue and confidence building in the region. Among the different views about CSCAP’s purposes, its ability to provide policy-relevant studies and analyses for the ARF has generally been accorded highest priority. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success.

Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers.

Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in *The Pacific Review* in 2002; it was drawn from a longer report by Simon published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001. He found that CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 diplomacy. He reported that CSCAP had “achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition of preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF, a number of agreements on oceanic management which have been taken up by the ARF, and the establishment of a database on nuclear energy safety practices”, and that “these and a number of other CSCAP recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and have attained an important place on the latter’s own agenda”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track

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3 Ian McPhedran, “Asia-Pacific Body Created to Formalise Regional Cooperation”, *Canberra Times*, 17 July 1993, p. 3.


1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific”.

Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003. It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. Job addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he argues that, ideationally, “they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities (both individual and collective), and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”.

Chapter 6 by Herman Kraft, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000. He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He argues that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests.

Part III is concerned with future perspectives on CSCAP, Track 2, and security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. In Chapter 7, Brendan Taylor and Anthony Milner discuss current developments and the future prospects with respect to Track 2 in the region. They contrast the crowded Asian institutional landscape of today with the dearth of multilateral security dialogue, which characterized the Asia-Pacific

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Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader

The trends and driving forces in the current process of inter-governmental institutionalism in the Asia Pacific, focusing on the functions and relevance of the ARF and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in this emerging regional security landscape. They argue that these ASEAN-led institutions have lost momentum since their formation, that they risk being side-lined by other regional “conventions and practices” that are more activist and better reflect strategic dynamics, and that, in order to retain a leadership role in Asia-Pacific institutionalism, ASEAN must enhance functional issue-based cooperation, strengthen regionalism in Southeast Asia in terms of both norms and structures, and fundamentally change the “ASEAN Way”.

Chapter 9 by Mely Caballero-Anthony explores how a number of NTS challenges, which are trans-boundary in nature, are pushing states in Asia to work together to mitigate the impact of NTS threats and minimize the chances of these challenges breaking out in the region. She argues that despite drawbacks arising from sovereignty and concerns for non-interference, as well the lack of regional capacity to address these threats, East Asian states have nevertheless demonstrated the capacity to work together in managing transnational threats like SARS, the 2004 tsunami, and environmental problems. The need to respond to an array of emerging NTS threats has therefore made the case for enhancing regional security cooperation in Asia more compelling.

In Chapter 10, Ralph Cossa focuses on the ARF and preventive diplomacy (PD), articulated in the ARF’s Concept Paper adopted in 1995 as Stage II of its agenda. Cossa briefly reviews the progress over the past 15 years, noting the critical role played by CSCAP at important junctures, such as the ARF’s adoption in 2001 of a working definition and “statement of principles on PD” which had been developed by the CSCAP Working Group (CSCAP WG) on CSBMs. He then surveys a range of existing ARF and ASEAN mechanisms that could serve as building blocks to facilitate the performance of a PD function. He offers nine specific recommendations for advancing the implementation of a successful PD programme within the ARF, but notes more generally that the ARF must demonstrate greater leadership, a willingness to “put words into action”, and an active commitment to moving down its own self-prescribed path.

In Chapter 11, Barry Desker discusses the future of CSCAP with respect to
shaping the future of the ARF and, beyond it, to shaping global security institutions and discourse. He argues that CSCAP and the ARF are still important in influencing regional security dynamics, but that the evolving regional security environment poses enormous challenges for them, and that “unless fundamental changes are made which will lead to renewed vigour ... they will risk being side-lined in the years ahead”. He puts forward eight proposals aimed at ensuring that CSCAP and the ARF remain relevant in the future, including organizational reforms, a willingness to “give greater attention to intra-state conflicts” as well as to NTS issues, and more active engagement with Track 3. In addition, he also proposes development of “a more synergistic relationship between APEC and the ARF”, connected at both the Secretariat and summit levels.

In Chapter 12, Kwa Chong Guan argues that CSCAP must be transformed from an epistemic community, as described by Sheldon Simon in Chapter 4, wherein development of a shared language of security discourse produced mutual confidence and trust, to a learning/probing network where the priority is not so much to categorize and analyse a policy issue but to make sense of why and how a subject is a policy issue. Covering broad theoretical ground, but using the experience of the recent CSCAP Energy Security Group as a case study, he argues that a “learning” community would consist of not only regional security domain experts but also other advocacy and NGO groups, and would probe, share and learn how we are making sense of our increasingly uncertain, complex and chaotic world. This is especially important regarding the non-traditional threats of energy and security, environment and climate change or food and water security or pandemics.

Finally, Chapter 13 by Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan concludes the volume with an assessment of CSCAP’s prospects and a review of ways and means of ensuring and promoting its relevance in the future. They acknowledge the erstwhile critiques of CSCAP and Track 2 diplomacy identified in Part II, such as the “autonomy dilemma”, its elitist composition, “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”, and the need to strengthen relations with Track 3. They also appreciate the future perspectives concerning Track 2 and regional security architecture articulated in Part III, including the “increasingly crowded institutional landscape” painted by Taylor and Milner, the need for a radical reform of the ARF and a fundamental change in the “ASEAN Way” if ASEAN and the ARF are not to lose their leadership role, and the need for enhanced cooperation to respond to an array of emerging NTS threats. They reiterate and endorse the litany of specific proposals made by Taylor and Milner, Cossa, and Desker in Part III.

Ball and Kwa also draw on the major CSCAP Review in 2008–2009, and the report by the retiring Non-ASEAN Co-chair, Jim Veitch, which prompted that review. These reports addressed a wide range of issues that are of crucial importance to the future of CSCAP—the tenure of its Study Groups (SGs), the key principle of “policy-relevance”, the structure of the Steering Committee, and relations with the ARF and with officialdom in the member countries. The reports contained many
specific recommendations for reforms of CSCAP activities, some of which have already been implemented. These are issues that require continuous reflection and frequent review. Indeed, Ball and Kwa argue that regular reviews should be institutionalized to ensure continuous and expeditious adaptation by CSCAP to evolving regional security challenges.

They also discuss CSCAP’s research agenda. They identify several subjects that are interesting and important in terms of regional security, concerning which CSCAP has the requisite expertise, and which are not currently being adequately studied anywhere—such as mechanisms for conflict resolution, the robust arms acquisition programs in East Asia and the lack of any effective arms control agreements, arrangements for enhancing defence cooperation in the region, multilateral responses to NTS challenges, and practical application of the concept of human security. It is argued that CSCAP should explore ways and means of covering these subjects.

Finally, Ball and Kwa argue that much will depend on CSCAP’s demonstrable ability to simultaneously both initiate and sponsor new conceptual approaches to regional security issues, and also support official enterprises, such as the ARF. But most determinate will be the dynamics of regional security developments. No matter how successfully CSCAP functions in organizational and intellectual terms, it will count for little if these developments engender an environment characterized by tension, conflict, arms races and a propensity to use force to resolve disputes. CSCAP’s prospects depend ultimately upon its capacity to influence and shape these developments, and to contribute to the construction of a regional security architecture in which cooperative modalities prevail over power politics.
PART 1
THE HISTORY OF CSCAP

2. CSCAP’s Foundation and Achievements
3. CSCAP and the ARF
At the beginning of the 1990s, as the Cold War ended, there was a burgeoning of non-governmental activities and institutional linkages concerning security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, in which government officials were greatly involved but in their private or non-official capacities, and which was soon generally referred to as the “second-track” or “Track 2” process. By 1993–1994, these second-track meetings exceeded one per week. Some of these were small workshops, sometimes involving less than two dozen participants, and designed to address specific issues (such as security of the sea-lanes through the region, or territorial disputes in the South China Sea). The largest and most inclusive was (and still is) the annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable, organized by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), which involves about 300 participants from more than two dozen countries.

In 1991, four institutions in the region, namely the ASEAN-ISIS, the Pacific Forum in Honolulu, the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo, together with representatives of other research institutes from the region, began a two-year project on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (SCAP). The discussions at a series of SCAP meetings in 1991–1992, involving participants from 17 countries, and including scholars as well as officials acting in their private capacities, clearly showed the need for more structured processes for regional confidence building and security cooperation.

The Foundation of CSCAP

CSCAP was formally established at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 8 June 1993, following agreement reached by representatives from strategic studies institutes in 10 countries in Seoul on 1–3 November 1992. Three essential themes permeated the discussions that attended its establishment. The first was that the Council should be a non-governmental institution, but that it should involve government officials, albeit in their private capacities. Although it was considered essential that the institution be independent from official control in order to take full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and fecundity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in the second-track process, as well as to allow relatively free discussion of diplomatically sensitive issues that could not be brought up in official fora, it was also recognized that official involvement was necessary in order to attract government resources and to ensure that the value and practicability of the NGO efforts secured official appreciation. In other words, the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second-track process. It was considered important that the official involvement include senior military personnel as well as defence civilians and foreign affairs officers.

The second theme derived from the experience of NGOs such as the Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) in the promotion of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These NGOs have contributed to the regional economic cooperation process in several important ways. They have, to begin with, developed and disseminated the ideas and stimulated the discussion that engendered the process. They have conducted the technical economic studies and analyses, which showed the benefits of liberalization of trade in the region, either through formal free trade arrangements or, more recently, the concept of “open regionalism”. They have demonstrated to government officials that meaningful and productive dialogue on complex and important policy matters is possible, notwithstanding the extraordinary disparity in the sizes and interests of the numerous parties involved. Indeed, some of them, and most especially the PECC, have explicitly been structured to involve officials themselves in this dialogue—albeit in their “unofficial” capacities. PECC has even engaged in negotiation with respect to the resolution of differences between states, which have arisen during the dialogue process. By providing fora for official but “unofficial” dialogue, the NGOs have contributed to greater official inter-action and enhanced mutual confidence, as well as providing a sound “building block” for supporting cooperative arrangements at the governmental level itself.

Many of the participants in the foundation of CSCAP were also actively involved in the PAFTAD and PECC processes. Indeed, several of the institutions represented in Seoul were also the coordinators of their national PECC committees. In a sense, CSCAP was loosely modelled on the PECC experience and practice. It was intended that CSCAP should support official fora concerned with regional security dialogue and cooperation, such as the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) and the Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOMs), in much the same way that PECC supports the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. More particularly, the establishment of CSCAP national committees and working groups (WGs) closely reflected those established in the PECC programme in terms of their general rationales and operational activities.

The third theme in the foundation of CSCAP was the acceptance of the need to build on extant arrangements in the region wherever possible rather than construct new structures and processes. In practice, this meant building upon the arrangements and processes developed by the ASEAN-ISIS association, and particularly ISIS Malaysia, which were the most advanced in the region in terms of both their infrastructure and their cooperative arrangements and practices.

The Achievements

CSCAP’s progress over the period from 1992–1993 to about 1996, which constituted its formative phase, was primarily measured in terms of its own institutionalization. It moved fairly quickly to draw up a charter and a set of by-laws, to expand its membership, to achieve a sound financial basis, to organize regular meetings, and to publish the products of its WGs. Since the late 1990s, CSCAP has been primarily concerned with institutionalizing its relationship with the ARF, discussed further in the next chapter. This has involved a progressively closer alignment of CSCAP activities with the ARF process, i.e. the ARF Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), the ARF Inter-Sessional Groups (ISGs), and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs). The foundations of this were laid in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, which constituted CSCAP’s reform and ARF-alignment phase. CSCAP’s third phase, since the mid-2000s, has involved the actual institutionalization of CSCAP-ARF linkages.

Procedures were developed for the selection of CSCAP co-chairs, one coming from an ASEAN country and the other from a non-ASEAN country. The founding co-chairs, Jusuf Wanandi from Indonesia and Amos Jordan from the United States, were appointed pro tem in 1993 and confirmed at the first Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994. Wanandi’s term of office was set at three years, and Jordan’s at two, in order to provide some continuity through subsequent (two-yearly) appointments. It was agreed at the fourth meeting of the Steering Committee in Honolulu in December 1995 that “the non-ASEAN chair will normally be selected on the basis of rotation among the geographical areas, namely (i) North America, (ii) Northeast Asia, and (iii) Australasia/South Pacific”.

A CSCAP Secretariat was established, courtesy of ISIS Malaysia. The first
CSCAP newsletter was produced in May 1994 and the second in October 1994. Memorandum No. 1 on The Security of the Asia Pacific Region was submitted to the first ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) in April 1994 for consideration prior to the first ARF meeting in July 1994. Memorandum No. 14, the most recent, on Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods, was issued in March 2009. Two more had been drafted as of mid-2009. It amounts to an average of about one monograph per year.

Several sub-committees have been established to support the Steering Committee. Three of these meet twice a year, coincidental with the Steering Committee meetings: the Finance Committee, which considers budgetary and financial matters; since December 2001, the Planning Committee; and, since May 2006, the Study Group (SG) Co-chairs Committee. A Planning Committee of the Steering Committee was initially established in December 1995; it “was tasked to prepare a vision for the future direction of the region, and help CSCAP accordingly”. In June 1996, the Steering Committee agreed that “the Planning Group be institutionalized as a Select Committee of the CSCAP Steering Committee, to be responsible for the further development of plans and proposals for consideration by the Steering Committee”. Since the 16th meeting of the Steering Committee in Canberra in December 2001, the Planning Committee has met immediately prior to the Steering Committee meetings. There had been a Working Group Committee, which consisted of the co-chairs of the five WGs and involved discussion of their current and prospective activities, and areas of duplication and potential cooperation. It held its last meeting in Jakarta on 5 December 2005; its agenda was transferred to a new Study Group Co-chairs Committee, which had its first meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 29 May 2006, prior to the 25th meeting of the Steering Committee.

The CSCAP Charter provides, in Article IX(1), that “CSCAP shall convene a General Meeting on a regular basis”, with “the agenda, time and venue [to] be decided by the Steering Committee”. Three General Meetings were convened (after which a new series of General Conferences was instituted). The first was held in Singapore on 4 June 1997, and was attended by about 200 members. The second was held in Seoul on 4 December 1999, and it discussed the role of CSCAP in Asia-Pacific security in the new millennium. The third General Meeting was held in Canberra on 8–9 December 2001.

**Membership**

CSCAP now includes nearly every country in the region. The original 10 (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States) were joined by three others in 1993–1994 (New Zealand, Russia and North Korea). Mongolia joined in June 1996. The most critical accession was that of China in December 1996. It was accepted from the outset that China’s membership was essential—a pan-regional security architecture of any substance or credibility was inconceivable without China—but it was also recognized that its
CSCAP’s Foundation and Achievements

Figure 2.1
CSCAP Structure

CSCAP Steering Committee
Co-Chairs

Sub-Committees
Finance
Planning
Study Group Co-Chairs
Review

Secretariat

Member Committees
Australia
Brunei
Cambodia
Canada
China
Europe
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea (ROK)
DPR Korea
Malaysia
Mongolia
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Russia
Singapore
Thailand
United States
Vietnam

Study Groups
Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
Study Group on the Establishment of Regional Transnational Organized Crime Hubs in the Asia Pacific
Study Group on Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific
CSCAP Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific
Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect
Table 2.1
**CSCAP member committees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Member committee and institutional sponsor</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activities/Comments</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Australia. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), The Australian National University</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Co-Chair of WG on Maritime Cooperation, WG on Transnational Crime, SG on Capacity Building for Maritime Cooperation, SG on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation, SG on Human Trafficking, SG on Climate Change, SG on Offshore O&amp;G Installations and SG on Transnational Crime Hubs.</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam. Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS)</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Canada. Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Co-Chair of WG on the North Pacific and SG on Peacekeeping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Member committee and institutional sponsor</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Activities/Comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>United States. Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Co-Chair of WG on CSBMs, SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD, SG on Multilateral Frameworks in Northeast Asia and SG on PD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>ASEAN co-chair year</td>
<td>Non-ASEAN co-chair</td>
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<td>CSCAP Indonesia</td>
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<td>Date issued</td>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>CSCAP Pro-Tem Committee</td>
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<td>Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea</td>
<td>February 2001</td>
<td>Working Group on Maritime Cooperation</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving International Terrorism</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against International Terrorism</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Human Trafficking</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG), Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD</td>
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Table 2.4

CSCAP Steering Committee meetings

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<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>5 June 1994</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3 June 1997</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>18 December 1997</td>
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<td>11.</td>
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<td>Canberra</td>
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<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>9 December 2002</td>
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<td>Jakarta</td>
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<td>Jakarta</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>14 December 2006</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>4 June 2007</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>1 June 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>15–16 November 2009</td>
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Table 2.5
CSCAP general meetings/conferences*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4 June 1997</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>4 December 1999</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>8–9 December 2001</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>7–9 December 2003</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>6–7 December 2005</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>7–8 December 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>16–18 November 2009</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The Steering Committee decided to substitute the term “General Conference” for “General Meeting” at its 18th meeting in Singapore on 9 December 2002.
inclusion would bring difficulties, especially concerning the involvement of Taiwan. The conditions for Taiwanese participation were agreed in Canberra in December 1996, but it took another two years before the Taiwanese attended their first WG meeting. Vietnam also joined in December 1996. The European committee became a full member in December 1998. India, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea joined the Council in June 2000. Brunei Darussalam joined in December 2001.

The individual memberships of CSCAP’s member committees grew rapidly. The total membership increased by nearly 60 per cent from 452 (in 13 countries) in 1995, when the first *CSCAP Directory* was compiled, to some 750 in 2000. The largest of the member committees is US-CSCAP, with more than 200 members; the average for the other Committees is about 30–50 members.

Several member committees initiated production of their own newsletters. The Australian Newsletter was produced twice a year, the final issue being No. 18 issued in March 2006. The Philippines and South Korea committees also published newsletters. These comprised, for many years, the best set of publicly available materials concerning cooperative security activities in the region. They were progressively replaced by websites on the Internet, which most member committees had instituted by the early 2000s.

**Working Groups**

The WGs were the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity for nearly a decade, before they were replaced by SGs in the early 2000s. According to the Charter, the WGs/SGs are supposed “to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and sub-regional political-security problems”. It had been agreed at the Seoul meeting in November 1992 that “the first two of these WGs will examine maritime surveillance in Southeast Asia and the enhancement of security cooperation in the North Pacific.”

Four WGs were established at the first official meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994:

- Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM)s;
- Concepts of Cooperative and Comprehensive Security;
- Maritime Cooperation; and
- Security Cooperation in the North Pacific.

A fifth, on Transnational Crime, was set up in December 1996 (initially as a Study Group, until its viability was accepted by the Steering Group in December 1997). These WGs had more than 70 meetings and produced about 20 volumes of edited papers before they were dissolved in 2003–2004.

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The Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures

The WG on CSBMs had been the most energetic. It was the first to have a meeting (in Washington, D.C., in October 1994). It had 22 meetings, double that of some of the other groups. It produced CSCAP Memorandum No. 2 on Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures for approval by the Steering Committee in June 1995, and published one edited volume and four occasional papers. It made more use of electronic dissemination of its reports than have the other groups.

Through its first five meetings, the group was primarily concerned with transparency-type CSBMs, which the ARF had articulated as its principal interest in 1995—such as Defence White Papers and conventional arms registers, as well as nuclear non-proliferation. In April 1996, at its fourth meeting, the group produced “a generic model for developing a defence white paper, which could be considered as a general format [for use] by interested parties”. However, work on arms registers stagnated, as most countries in the region acceded to the UN Conventional Arms Register, while being unwilling to accept a more detailed and more meaningful, but also more intrusive, regional arms register.

In 1996–1997, the WG on CSBMs concentrated on two main subjects: nuclear energy and non-proliferation, and preventive diplomacy. The work on nuclear energy, initially called the PACATOM project, was intended to address the safety and non-proliferation concerns about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was “premised on the belief that multilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs) aimed at increasing transparency and enhancing safeguards and individual assurances, if introduced at an early stage in the process, could help ensure that the anticipated expanded regional use of nuclear energy does not contribute to misunderstandings about the nuclear intentions of individual nations, while also promoting nuclear safety and non-proliferation goals”. The objectives of the project were to:

- identify and articulate, and then help to address or alleviate, nuclear energy-related regional concerns;
- identify and help institute both information collection and dissemination and a series of CBMs aimed at reducing current nuclear energy-related concerns while setting the stage for more formalized multilateral cooperation;
- assess the feasibility and define the likely parameters of an institutionalized regional regime aimed at promoting greater safety, security, and transparency in nuclear energy production and research operations [i.e. an Asian or Pacific Atomic Energy Community (PACATOM)].

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6 Ibid., p. vi.
The work on preventive diplomacy began at the fifth meeting of the group, in Singapore in October 1996. Both this and the sixth meeting, in Washington, D.C., in May 1997, were designed to directly assist the ARF’s preliminary consideration of preventive diplomacy. Since then, as discussed further in Chapter 3, the group worked closely with the ARF on this subject. It is probably the CSCAP work which has been most appreciated by the ARF.

Over the next couple of years, the WG on CSBMs continued development and refinement of the CSCAP Asia-Pacific Nuclear Energy Transparency Web Site. The site was made even more comprehensive through the addition of information on nuclear energy research and reprocessing facilities, nuclear weapons free zones, and the plans and attitudes of current non-nuclear energy producing states.

The WG also widened its discussions to address other regional security concerns, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), offensive and defensive missile developments, military alliances, and some non-traditional security concerns. It also closely monitored ARF activities to determine how best to assist the ARF’s examination of confidence building and preventive diplomacy. It also worked on Regional Security Outlook assessments.

The 15th meeting, held in Paris in June 2001, was organized jointly with the WG on the North Pacific, and discussed developments on the Korean Peninsula as well as regional perspectives on missile defence systems. The 16th meeting, held in Washington, D.C. in October 2001, discussed the implications of the war on terrorism; proliferation issues; missile defence; Annual Security Outlook (ASO) reports; and preventive diplomacy. The 17th meeting, in Hanoi in April 2002, was concerned with preventive diplomacy. The 18th and 22nd meetings, held in Singapore in December 2002 and in Hanoi in May 2004 were organized jointly with the WG on Maritime Cooperation, and discussed maritime confidence building and preventive diplomacy, and, at the Hanoi meeting, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
The WG on Maritime Cooperation earned a reputation as one of the most important second-track activities concerning maritime security matters in the region. It had 14 meetings, and produced five volumes of edited papers and for CSCAP memorandums. It remained very conscious of its objectives, and adhered to a perspective plan designed to meet those objectives. Its edited volumes comprise an essential

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set of reference material for any informed discussion of maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s and early 2000s; they are widely cited in both the academic literature on Asia-Pacific security and official fora.8

The objectives of the WG were defined in November 1994 (in preparation for the second meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in December 1994) as being to:

- foster maritime cooperation and dialogue among the states of the Asia-Pacific region and enhance their ability to manage and use the maritime environment without prejudicing the interests of each other;
- develop an understanding of regional maritime issues and the scope they provide for cooperation and dialogue;
- contribute to a stable maritime regime in the Asia-Pacific region which will reduce the risk of regional conflict;
- undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional maritime security problems;
- promote particular maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBMs); and
- promote adherence to the principles of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).9

Its initial meetings focused on MCSBMs, maritime surveillance and information sharing, marine scientific and technological research, marine resources, marine environmental conservation, and law and order at sea (especially piracy). Its work on CSBMs resulted in publication of CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation in December 1997.

In June 1997, at its third meeting in Bangkok, the group began work on regional oceans management and security, central themes from which have been pursued in accordance with an “action plan” for work on the “objectives and principles of good oceans management” drawn up at the fifth meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998. The work on “good oceans management” is “directed towards the building of law and order at sea”, and covers safe movement of shipping and resource exploitation at sea, maritime crime, maritime pollution, and instruments for dispute settlement. The sixth meeting of the group, in Hanoi in August 1999, was devoted to “good oceans governance”, and the papers prepared for the meeting were published by CSCAP Vietnam in September 1999.

The seventh meeting, in Wollongong in November 1999, was organized jointly

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8 See, for example, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia and ASEAN: Managing Change (Canberra: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, March 1998), p. 198.

with the WG on Transnational Crime, and addressed issues involving maritime crime and law and order at sea. The eighth meeting, in Manila in July 2000, finalized the draft of CSCAP Memorandum No. 5 on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea, which was considered by the Steering Committee at its 14th meeting in Manila in December 2000 and published in February 2001.

At its ninth meeting in Beijing in November 2000 and its tenth meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 2001, the WG on Maritime Cooperation focused on issues in the marginal seas of East Asia. It was concerned that jurisdictional problems in these seas were a source of tension and potential conflict in the region, the resolution of which requires a range of maritime confidence-building and preventive-diplomacy measures. The eleventh meeting, held in Seoul in February 2002, prepared a draft CSCAP Memorandum on The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific, which was considered by the Steering Committee at its 17th meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 2002 and issued as CSCAP Memorandum No. 6 in December 2002. The Seoul meeting also issued a statement against maritime terrorism.

The 13th meeting, held in Manila in September 2003, was a joint meeting with PECC, and was concerned with maritime cooperation and measures to ensure the security of shipping and seaborne trade. It led to CSCAP Memorandum No. 8 on The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade and the Maritime Regime in the Asia Pacific, issued in April 2004.

The Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security

The WG on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security was set up following the suggestion of then Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi at the Seventh Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur in June 1993, that a Study Group be formed to examine the concept of comprehensive security and how it might be adopted as the basis of security policymaking by all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This group had 13 meetings, and produced seven edited volumes and a CSCAP Memorandum on The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security.

The work of this group was different from that of the other groups in being more conceptual and theoretical. It was also perhaps more difficult, due to both the gulf between the conceptual literature and “the real world of policy-making”, and to the elusiveness of the subject itself. As one of the co-chairs of the Working Group noted at the third meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995: “The subject is still a concept in search of a settled identity.”

As befits the breadth of comprehensive approaches to security, as well as reflecting the elusiveness of the subject, the work of the WG/CCCS was wide-ranging—perhaps at the expense of analytical depth and policy utility. The first two meetings of the group explored the concept of comprehensive security and prepared the memorandum on The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security for approval by the CSCAP Steering Committee in December 1995 and submission to the ARF SOM-3 in April 1996. The third meeting, in Wellington in December 1996, discussed the theme of inter-dependence and security, and particularly the linkages between economic development, high levels of economic inter-dependence, and peace and security. The fourth meeting, in Kuala Lumpur in September 1997, focused on the challenges to regional security posed by environmental degradation, food shortages and energy requirements; it also examined the political, legal and military dimensions of disputes concerning marine resources in East Asia. The fifth and sixth meetings involved an in-depth examination of the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 and its implications for the structure of regional security.11 The papers prepared for these two meetings were published in a single volume in 1999. The seventh meeting, in Seoul in December 1999, discussed the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states, some recent challenges to the principle, and its applicability in the Asia-Pacific context.13

The eighth meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur in October 2000, was concerned with the implications of globalization on security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The ninth meeting, held in Wellington, New Zealand in March-April 2001, analysed national and regional perspectives on human security issues and discussed the challenges and threats to human security in the Asia Pacific. The papers prepared for the meeting were published in 2002.14 The tenth meeting was held in Shanghai in October 2001 and was concerned with economic security in the light of changes brought about by globalization. The eleventh meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur in February 2002, and the twelfth meeting, in Wellington in April 2003, were primarily concerned with domestic and international terrorism; they addressed the patterns, incidence, causes and trends of terrorism, the impact of 9/11 on regional politics.

13 See David Dickens & Guy Wilson-Roberts (Eds.), Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, 2000).
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and security, and counter-terrorism issues. The papers prepared for the eleventh meeting were later published by ISIS Malaysia. The 13th meeting, held in Suzhou in China in March 2004, discussed the political and security implications of the war in Iraq for the Asia-Pacific region.

The Working Group on the North Pacific
The objective of the WG on the North Pacific, as defined in a paper prepared by its founding co-chairs on 2 November 1994, was “to contribute toward dialogue and security cooperation in the North Pacific with specific reference to security issues in Northeast Asia.” It was different from the other groups in several important respects: it had distinct geographical boundaries in focusing on a sub-region of the Asia Pacific; whereas the most vital regional security issues lie in Northeast Asia, the mechanisms for dialogue are less developed there than elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region; the intention was to focus on a few key issues, mainly concerning the Korean Peninsula, rather than pursuing several fronts; and it was from the outset less confident about its capacity to produce policy recommendations. Rather, it was tasked with promoting the institutionalized dialogue necessary for the development of cooperative policies. The group had its first meeting (on “Frameworks for Stability on the Korean Peninsula”) in Tokyo in April 1995, but it was hamstrung for a couple of years by the absence of participants from North Korea (which joined CSCAP in December 1994 but did not attend the group’s meeting in April 1995) and China (which did not join CSCAP until December 1996).

The WG on the North Pacific had 10 meetings. Its second meeting, held in Vancouver, Canada, in January–February 1997, included participants from both North Korea and China. This meeting, and the third meeting, held in Japan in December 1997, involved general discussions of topics such as the current dialogue mechanisms in Northeast Asia; the relevance of institution-building in Southeast Asia for Northeast Asia; the connection between economic and security cooperation; possible CSBMs suitable for Northeast Asia; and, the role of the ARF in Northeast Asia. The subsequent meetings, while remaining fairly general, increasingly focused on security developments in the Korean Peninsula.

The Working Group on Transnational Crime
The WG on Transnational Crime was designed to address the increasing importance of transnational crime as a threat to regional security. The official objectives of the group, as decided at the Steering Committee meeting in Canberra in December 1996, were to:

- gain a better understanding of and reach agreement on the major transnational crime trends affecting the region as a whole;

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- consider practical measures that might be adopted to combat transnational crime in the region; and
- encourage and assist those countries that have recently become engaged in regional security cooperation, and that are concerned about the problem of transnational crime in the region, to endorse the United Nations and other protocols dealing with transnational crime, particularly in the narcotics area, and to develop laws to assist in regional and international cooperation to counter drug trafficking, money laundering, mutual assistance, extradition and the like.

It was a test case of the ability of security analysts in the region to seriously consider the new security agenda as involving real threats to security. The WG held 14 meetings, or more than that of most of the other groups set up three years before it began. It published one volume of edited papers and produced two CSCAP memorandums.

The first two meetings were exploratory. The first, in Singapore in March 1997, developed a checklist of 19 types of transnational crime affecting the region, and allocated research projects to member countries from this list. The second meeting, in Bangkok in October 1997, winnowed this to leave those crime types most likely to affect the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region: arms trafficking, drug production and trafficking, international corporate/white collar crime, smuggling of nuclear materials, counterfeiting, illegal immigration, money laundering, and technology crimes. The third meeting, in Manila in May 1998, discussed drug trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, terrorism, illegal immigration, and technology crimes, as well as the conceptual and policy relationships between transnational crime and regional security. The papers prepared for the second and third meetings were published in 1999.16

Subsequent meetings were more focussed on particular issues. The fourth and fifth meetings, in Sydney in October 1998 and Bangkok in May 1999, discussed three topics: illicit arms trafficking, production and trafficking of synthetic drugs, and the impact of the economic crisis of 1997–1998 on crime in the region. The group found that transnational crime had increased as a result of the crisis. The increased unemployment led people to resort to illegal activities to survive. Illicit capital flight and money laundering increased. Smuggling of people also increased. On the other hand, the law enforcement resources available to meet these challenges were reduced by the crisis.17

The group had its seventh meeting in Manila on 31 May–June 2000, the two

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themes of which were identity fraud, especially in relation to international travel documents, and law enforcement cooperation in the region. With regard to further work on identity fraud, the meeting decided to establish two sub-groups: one on technology and crime, particularly e-crime, and the other to consider best practice in the issuance and handling of travel documents. In the case of law enforcement cooperation, the meeting also decided to survey the current status of cooperation in relation to “mutual assistance and extradition” in the region.

The eighth meeting, held in Bangkok in October 2000, discussed law-enforcement cooperation in the region with particular respect to cyber crime; identity document fraud; and synthetic drug production and trafficking in the region. The ninth meeting, in Sydney in May 2001, discussed the role of police in peacekeeping, including the role of CrimTrac; cyber crime; document and identity fraud, especially in relation to illegal movement of people; and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements. The tenth and eleventh meetings, held in Jakarta in November 2001 and in Shanghai in May 2002, discussed law enforcement and regional cooperation with particular emphasis on transnational crime and terrorism. The twelfth meeting, in Bangkok in November 2002, produced a further draft of CSCAP Memorandum on The Relationship between Terrorism and Transnational Crime, issued in July 2003. The 13th meeting, in Manila in June 2003, was essentially a stocktaking exercise, but also discussed plans for future work of a Study Group proposed to replace the Working Group. It also initiated a study on arms trafficking in the region; this subject was discussed further at the final meeting of the Working Group held in Jakarta in December 2003, which produced a draft of CSCAP Memorandum No. 9 on Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia-Pacific Region, issued in May 2004.

The work of the WG on Transnational Crime was applauded by several law enforcement agencies and was widely reported in the regional media. For example, in 1997 the Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Adrien Whiddett, described the establishment of the WG as “a heartening development” and a “clarion-call to arms”.18 The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Australian Parliament also commended the setting up of the group.19 The Far Eastern Economic Review reported in April 2000 in a special report on cyber crime that as early as May 1998 the WG on Transnational Crime had warned that “crime in cyberspace is clearly a significant threat to national and regional security and stability”.20

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19 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia and ASEAN, p. 205.
Review of the Working Groups, 2001

In October 2000, Desmond Ball, then the non-ASEAN co-chair, published a monograph on CSCAP, which reviewed its record and assessed its prospects. It was tabled at the 14th Steering Committee meeting in Manila on 11 December 2000, which discussed three particular issues highlighted in the monograph: the possibility of preparing an Annual Security Outlook, the possibility of preparing a new draft Concept Paper for the ARF (detailed in Chapter 3) and a review of the CSCAP WGs.

With respect to the third issue, Ball had argued in his monograph that:

The Steering Committee should initiate a thorough review of the WGs. Four of the groups were established, and their objectives and terms of reference defined, back in 1994, and the fifth (on transnational crime) in 1996. Some of the groups have been more active and more productive than others, at least according to quantitative measures such as the number of meetings held and publications produced. Some have developed more effective ways of supporting the ARF process than others.

Ball noted that “new issues have arisen as the regional security environment has evolved over the past six years, while others have acquired greater urgency”, and pointed out that the Steering Committee had agreed at its first meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994 that “Working Groups should not exist indefinitely, and the Steering Committee will decide when a particular Working Group should be terminated”.

The 14th Steering Committee meeting in Manila established a Working Group Review Committee, chaired by Ball and including China, Japan, Canada, the United States, two from the ASEAN members, and a representative from the Secretariat. The Review Committee met in Kuala Lumpur on 24–25 April and 3 June 2001, and presented its report at the 15th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 4 June 2001 (Appendix 5 of the minutes).

The report contained revised Terms of Reference and Work Plans for all CSCAP WGs. It also recommended that the Planning Committee be reactivated to meet coincidentally with Steering Committee meetings, for the purposes of (i) highlighting “critical issues that require the urgent attention of the Steering Committee”, and (ii) identifying and conducting initial analyses of emerging issues not already being addressed by the current Working Groups”. The report was adopted and its recommendations accepted by the Steering Committee on 4 June 2001.


22 Ibid, p. 89.

23 Ibid.
CSCAP Memoranda

The 17th CSCAP Steering Committee meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur on 6 June 2002, discussed the length, format and purpose of the CSCAP Memoranda. The meeting reaffirmed that the principal purpose of the memoranda was to provide brief arguments supporting policy-relevant recommendations for consideration in the ARF process (the ARF SOMs, the ARF ISGs and the ARF Ministerial Meetings), and decided that this required extreme brevity and conciseness. Memorandum No. 1, which was prepared for submission to the first ARF SOM meeting in April 1994, was only three pages long. Memoranda No. 2 and No. 3 were each five pages; No. 4 was seven pages; and No. 5, on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea, issued in February 2001, was 17 pages long.

The issue arose at the June 2002 meeting because two draft memoranda, prepared by the WG on Maritime Cooperation (on The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific) and the WG on Transnational Crime (on The Relationship between Terrorism and Transnational Crime) and tabled for consideration at the meeting, were long, comprehensive, analytical reports rather than policy briefs. As paragraph 4.5.6 of the minutes of the 17th CSCAP Steering Committee meeting records:

Mr. Cossa, Amb. Desker and Mr. Jusuf clarified that although both the Working Groups on Maritime Cooperation and Transnational Crime had done very useful, substantive work in producing their respective memoranda, the documents could not appropriately be classified as such due to their length and comprehensiveness. Prof. Ball suggested that there be a new category of CSCAP documents under the label of “Study Papers” in addition to memoranda; or to have two sets of documents, with the first establishing a policy recommendation to which would be appended a detailed study providing the context. Amb. Desker, however, qualified that studies are never attached to policy memoranda sent to ministers. This was confirmed by Ms. Luidmila Vorobieva [CSCAP Russia] who suggested that brevity be reinstated to CSCAP memoranda sent to the ARF.

The next memorandum, No. 6, on The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific, issued in December 2002, was a very truncated version of the draft considered in June, cut to only three pages. No. 7, on The Relationship between Terrorism and Transnational Crime, issued in July 2003, was a four-page version of the draft considered in June 2002. No. 8 was six pages, and No. 9, on Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia-Pacific Region, issued in May 2004, was 11 pages. Memorandum No. 12 on Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations of Maritime Security, issued in December 2007, was five pages (including a one-page appended table); No. 13, Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, issued in June 2008, was eight pages; and No. 14, Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods, issued in March 2009, was also eight pages.
The CSCAP Study Groups

At the 17th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 6 June 2002, Jusuf Wanandi suggested that limits should be placed on the tenure of the WGs. He proposed that “a ‘sunset clause’ of three years be imposed on Working Groups, to be renewed upon submission of a new proposal for work to be continued, to maximize cost-efficiency of CSCAP funds” (see paragraph 5.3.3 of the minutes of the meeting). The proposal was discussed further at the 18th meeting of the Steering Committee in Singapore in December 2002, which decided that WGs would have a maximum tenure of two years.

In December 2003, the CSCAP co-chairs, Barry Desker and Brian Job, produced a “Proposal on the Restructuring of CSCAP WGs”, the objective of which was “to build upon the decision at the 18th Steering Committee Meeting and suggest a restructuring of CSCAP WGs in order to improve the ability of CSCAP to undertake timely, relevant and focused policy studies on Asia-Pacific security matters consistent with its role and functions as specified in the CSCAP Charter”. The co-chairs reported that:

The Working Groups have done substantial work in their respective areas of study, and issued no less than eight Memorandums for the consideration of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and regional governments. Some of their work, such as in the formulation of principles of preventive diplomacy, has been much appreciated by the ARF.

Papers presented at the WG meetings have also been published in the form of books to add to the general reservoir of knowledge on the relevant security matters.

Despite these significant contributions, the general sentiment among the member committees is that the present arrangement, which is a decade old, is not yielding the best results in the following respects:

1. The WGs are too broadly focused, and more focus on specific and urgent issues is urgently required.
2. Some of the WGs feel obliged to sustain continued activity even when their original objectives have been met.
3. The present arrangement involving broad terms of reference for WGs result in frequent instances of overlap of work.

In order “to help render CSCAP more relevant, effective and responsive to the important changes taking place in the strategic environment”, the “Proposal on Restructuring” proposed, firstly, that all existing WGs should conclude their agendas by the end of May 2004, and secondly, that from June 2004, policy studies conducted by CSCAP would be carried out by “freshly constituted Working Groups or SGs or Task Forces established by the Steering Committee, which will also have a maximum tenure of 2 years”. It also proposed a process for restructuring the extant...
WG into SGs, involving the submission of topics for such SGs to the CSCAP co-chairs by 1 April 2004; the co-chairs were mandated to then produce a draft proposal by May 2004, which “would allow a period of discussion of up to a month” prior to the 21st Steering Committee meeting at the end of that month. The “Proposal on Restructuring” was adopted at the 20th Steering Committee meeting in Jakarta on 7 December 2003 (see paragraph 5.1 of the minutes of that meeting).

While the process of moving from WGs to SGs with strict “sunset clauses” was underway, a Special Study Group on Terrorism was created at the 16th Steering Committee meeting in Canberra in December 2001, following the attacks by al-Qaeda on the US on 11 September 2001. It was headed by the CSCAP co-chairs, and held its first meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 24–26 March 2002. It decided that rather than produce a general statement condemning the terrorist attacks, it would concentrate on expeditiously incorporating counter-terrorism into CSCAP’s work agenda. It produced “an internal document setting out CSCAP’s principles on counter-terrorism that Working Groups could follow ... as guidance”, tabled at the 17th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 2002. Section 5 of the document comprised a “Proposed CSCAP Action Plan to Study International Terrorism”, which outlined “the particular tasks each Working Group had undertaken to execute”. At the 19th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 6 August 2003, CSCAP Singapore tabled a Draft Memorandum on Counter-Terrorism: Roadmap for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which summarized “the efforts of the five Working Groups on understanding and countering the emerging international terrorist threat”. A revised draft was circulated at the 20th meeting of the Steering Committee in Jakarta on 7 December 2003, which called for more changes. A further revised draft was prepared by CSCAP Singapore for consideration at the 21st meeting of the Steering Committee in May 2004, but it was dropped when it became apparent that no consensus was likely to be reached. The establishment of the Special Study Group on Terrorism exemplified CSCAP’s willingness to “focus on specific and urgent issues” and demonstrated the utility of the SG mechanism, although it also showed the difficulty of securing a consensus on sensitive issues where many of CSCAP’s member committees remain beholden to their Track 1 positions.

A CSCAP SG on Oceania was also established by the 20th Steering Committee in Jakarta in December 2003. At its 19th meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 6 August 2003, the Steering Committee invited CSCAP New Zealand to explore whether or not a CSCAP SG on the South Pacific “would have merit”, and to present a brief report on the matter at the Jakarta meeting. Consultations were held with both Track 1 and Track 2 representatives from the South Pacific during preparation of the report. The Steering Committee was wary of creating a new group while the WG restructuring was underway, but authorized CSCAP New Zealand to organize a single meeting, held in Wellington on 24–25 August 2004, to address the geopolitical setting, examine resource extraction, analyse the broader security relationships between Oceania and the rest of the Asia Pacific, and to promote further engagement between Oceania
and the rest of the region. Revised versions of papers presented at the meeting were later published by CSCAP New Zealand.24

The first six SGs were established, with two-year tenures, at the 21st meeting of the Steering Committee, in Kuala Lumpur on 30 May 2004 (see paragraph 3.2.3.28 of the minutes of that meeting). These were concerned with:

- Capacity building for maritime security cooperation in the Asia Pacific;
- Countering the proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific;
- Future prospects for multilateral security frameworks in Northeast Asia;
- Human trafficking in the Asia Pacific;
- Regional peacekeeping and peace building; and
- Enhancing the effectiveness of the campaign against international terrorism with specific reference to the Asia Pacific.

These groups did not have their first meetings until late 2004 or early 2005, but they had all finished them by the end of 2006, apart from the SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific, which gained continued longevity by securing independent funds. The other five Groups each had two to four meetings, while the SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD had had 10 meetings as at the end of 2009.

A further 11 SGs have been established since 2006. Three have been “one-off” SGs, formed for a single meeting on a specific issue. Altogether, the 17 SGs had held 45 meetings and produced five CSCAP Memoranda by mid-2009. They have generally proven to be an adept mechanism for both responding to urgent security issues and correlating CSCAP’s work with the ARF process.

The conditions for Taiwanese participation in SG activities were clarified at the 22nd meeting of the Steering Committee in Kunming, China, on 11 December 2004, which agreed on a document titled “Procedural Guidelines for the Participation of Scholars/Experts from Chinese Taipei in CSCAP SG Meetings”. It reaffirmed that the number of scholars/experts from Taiwan should normally be limited to two for each SG, and that the “One China” principle should be followed in “all CSCAP activities”, and specified that Taiwanese participants should be described as coming from “Taipei, China” or “Chinese Taipei”.

**The Study Group on Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation**

The SG on Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific was a direct successor to the highly successful WG on Maritime Security Cooperation. It was co-chaired by Australia, Indonesia and India, and held four meetings.

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The first and second meetings, held in Kunming, China, in December 2004 and in New Delhi in April 2005, examined several dimensions of capacity building, including legal frameworks and resources; the revised versions of selected papers prepared for these two meetings were later published in an edited volume by CSCAP New Zealand. The third meeting, in Singapore in December 2005, discussed particular institutions and "maritime awareness". The fourth meeting, in Kuala Lumpur in May 2006, initiated preparation of a Draft Memorandum on Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations of Maritime Security, completed by its successor, the SG on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, in 2007.

The Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific

The SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific was essentially a successor of the nuclear energy (PACATOM) and nuclear non-proliferation element of the WG on CSBMIs. As mentioned above, it has been successful in attracting substantial independent funds, enabling it to considerably extend its tenure. It has now had 10 meetings. It was initially co-chaired by Singapore and the United States, but Vietnam replaced Singapore after the fourth meeting. The establishment of this SG was acknowledged in a report on fighting WMD proliferation published by the Australian Government in October 2005 as follows:

In parallel with the ARF's official work, second-track (non-official) institutions—such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)—have been instrumental in generating ideas and inputs for ARF consideration. CSCAP has formed a Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, which met for the first time in May 2005. The Australian Government has provided grants to support the activities of the Australian Member Committee of CSCAP.

The first meeting of the SG was held in Singapore in May 2005. It discussed regional attitudes towards the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and initiated a long-term project to develop an Asia-Pacific Handbook and Action Plan to Prevent the Proliferation of WMD. The second, third and fourth meetings mainly discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the Six Party Talks and the PSI, while continuing work on the Asia-Pacific Handbook and Action Plan.


The fifth and sixth meetings, in San Francisco on 12–13 February 2007 and in Jakarta on 9–10 December 2007, discussed the outlook for the global non-proliferation regime; the regional nuclear energy outlook; the Six Party Talks; and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The seventh meeting, in Ho Chi Minh City on 25–26 May 2008, finalized a “Charter for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”. It was provided to the Russian Chairman of the Six Party Talks’ WG on the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, which has been in abeyance since April 2009, and is expected to “play a key role in institutionalising the Northeast Asia security mechanism” whenever the Six Party Talks resume.27

The eighth meeting, in Bangkok on 23–24 January 2009, discussed the Handbook and Action Plan on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for the Asia Pacific. The ninth meeting was held in Beijing on 28–30 June 2009, immediately prior to the inaugural meeting of the ARF ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. By June 2009, the Handbook on Countering the Proliferation of WMD had been nearly completed, while specific proposals were still being developed for inclusion in the WMD Action Plan. The tenth meeting was held in Hanoi on 6–8 December 2009. It reviewed recent developments in the global non-proliferation regime, examined recent initiatives in nuclear disarmament, and considered the implications of the nuclear energy revival for the Asia-Pacific region; it also worked on the development of policy recommendations to prevent WMD proliferation and promote disarmament in the region.

The SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD has spawned a sub-group, called the Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG), which had its first meeting in Tokyo in November 2005. Its agenda is to compile data sets on export controls concerning nuclear, chemical and biological materials, to examine national programs supporting export controls, to develop “a universal template as a device for evaluating national export control programs”, and to build a “virtual technical experts group”. It held its second meeting in Beijing on 11–12 May 2006, its third in Tokyo on 9–10 February, and its fourth in Manila on 25–26 August 2008. The Manila meeting prepared a draft of CSCAP Memorandum No. 14, on Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods, a further draft of which was approved in principle by the 30th Steering Committee meeting in Bangkok in January 2009, and which was produced in March 2009 for distribution at the inaugural meeting of the ARF ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

The Study Group on Future Prospects for Multilateral Security Frameworks in Northeast Asia
This SG, co-chaired by China, Japan, South Korea and the United States, was essentially a successor to the WG on the North Pacific. It held four meetings, in Tokyo on

27 Information from Ralph Cossa, Co-chair of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific, 4 October 2009.
29–30 April 2005, Seoul on 11–12 November 2005, Beijing on 28–29 April 2006, and in Berkeley, California, on 23–24 October 2006, which discussed the security situation in Northeast Asia and possible “approaches and mechanisms for multilateral security cooperation” in Northeast Asia. The Berkeley meeting produced a draft set of policy recommendations, which was tabled at the 26th meeting of the Steering Committee in Wellington, New Zealand, on 14 December 2006.

The Study Group on Human Trafficking
The SG on Human Trafficking was formed to examine one of the most serious NTS concerns in the region. While human trafficking is essentially an issue of human exploitation, it also becomes an important security issue by corrupting government officials, undermining the rule of law, and sometimes generating trans-border tensions. The SG was co-chaired by Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, and held three meetings. The first, in Manila in April 2005, established small sub-groups to work on eight issues: strategies to combat human trafficking; legislation; regional arrangements; intelligence exchanges and national coordination; victim support; public awareness; case studies; and crime-type convergence. The second meeting, in Bangkok in August 2005, discussed legislation to combat human trafficking, regional arrangements and cooperation, capacity building, and victim support. The third meeting, in Manila in July 2006, discussed the Bali Process and considered “situation reports” prepared by various CSCAP member committees. It also produced a draft of CSCAP Memorandum No. 11 on Human Trafficking, which was issued in June 2007.

The Study Group on Regional Peacekeeping and Peace-building
This SG was set up to study peacekeeping and peace-building in the region, including issues of demobilization, post-conflict reconstruction, and support to civil society. It was co-chaired by Canada and Indonesia, and held three meetings. The first, in Bali on 12–13 February 2005, primarily discussed various case studies of peacekeeping and peace building in the region, including in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Cambodia and East Timor. The second, in Vancouver, Canada, on 10–12 March 2006, discussed the UN Peacekeeping Commission, which had been established in September 2005, as well as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The third, in New Delhi on 8–9 December 2006, discussed four main issues: how Asia should engage with the UN Peacekeeping Commission; the proposed ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council; regional capacity building; and the role of civil society in post-conflict reconstruction.

A set of draft recommendations was tabled at the 26th meeting of the Steering Committee in Wellington on 14 December 2006. It included the creation of an Asian association of peacekeeping training centres; the creation of a consultative mechanism within the ARF on peacekeeping and peace building; the development by ASEAN of a Peace-building and Reconstruction Program within the ASEAN
Secretariat; and a plea that discussions about these first three recommendations “be linked to a constant dialogue with regional humanitarian and civilian actors”.

The Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign against International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific

This SG, which was essentially a continuation of the Special Study Group on Terrorism created in December 2001, was co-chaired by Malaysia, New Zealand and Thailand, and held two meetings. The first, in Bangkok in April 2005, discussed the factors driving al-Qaeda, the factors that induce local terrorist groups to cooperate with international terrorist networks, and the factors that induce foreign support for local terrorist groups. The second meeting, in Kuala Lumpur in August 2005, examined the root causes of terrorism and considered measures to effectively address the factors driving international terrorism. It also produced a draft of CSCAP Memorandum No. 10 on Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving International Terrorism, issued in December 2005.

The Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

The establishment of this SG was approved at the 25th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 29 May 2006, but it had a direct lineage to the SG on Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation and the WG on Maritime Cooperation before that. It was co-chaired by Australia, India and Indonesia. The first meeting, which focused on the roles of maritime security forces, was held in Wellington, New Zealand, on 15–16 December 2006. It also finished drafting CSCAP Memorandum No. 12 on Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations of Maritime Security, begun by the SG on Capacity Building in May 2006, and issued in December 2007.

The second meeting of the CSCAP SG on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific was hosted by CSCAP Korea and was held in Seoul on 2–3 April 2008. The primary objective of the meeting was “to develop general principles and guidelines for maritime cooperation in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas”. The meeting produced a paper on “Draft Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia Pacific”, which was adopted by the 29th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008 as CSCAP Memorandum No. 13, Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia Pacific.

The Study Group on Asia-Pacific Cooperation for Energy Security

A Study Group on Asia-Pacific Cooperation for Energy Security was established at the 26th Steering Committee meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, on 14 December 2006. It was co-chaired by India and Singapore, and held four meetings. The first
was held in Singapore on 23–24 April 2007, and examined the perceptions in Asia-Pacific countries about energy security issues. The second meeting, held in Goa, India, on 14–15 September 2007, reviewed the strategies that had been adopted by Asia-Pacific countries to ensure the security of energy supply. The Goa meeting also discussed the development of alternative energy sources and the prospects for an integrated regional energy market. The third meeting was hosted by CSCAP China and held in Beijing on 25–26 March 2008; it discussed the prospects for a common energy market, cooperation in infrastructure security, and prospects for common stockpiling. The fourth meeting of the SG was held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 8–9 July 2008; it produced a Draft CSCAP Memorandum on *Asia-Pacific Cooperation for Energy Security*. The Draft Memorandum was tabled for consideration at the 30th Steering Committee in Bangkok on 22 January 2009, which approved it “in principle” but requested that it be re-formatted to “emphasize policy recommendations” before publication. A selection of the papers prepared for its meetings were revised and published in an edited volume at the beginning of 2010.\(^\text{28}\)

**The Study Group on Oceania**

Three “one-off” SGs were established for specific purposes in 2006–2007. The first of these was the SG on Oceania, which was established at the 26th Steering Committee meeting in Wellington on 14 December 2006, after consideration of a resolution tabled by CSCAP New Zealand. CSCAP New Zealand argued that the current “unrest” in Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Fiji warranted urgent discussion of governance issues in Oceania, which could potentially create instabilities in the wider region. The tabled resolution read:

> In view of the critical situation in some South Pacific states, the Steering Committee asks CSCAP New Zealand to establish a specialized group on governance in the region with the implications for the wider Asia-Pacific region, and to consult CSCAP Australia, CSCAP PNG, CSCAP Thailand and CSCAP Indonesia with a view that such a Study Group meet as soon as possible and to report substantively to the next meeting of the Steering Committee.

The SG was chaired by New Zealand, and met in Wellington on 15–17 April 2007; it discussed a wide range of issues, including good governance, capacity building, natural resource exploitation, poverty, demographic growth, and how to integrate Pacific island nations into broader regional arrangements.

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The Study Group on Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits
The SG on Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the second one-off SG, was established at the 27th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 4 June 2007. It was co-chaired by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and convened its single meeting in Jakarta on 8–9 September 2007. The meeting discussed a wide range of issues, including drug trafficking, illegal fishing, ship-sourced marine pollution, and armed robbery in the Straits. The meeting also discussed how the littoral states would deal with a possible maritime terrorist attack, the activities of private security companies, and current arrangements for information collection and exchange.

A draft memorandum on Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits was produced following the September meeting; it was tabled at the 28th Steering Committee meeting in Jakarta on 6 December 2007, but was never completed.

The Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum
The SG on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum was established at the 27th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 4 June 2007 specifically to organize a one-off meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 30–31 October 2007, which would be held back-to-back with a meeting of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBMs and PD). It was co-chaired by Singapore and the US. The SG produced a “Summary of Key Findings” which was presented to the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD to “help attract the attention of policy-makers”. The “Summary” included the recommendation that “the ARF should consider developing a Vision 2020 Statement that would clarify the ARF’s objectives and provide specific benchmarks for its progress”.

The SG also initiated the drafting of a “Preamble and Statement of Principles for the Charter for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”, completed by the SG on Countering Proliferation of WMD in 2008, for the consideration of the participants of the Six Party Talks.

The Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
The SG on the Security Implications of Climate Change was one of two SGs established at the 28th Steering Committee meeting in Jakarta on 6 December 2007. It was co-chaired by Aus-CSCAP, CSCAP Malaysia and CSCAP Philippines, and convened two meetings. The first meeting, hosted by CSCAP Philippines and held in Manila on 15–16 February 2009, identified the climate change scenarios that were projected to emerge in the Asia Pacific and determined which of them were likely to have serious security implications. The second meeting, in Kuala Lumpur on 30–31 May 2009, discussed the adaptive measures that could be taken to address the security implications. It also produced a Draft Memorandum on the Security Implications of Climate Change, which was tabled for consideration at the 31st meeting of the
Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 2009.

Following the first meeting in Manila, Herman Kraft, as the SG co-chair, was invited to attend the “ARF Seminar on International Security Implications of Climate-related Events and Trends” in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 19–20 March 2009. He used his presentation to inform the ARF representatives about the framework developed and utilized by the SG to assess the likely security implications of the postulated climate change scenarios.

The Study Group on Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific

This SG was established at the 28th meeting of the Steering Committee in Jakarta on 6 December 2007, and is a successor to the SG on Future Prospects for Multilateral Security Frameworks in Northeast Asia (2004–2006) and the WG on the North Pacific. It is co-chaired by CSCAP Japan, CSCAP China and CSCAP Korea, and is tasked with exploring how a de facto multilateral security framework for Northeast Asia could be created from coordinating and linking the efforts of existing institutions in the region. Its first meeting was held in Tokyo on 24–25 February 2009, and discussed several institutional designs for future security multilateralism in Northeast Asia, based on the ongoing Six-Party Talks process. The co-chairs of the SG reported at the 31st Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 1 June 2009 that formulating “concrete policy recommendations” for an inclusive security architecture in Northeast Asia was “not easy”.

The Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific

The SG on Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific was proposed by CSCAP Japan, with the support of CSCAP China and CSCAP India, at the 29th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008, and approved at the next Steering Committee meeting in Bangkok on 22 January 2009. Its purpose is to identify, first, the potential risks and benefits of the enhanced capabilities and capacities of the region’s maritime security forces, and, second, the MCSBMs that could help maximize the benefits and minimize the risks associated with naval modernization. The first meeting was held in Singapore on 25–26 May 2009 and the second is to be held in Auckland in March 2010.

This SG expects to develop policy recommendations for submission to the ARF on three issues of substance: first, transparency issues, including political intent, operational transparency, notification of information, etc; second, conflict prevention mechanisms at sea; and, third, issues concerning navies, ocean governance and management.

The Study Group on the Establishment of Regional Transnational Organized Crime Hubs in the Asia Pacific

At the 28th meeting of the Steering Committee, in Jakarta on 6 December 2007, Aus-CSCAP foreshadowed a plan to submit a proposal to the 29th meeting, to be
CSCAP’s Foundation and Achievements

held in Kuala Lumpur the following June, to establish a Study Group to “examine the factors that had led certain parts of the Asia Pacific to become hubs for regional transnational crime networks”. The proposal was approved at the 29th meeting on 2 June 2008. The SG seeks to “identify the criteria that would help in predicting the emergence of crime hubs”, and also aims “to identify the most effective strategies to prevent and counter the emergence of crime hubs in the Asia Pacific”. It held its first meeting in Bangkok on 30 April – 2 May 2009; the second meeting was held in Phuket, Thailand, on 10–11 October 2009. A third meeting is planned “to analyse the significance of the data and materials gathered from the predictive model in order to provide a clear proposal in the final memorandum”.

The Study Group on the Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations

The establishment of a Study Group on the Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations was approved at the 29th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008, initially with CSCAPs Singapore, Malaysia and Australia as co-chairs, although Vietnam replaced Malaysia with the agreement of the 30th Steering Committee in Bangkok on 22 January 2009. It has a very focused and specialized agenda, and was prompted by recent accidents involving offshore oil and gas installations in Europe and the United States that had consumed considerable resources and had required close cooperation among neighbouring countries, and by the growing risk of such accidents taking place in the Asia Pacific, given the increasing number of offshore oil and gas installations in the region. It is a one-off SG, with its single meeting to be hosted by CSCAP Vietnam.

The aim of the SG is to produce a Draft CSCAP Memorandum that would provide guidelines on the scope for cooperation in the provision of security and safety of offshore installations; contingency arrangements for response and search and rescue following a major disaster involving an offshore installation; a common interpretation of jurisdictional issues relating to offshore installations; and a possible regional position on the disposal of decommissioned installations.

The Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect

The SG on the Responsibility to Protect was established at the 31st Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 1 June 2009. The principle of “the responsibility to protect” had been unanimously adopted by the UN 2005 World Summit and reaffirmed unanimously by the UN Security Council in 2006. The agenda of the SG is to clarify the meaning of the principle in terms of its application to the Asia-Pacific region, and to explore possible mechanisms for its implementation in the region, as well as to examine its implications for key regional institutions, including the ARF. It is co-chaired by Canada, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia; it had an initial “scoping meeting” in Jakarta in November 2009 and plans to have three meetings in 2010–2011, the first of them in Jakarta in February 2010.
The CSCAP General Conferences
At its 18th meeting in Singapore on 9 December 2002, the Steering Committee agreed to change the name of its General Meeting to CSCAP General Conference. Co-chair Barry Desker explained at that meeting that the objective was “to put forth CSCAP views to a larger audience as well as integrate the participation of senior government representatives, academics, civil society members, journalists and businessmen with the work of CSCAP”. Major emphasis was to be placed on the participation of a substantial number of Foreign Ministers and key officials, as well as regional and international experts not normally involved in CSCAP activities. It was agreed that the first one would be held in Jakarta, but called the Fourth CSCAP General Conference, and, indeed, four of these CSCAP General Conferences have now been held in Jakarta. They have been primarily funded by Aus-CSCAP, together with substantial contributions from Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Canada and, more recently, China.

The Fourth CSCAP General Conference, on 7–9 December 2003, was on the Strategic Outlook in the Asia Pacific. It included addresses by H.E. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then the Minister Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs in Indonesia, H.E. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Indonesia, The Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia, H.E. Jose Ramos Horta, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Timor Leste, The Hon. Cedric Foo Chee Keng, Minister of State for Defence in Singapore, and Ichiro Fujisaki, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in Japan, and involved some 230 registered participants.

The Fifth General Conference, on 6–7 December 2005, was on Addressing Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region, and was opened by H.E. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, Minister of Defence in Indonesia. It had sessions on Northeast Asia, for which the keynote speaker was Dr. Kiyohiko Toyama, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Japan; Countering Terrorism, which had keynote speeches by H.E. Datuk Azalina Othman Said, Minister of Youth and Sports in Malaysia, and H.E. Zainal Abidan Rasheed, Minister of State in Singapore; Human Trafficking, with a speech by Ms. Sigma Huda, the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons; and Countering WMD Proliferation, which featured addresses by Alexander Downer from Australia and Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe, the UN Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs. It had more than 250 registered participants. A 39-page report on the Fifth General Conference was published soon after by CSCAP Indonesia.

The Sixth General Conference, on 7–8 December 2007, was on Great Power Relations and Regional Community Building in Pacific Asia. It included addresses by H.E. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Indonesia; H.E. Juwono Sudarsono, Minister for Defence in Indonesia; H.E. Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN Secretary General; H.E. Lee Su-hoon, Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Republic of Korea; Masatoshi Shimbo, Deputy Director General for Foreign Policy Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan; and Ambassador S. T. Devare, Advisor to the Ministry of External Affairs, India. China contributed to the funding of the conference, and the meeting was notable for the active participation of several senior officials as well as scholars from China. Reports on the conference were produced by CSCAP Indonesia, one version for public distribution and another for internal CSCAP purposes.

The Seventh General Conference was held on 16–18 November 2009. It was on New Challenges to Asia-Pacific Security, and covered the evolving regional security architecture, the regional security implications of the global financial crisis, the naval build-up in the Pacific, the tensions in Northeast Asia, and the prospects for arms control and disarmament. Presenters included H.E. Raden M. Marty Muliana Natalegawa, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs in Indonesia; Ambassador Richard Woolcott, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Australia; Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Minister of Defence, Japan; Gareth Evans, co-chair of the International Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Commission; Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and former President of the World Bank; and Ambassador Wu Jianmin, member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

The CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO)
In his review of CSCAP published in October 2000, Desmond Ball had put forward a case for publication by CSCAP of a regular Regional Security Outlook (RSO). He argued that not only was immersion in such a process “the most reliable and effective way for the Steering Committee to adequately stay abreast of regional security concerns” but also that the exercise would be very beneficial to the ARF, which was then struggling to initiate its own Annual Security Outlook (ASO). The proposal was discussed at the 14th Steering Committee meeting in Manila in December 2000, where there was “a general sense that CSCAP was not yet ready to start something like this at this stage”. The Steering Committee agreed that the CSCAP WG on CSBMs should “prepare a sample generic outline for a Regional Security Report which will be presented to the Steering Committee [at some future meeting] for discussion and consideration”, but this was not pursued.

However, the idea of an annual CSCAP publication was resuscitated by co-chair Jusuf Wanandi at the 25th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 29 May 2006. Wanandi was concerned that CSCAP should accord greater effort to making its activities, ideas and recommendations more accessible to the wider public. He argued in Kuala Lumpur that it was extremely important “for CSCAP to reach out to governments, the mass media, the academia, and the public in general”, and that this might best be done “through an annual publication”. He undertook to prepare a “Proposal for the Publication of the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook”, which was tabled for consideration at the 26th Steering Committee meeting in Welling-

ton, New Zealand, on 14 December 2006. The Wellington meeting adopted the proposal, appointed Brian Job from CSCAP Canada to be Editor of the first edition, and appointed Carolina Hernandez from CSCAP Philippines and Tsutomu Kikuchi from CSCAP Japan to serve as Editorial Advisers. The meeting also accepted an “advisory”, at the suggestion of CSCAP China, to “be printed in every edition of the proposed publication”, as follows:

The CSCAP Regional Security Outlook is a product of an editorial board established by CSCAP. While efforts are made to ensure that the views of the CSCAP membership are taken into account, the opinions and facts contained in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors and the editorial committee and do not necessarily reflect those of the member committees of CSCAP or their individual members.

CSCAP China said that it “hoped that the norms of CSCAP would be observed in the proposed publication”.

The Executive Version of the first CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO), titled Security Through Cooperation: Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral Engagement, was printed and circulated at the Sixth CSCAP General Conference in Jakarta on 7–8 December 2007. Brian Job noted in an editorial note at the beginning that the mandate of the CRSO “is to survey the most pressing security issues of today and to provide informed policy-relevant recommendations as to how Track 1 and Track 2, working together, can advance regional multilateral solutions to these issues”. The Executive Version was 40 pages long, and presented summaries of the analyses of the Editor and eight prominent regional experts. The analyses were presented in full in digital form, available through the Internet at CSCAP Canada’s website (www.cscap.ca). Job reminded the Steering Committee at its 28th meeting in Jakarta on 6 December, immediately preceding the General Conference, that “the CRSO had been published under editorial responsibility and thus did not necessarily reflect the views of CSCAP Member Committees”. The Jakarta meeting unanimously agreed to the extension of Job’s tenure as Editor for another one year, to produce the second edition. CSCAP Japan produced a Japanese translation of the first edition for publication in early 2008.

The second edition was published in December 2008. It was 56 pages long, and covered human security and energy security concerns as well as the implications of “military enhancement” in the region and the security dilemmas in Northeast Asia. Brian Job and Erin Williams suggested in the opening chapter that, given the variety of urgent issues, “2008 should be a wake-up call for an Asia-Pacific multilateralism that has grown accustomed to low performance expectations and a leisurely pace of change.”

It can be accessed on the Internet at www.cscap.org. The 30th Steering Committee.

Committee meeting in Bangkok on 22 January 2009 extended Job’s tenure as Editor for a further edition of the CRSO.

The third edition, *CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2009–2010*, was published in November 2009; it is 52 pages long. Brian Job and Erin Williams argue in this edition that “regional multilateral processes and institutions increasingly are failing to respond effectively to the security crises confronting the peoples of Asia”, that “analysts are increasingly skeptical of the prospects for the institutional revitalization of the ARF, ASEAN, and APEC”, and that “the Asia Pacific’s existing regional multilateral institutions, Track 1 and Track 2, will face critical tests of relevance as ad hoc institutional forms assume greater roles and alternative regional architectures are increasingly debated”.

### The Veitch Report and the CSCAP Review, 2008–2009

In May 2008, Jim Veitch, the retiring Non-ASEAN co-chair, produced a nine-page report titled “Comments and Suggestions of the Retiring Non-ASEAN CSCAP Co-Chair”. It was tabled for discussion at the 29th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008 (Annex M of the minutes). The report reviewed recent developments with respect to institutionalization of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF ISG on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBMs and PD), including regular attendance of the CSCAP co-chairs or their representatives at ISG meetings, and attendance of the ISG co-chairs or their representatives at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings, and argued for a closer alignment of the schedules for SG activities, and production of SG reports and CSCAP Memoranda with ISG meetings, as well as the SOMs.

It argued that the CSCAP Secretariat should be upgraded to give it “a greater role than now in collating Study Group reports and in ensuring that SGs do undertake and complete the work that has been agreed and been undertaken”, and “so that CSCAP can develop a more formalized liaison with the ARF Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat”. It also suggested a variety of means for rejuvenating the activities of some of the member committees.

The Veitch report also reflected on the process for electing the Non-ASEAN co-chair. It argued for greater transparency in the process, proposed a grouping of the Non-ASEAN member committees (Group A comprising the United States, Canada, the European Union and Russia; Group B comprising the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia and China; and Group C comprising Australia, New Zealand, India and Papua New Guinea), and proposed an order of appointment for these groupings. It also proposed creation of a position of Deputy Non-ASEAN co-chair, and reduction of the tenure of the Non-ASEAN

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co-chair to one year, which would be preceded by a year in the Deputy position, in order to double the rate of rotation of Non-ASEAN member committees through the co-chair position. It concluded that “CSCAP has a very important future if the quality of the work that is completed under its umbrella can continue to be relevant to the needs of the Asia-Pacific region and can be produced in a timely and forward looking manner,” and suggested that “CSCAP might like to consider commissioning a review of its activities and an assessment of its achievements”, including a “review [of] our present structures and our ways of working so that we can achieve these goals in the near future”.

The Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008 agreed that the CSCAP co-chairs should establish “a Review Committee that would have a limited membership but would be open to views and suggestions from all CSCAP stakeholders”. The Committee had its first meeting in Singapore on 8 October 2008; in addition to the CSCAP co-chairs, Ralph Cossa and Mohamed Jawhar, the meeting also included Jim Veitch, Zhou Xingbao from CSCAP China, Rizal Sukma from CSCAP Indonesia, and Kwa Chong Guan from CSCAP Singapore. The four-page “Summary Notes” of the meeting, prepared by CSCAP Singapore, served as the basis for discussion at the second meeting of the Committee held in Bangkok on 21 January 2009, immediately prior to the 30th Steering Committee meeting. A report was finalized for presentation to the Steering Committee on 22 January, but members of the Steering Committee requested further time to consider its recommendations. A third meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur on 31 May 2009, immediately prior to the 31st Steering Committee meeting, which made some refinements to the report. Its “Summary of Recommendations” was adopted by the 31st Steering Committee meeting on 1 June 2009 (Annex B of the minutes).

The report of the Review Committee was primarily concerned with CSCAP-ARF relations, and ensuring that CSCAP activities and products were aligned with the respective activities and interests of the ARF instruments. It noted that “CSCAP should strive to be more relevant to the ARF”, that the SGs should have more back-to-back meetings with the pertinent ARF meetings, and that “CSCAP should choose subjects also [being] studied by the ARF”, although it also noted that “at the same time, CSCAP should stay ahead of the curve by providing early warning of future threats and security concerns”.

The “Recommendations” adopted at the 31st Steering Committee meeting on 1 June 2009 specifically addressed the CSCAP SG process. Most importantly, they included the provision that “the mandate of CSCAP SGs should be limited to one year or at most 18 months to avoid their self-perpetuation and to encourage faster decision-making”, although “some flexibility could be accorded if they matched the on-going concerns of ARF ISMs”. The report also stressed that “CSCAP Memoranda should be brief, straight to the point and focused on policy recommendations”.

The report of the Review Committee also included an agreement on the process for selection of the Non-ASEAN co-chairs. It accepted the groupings of the member
committees proposed by the Veitch report, and determined a rotation schedule: in 2010, the nominee for the Non-ASEAN o-chair will come from Northeast Asia (Group B); in 2012, the nominee will come from Group C; in 2014, the nominee will come from Group A; and in 2016, the post will revert to Group B.

Young Leaders Programmes

By the early 2000s, as CSCAP approached its first decade, some member committees began to consider ways of introducing the “next generation” of “young leaders” to CSCAP activities, including their involvement in the meetings of the member committees, participation in SG meetings and the CSCAP General Conferences, and attendance as Observers at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings.

The most substantial initiative has been undertaken by the Pacific Forum CSIS, hosts of the Secretariat of the U.S. Member Committee. In 2004, the Pacific Forum CSIS began a Young Leaders Program, designed to educate participants about the practical aspects and complexities of policymaking, generate a greater exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promote cross-cultural interaction and cooperation among young professionals, and lend generational perspectives to dialogues for the benefit of all. The programme invites selected up-and-coming young professionals and post-graduate students up to 35 years of age with relevant backgrounds to participate in Pacific Forum CSIS policy dialogues and conferences in the Asia-Pacific region normally limited to seasoned experts. By September 2009, more than 300 Young Leader participants had attended Asia security-related conference events around the Pacific Rim. They had come from over 22 countries, with over 45 per cent being women.

Members of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program began to attend some SG meetings in 2005. Sixteen members joined the discussions during the sixth meeting of the CSCAP SG on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific in Jakarta on 9–10 December 2007. They also attended the third General Conference in Jakarta on 7–8 December 2007. In June 2009, the US Member Committee included a member of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program in its three-person delegation at the 31st Steering Committee meeting.

In his report as the retiring Non-ASEAN co-chair in May 2008, Jim Veitch noted that the Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program had “attached itself to CSCAP meetings and this has injected a younger perspective and participation into these [Study Group] meetings and the General Conference”. He strongly commended CSCAP USA and the Pacific Forum CSIS “for taking this very important initiative and for securing the financial base for its activities”.

In 2008, Aus-CSCAP received a grant from RLM Pty Ltd, an Australian defence company, to initiate a process to “engage young professionals in policy dialogue in the region and to bring them into contact with established strategic policy professionals”. As part of this process, Aus-CSCAP organized a group of Australian “young leaders”
to attend the CSCAP Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008, as well as to participate in the subsequent ASEAN-ISIS Asia Pacific Roundtable. The group was drawn from a diverse background; it included a journalist from *The Age* newspaper, and staff from the International Red Cross, the Parliamentary Library, and the NSW Police Force, in addition to members of the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The group was able to meet the Malaysian Prime Minister and other senior officials, and to interview selected “major strategic professionals” from the region.

The report of the CSCAP Review Committee adopted by the Steering Committee on 1 June 2009 also enjoined member committees to bring “the next generation of security professionals into the CSCAP process to enable regeneration”.

**CSCAP’s Visibility**

In the last few years, the CSCAP Steering Committee has accorded increasing attention to measures that could improve CSCAP’s “visibility” to a range of external audiences, not just those associated with the ARF process. In addition to promotion of the biennial General Conferences in Jakarta, publication of the annual *Regional Security Outlook*, and encouraging increased participation of younger people in its activities, increased resources have been devoted to the development and maintenance of the CSCAP website (www.cscap.org). The CSCAP website was administered for many years by Aus-CSCAP, having been established in 2001 as a Link to the Aus-CSCAP website. It was agreed at the 28th meeting of the Steering Committee in Jakarta on 6 December 2007 that CSCAP New Zealand would take over the responsibility. It now provides a directly accessible site, with information about CSCAP’s development and purpose, “Latest News”, an Events Calendar, and information about SG activities and CSCAP publications.

The report of the CSCAP Review Committee adopted by the Steering Committee on 1 June 2009 also included the recommendation that CSCAP New Zealand would compile, in a triennial digital publication of *The CSCAP Papers* for uploading on the CSCAP website. The publication should contain some of the best papers produced by the SGs. Each issue is to be limited to 75 pages of text with five papers of no more than 15 pages of text.

The 30th Steering Committee meeting in Bangkok in January 2009, during its discussion of the draft CSCAP Review, agreed on the desirability of a CSCAP Brochure, and invited Aus-CSCAP and CSCAP Singapore to prepare a “mock-up”; it was approved for publication at the 32nd meeting in Jakarta in November 2009.
Table 2.6
Working Group/Study Group meetings

*Working Group on CSBMs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. October 1994</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Discussed a wide range of CSBMs and their acceptability or applicability in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia-Pacific region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 16–17 May 1995</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Produced draft of CSCAP Memorandum No. 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. October 1995</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Discussed various CSBMs, especially with respect to proliferation, weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>modernization and transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. April 1996</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Discussed three main subjects: Defence White Papers; the UN Arms Register; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nuclear safety and non-proliferation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. October 1996</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Discussed three main subjects: the UN Arms Register; nuclear safety and non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>proliferation; and preventive diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 30–31 October 1997</td>
<td>Fukushima, Japan</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 7–9 May 1998</td>
<td>Washington, D.C., and</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albuquerque, New Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 12–13 December 1998</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 28 February – 2</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 25–27 May 1999</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 3–5 April 2000</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 21–23 May 2001</td>
<td>Misawa, Japan</td>
<td>Reviewed and updated the CSCAP Asia-Pacific Nuclear Energy Transparency website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 27–29 June 2001</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Joint meeting with WG on the North Pacific: Discussed developments in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Peninsula; regional perspectives on missile defence systems; and alliance,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strategic partnerships and cooperative security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>29–31 October 2001</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>24–28 April 2002</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>25 March 2003</td>
<td>Vientiane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>11–12 August 2003</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>10–11 December 2003</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>25–28 May 2004</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Working Group on Maritime Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. 24–25 August 1999</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>Objectives and principles of good oceans governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. 6–9 November 1999 Wollongong | Joint meeting with the WG on Transnational Crime: maritime crime and law and order at sea.

8. 25–26 July 2000 Manila | Reviewed current initiatives for regional security cooperation and finalized the draft CSCAP Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea.

9. 19–21 November 2000 Beijing | Discussed maritime security and regional maritime cooperation and confidence building in Northeast Asia; existing cooperation management regimes in the Yellow Sea, East Sea/Sea of Japan and East China Sea; the situation of the countries that are either geographically disadvantage or landlocked; and common understanding of the Law of the Sea and state practice in the Asia Pacific.

10. 31 May – 1 June 2001 Kuala Lumpur | Discussed maritime security developments in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia; major problem areas including the regime of the islands, the use of territorial sea straight-line baselines, freedom of navigation and overflight in EEZs; and the implementation of UNCLOS Article 43.

11. 18–19 February 2002 Seoul | Prepared a Draft CSCAP Memorandum on the Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific; issued a statement against maritime terrorism.

12. 9–11 December 2002 Singapore | Joint meeting with WG on CSBMs: Explored issues of maritime confidence building and preventive diplomacy.

13. 6–7 September 2003 Manila | Joint meeting with PECC: maritime cooperation and measures to ensure the security of shipping and seaborne trade.

14. 26–27 May 2004 Hanoi | Discussed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI); bilateral exercises between the U.S. and other Asia-Pacific countries; cooperation between Japanese and Southeast Asian coast guards. Joint meeting with WG on CSBMs: discussed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
**Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. 15–16 September 1997</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Environmental security, food security and energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1–2 April 2001</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>Analysed national and regional perspectives on human security concerns and discussed the challenges and threats to human security in the Asia Pacific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 29–30 October 2001</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Economic security in light of changes brought about by globalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 4–5 February 2002</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Discussed domestic and international terrorism; patterns, incidence, causes and trends of terrorism; impact of 9/11 on regional politics and security; and Islam-West relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. April 2003</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>Examined the underlying factors that contribute to terrorism; and counterterrorism issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. March 2004</td>
<td>Suzhou</td>
<td>The meeting was themed: “A Changing World after the Iraq War: Its Political and Security Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Working Group on the North Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Co-chaired by Canada and Japan</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. April 1995</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Frameworks for stability on the Korean Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 31 January – 2 February 1997</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Discussed four main topics: current dialogue mechanisms in Northeast Asia; the relevance of institution-building in Southeast Asia for Northeast Asia; the connection between economic and security cooperation; and possible CSBMs suitable for Northeast Asia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 15–16 December 1997</td>
<td>Makuhari, Japan</td>
<td>Discussed four main issues: recent developments in Northeast Asia (and particularly the bilateral summit meetings); border CSBMs in Northeast Asia; institutional arrangements for economic security cooperation in Northeast Asia (particularly KEDO); and the role of the ARF in Northeast Asia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 8–10 November 1998</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Four topics were discussed: the security implications of the regional economic crisis, particularly for North Pacific states; the significance of recent increased bilateral, trilateral and multilateral relations among the major powers of Northeast Asia; the evolving circumstances in the Korean Peninsula; and the proliferation of weapons and the effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes with regard to Northeast Asia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 27–28 September 1999</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Discussed four topics: the implications of the changes in major-power relations in Northeast Asia; the Korean Peninsula; proliferation and counter-proliferation in the North Pacific; and economic cooperation and regional governance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 15–17 June 2000</td>
<td>Ulaanbaatar</td>
<td>Developments in the Korean Peninsula; the energy situation; and developments in Northeast Asia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 9–10 December 2000</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Discussed recent developments in the Korean Peninsula and their implications for the security of the entire Asia Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 27–29 June 2001</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Joint meeting with WG on CSBMs: Discussed developments in the Korean Peninsula; regional perspectives on missile defence systems; and alliance, strategic partnerships and cooperative security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 10–12 March 2002</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Focused on the 9/11 attacks and its impact on the region, including the potential for improved relations among the major powers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Working Group on Transnational Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subjects/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25–26 March 1997</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Developed a list of 19 types of transnational crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–11 October 1997</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Revised list of ‘crime types’ relevant to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region: arms trafficking; drug production; international corporate/white collar crime; smuggling of nuclear materials; counterfeiting; illegal immigration; money laundering; and technology crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23–24 May 1998</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Discussed the impact of transnational crime on regional security; drug trafficking; money laundering; weapons smuggling; terrorism; illegal immigration; and technology crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–13 October 1998</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>The major topics discussed were the illicit trafficking in firearms throughout the Asia-Pacific region; the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs in the region; and the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the development of transnational crime in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–9 November 1999</td>
<td>Wollongong</td>
<td>Joint meeting with the WG on Maritime Cooperation. Two themes: trafficking in humans; and maritime crime and law and order at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May – 1 June 2000</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Identity fraud (including cybercrime), and law-enforcement cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16–18 October 2000</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Discussed law-enforcement cooperation in the region; cybercrime; identity document fraud; and synthetic drug production and trafficking in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–9 May 2001</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Discussed the role of police in peacekeeping; role of CrimTrac; cybercrime; document and identity fraud especially in relation to illegal movement of people; and MLA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–10 November 2001</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Discussed criminal links with terrorism, terrorist funding networks and arms trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–14 May 2002</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Discussed law enforcement and regional cooperation with particular emphasis on transnational crime and terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17–19 November 2002</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Drafted the CSCAP Memorandum on the Relationship between Terrorism and Transnational Crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27–28 June 2003</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Stocktaking and discussed plans for future work of the Study Group; Initiated studies on arms trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–5 December 2003</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Discussed arms trafficking; attributes of failed and failing states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Study Group on Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 7–8 December 2004</td>
<td>Kunming</td>
<td>Examined capacity building in three dimensions, namely institutional frameworks, legal frameworks and resources with reference to national, bilateral and multilateral levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 6–7 April 2005</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>Concentrated on four areas, namely, the creation of maritime awareness, consideration of legal frameworks relevant to maritime cooperation, regional cooperation in the context of maritime forces and consideration of mechanisms to facilitate regional cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2–3 December 2005</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Discussed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and maritime awareness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 27–28 May 2006</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Discussed the final output of the Study Group, including a CSCAP Memorandum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Study Group on Human Trafficking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2–3 April 2005</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Established working groups on eight areas: strategies to combat human trafficking; legislation; regional arrangements; intelligence exchanges and national coordination; victim support; public awareness; case studies; and crime-type convergence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 28–29 August 2005</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Held discussion sessions on, among others, legislation to combat human trafficking, regional arrangements and cooperation, capacity building, and victim support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 8–9 July 2006</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Discussed the Bali Process; the situation in the Pacific Islands; consideration of situation reports from various CSCAP member countries; drafted the CSCAP Memorandum on Human Trafficking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia-Pacific Region**

Co-chaired by Malaysia, New Zealand and Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 26–27 April 2005</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Discussed the factors driving al Qaeda, the factors that induce local terrorist groups to cooperate with international terrorist networks, and the factors that induce foreign support for local terrorist groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 9–10 August 2005</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Examined the root causes of terrorism and measures to effectively address the factors driving international terrorism; drafted the CSCAP Memorandum on Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving International Terrorism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Study Group on the Future Prospects for Multilateral Security Frameworks in Northeast Asia**

Co-chaired by China, Japan, South Korea and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 29–30 April 2005</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Discussed the current situation in Northeast Asia, the Six Party Talks, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 11–12 November 2005</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Discussed the security situation in Northeast Asia, the Six Party Talks, theoretical framework, approaches and mechanisms for multilateral security cooperation, non-traditional security threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 28–29 April 2006</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Continued discussion of the security situation in Northeast Asia and tasks for multilateral security cooperation; theoretical framework, approaches and mechanisms for multilateral security cooperation, the Six Party Talks and multilateral security cooperation; and non-traditional security threats and multilateral security cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 23–24 October 2006</td>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>Developed the Study Group’s recommendations and discussed, among others, the situation in the Korean Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Study Group on Regional Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12–13 February 2005</td>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>Examined case studies on the PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Cambodia; discussed the UN and changing forms of conflict resolution; the future of peacekeeping and peace-building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–12 March 2006</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Discussed the UN Peacebuilding Commission; an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities between the UN and regional organizations; the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM); national approaches to peace operations; and regional capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–9 December 2006</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>Discussed how global and regional peacekeeping mechanisms can be coordinated; the role of non-governmental organizations in post-conflict reconstruction; ASEAN and post-conflict reconstruction; regional peacekeeping centres and the development of a regional policy and research agenda; developed the Study Group’s recommendations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–16 December 2006</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>Discussed the role of maritime security forces (i.e., navies, coast guards, marine police, etc) and identified ways and means of enhancing cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–3 April 2008</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Developed general principles and guidelines for maritime cooperation in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Study Group on Asia-Pacific Cooperation for Energy Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23–24 April 2007</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Examined how Asia-Pacific countries perceived energy security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14–15 September 2007</td>
<td>Goa, India</td>
<td>Reviewed strategies adopted by Asia-Pacific countries to ensure the security of energy supply; the development of alternative energy sources; the prospects for an integrated regional energy market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–26 March 2008</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Discussed the energy policies of various countries, the prospects for a common energy market, cooperation in infrastructure security, and prospects for common stockpiling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## One-off Study Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Study Group</th>
<th>Chair(s)</th>
<th>Place and date</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Wellington, 15–17 April 2007</td>
<td>Discussed a wide range of issues, including good governance, capacity building, natural resource exploitation, poverty, demographic growth, and how to integrate Pacific island nations into broader regional arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits</td>
<td>Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore</td>
<td>Jakarta, 8–9 September 2007</td>
<td>Trafficking, illegal fishing, ship-sourced marine pollution, armed robbery and the risks of maritime terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>Singapore and the United States</td>
<td>Bandar Seri Begawan, 30–31 October 2007</td>
<td>PD and the ARF; the relationship between PD and confidence building; examined several case studies in PD; formulated recommendations on reinvigorating the ARF process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-chaired by Singapore and the United States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2–3 December 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. 26–27 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. 12–13 February 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. 9–10 December 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. 25–26 May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. 23–24 January 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. 28–30 June 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. 6–8 December 2009</td>
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### Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–16 Feb 2009</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Identified projected climate change scenarios and determined the likely security implications.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Study Group on Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
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### Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25–26 May 2009</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Identified the potential risks and benefits of enhanced naval capabilities in the Asia Pacific.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Study Group on the Establishment of Regional Transnational Organized Crime Hubs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr – 2 May 2009</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Examined the factors that lead certain parts of the Asia Pacific to become hubs of organized crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–11 Oct 2009</td>
<td>Phuket</td>
<td>Identified criteria for predicting the emergence of crime hubs, and identified the most effective counter strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most straightforward measure for the achievements of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is its utility to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—although it is not easy to measure, and it is not CSCAP’s only objective. As Jusuf Wanandi argued in June 1994, “The main challenge for CSCAP is whether its work will be relevant to the ARF.” And as the Planning Group of the CSCAP Steering Committee reported in June 1996, “CSCAP’s utility ... will largely hinge on the relationship between CSCAP and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).”

As soon as the moves to set up the ARF began, CSCAP’s pro-tem members were considering ways and means of forging a special working relationship with it. The members of the ASEAN-ISIS group were important players at this juncture. The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) was registered with ASEAN, the core of the incipient ARF process, and since 1991 had provided support to the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), and the ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) in terms of both the generation of ideas, and the provision of research and studies on regional security issues. Wanandi, who was foundation co-chair of CSCAP and who was one of the principal proponents of both the establishment of the ASEAN PMC SOMs and the notion of using the PMC as a regional security forum, was one of the most articulate advocates of close linkages with the ARF process.

CSCAP Memorandum No. 1 on The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region was prepared by the CSCAP Pro-Tem Steering Committee and submitted to the first ARF SOMs in April 1994 for consideration prior to the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 1994. These officials’ and Ministerial meetings in 1994 were of historical


2 See, for example, ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth Asean Summit, 4 June 1991.
importance, but they were mainly taken up by protocol and organizational matters, with little discussion of substantive security issues. CSCAP’s memorandum and other specially prepared material on security and confidence building in the region, including an Australian paper on practical proposals for security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, were given only perfunctory consideration.

The ARF’s agenda was essentially set by the Concept Paper endorsed at the second ARF meeting in Brunei in August 1995, which articulated the three-stage programme (confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution) and the catalogue of CSBMs for possible implementation in the short and longer-term time frames. It stated that:

Given the delicate nature of many of the subjects being considered by the ARF, there is merit in moving the ARF process along two tracks. Track 1 activities will be carried out by ARF governments. Track 2 activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-government organizations in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. The synergy between the two tracks would contribute greatly to confidence-building measures in the region. Over time, the Track 2 activities should result in the creation of a sense of community among participants of those activities.

The CSCAP Steering Committee discussed the Concept Paper at their third meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995, and noted that “all CSCAP work should be tailored” to provide “input and expertise” to the ARF.

In July 1996, at their 29th annual meeting (in Jakarta), the ASEAN Foreign Ministers reviewed the development of the ARF over the previous couple of years, and their joint communiqué stated:

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress made thus far through Track 1 as well as Track 2 activities, in promoting confidence-building measures among its [i.e. the ARF’s] participants.

The foreign ministers noted with satisfaction the closer cooperative relations between ASEAN and non-governmental bodies such as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). They

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also noted that these bodies had continued to provide ASEAN with useful ideas and proposals with regard to political and security cooperation in the region.\footnote{29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 20–21 July 1996, \textit{Joint Communiqué}, paragraphs \textit{6–7}.}

CSCAP’s desire to forge a close working relationship with the ARF affected most aspects of its development during its formative phase. By 1995, the outstanding problem constraining the ARF relationship was the inconformity of their memberships, and particularly China’s absence from CSCAP. As the Steering Committee meeting in Honolulu in December 1995 was informed: “China’s membership in CSCAP is vital given the fact that the PRC has insisted that all second track activities recognized by the ARF should have the participation of all ARF members.”

From around 1997, most of the direct support to the ARF came from the Working Group (WG) on CSBMs and the WG on Maritime Cooperation. The former’s project on Preventive Diplomacy has been the model in this respect. When the project was initiated in 1996–1997, it was carefully designed to explore possible ways for the ARF to move into the subject. Officials from the ARF’s ISG on Confidence Building were invited to the WG’s meeting in May 1997.

In September 1997, CSCAP organized the third ARF Track Two Conference on Preventive Diplomacy, the purpose of which was “to identify possible concrete measures which could be adopted to move the ARF process to Stage Two”. Its most important proposal was that “the ARF SOM be asked to consider a preventive diplomacy role for the ARF Chair to provide good offices in certain circumstances”.

The exemplary initiative was the organization of the tenth meeting of the group in Bangkok, on 28 February–2 March 1999, immediately prior to the meeting of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building on 3–5 March 1999, most of the members of which also attended the CSCAP meeting. This provided the officials with a superb opportunity to participate in a lively and informal discussion of a dozen possible preventive diplomacy measures—including enhancing the “good offices” role of the ARF Chair, establishing a register of experts or eminent persons, producing an annual Regional Security Outlook, etc. The most memorable achievement of this WG meeting, however, was the agreement which was reached on a working definition of preventive diplomacy, and an accompanying list of “key principles”, which were then forwarded to the ensuing ISG meeting.\footnote{Desmond Ball, “Introduction: Towards Better Understanding of Preventive Diplomacy” in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (Eds.), \textit{The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region}, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999), pp. 8–9.} A report by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted in June 1999 that:

The CSCAP meeting on preventive diplomacy held immediately before the
ISG was successful in developing a set of draft principles. This is a useful and helpful document, which will no doubt form the basis of the ARF’s work in this area in the next year.7

In July 2000, at the ARF-7 meeting in Bangkok, Thai Foreign Minister Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (the ARF Chair) reported on “the implementation of the enhanced role of the ARF Chair as an excellent example of progress in the interaction between the ARF and CSCAP”8

The WG on Maritime Cooperation also contributed substantially to the ARF process. About a third of the measures in the Concept Paper’s Annexes A and B involve maritime matters, providing the group with a rich pasture to explore. Several of these subjects were addressed in the first meetings of the group, such as maritime safety, marine pollution, search and rescue, and joint marine scientific research. CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation, produced by the group in 1997, incorporated the proposal in Annex B for “a multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents” in the region.

The WG on Maritime Cooperation was given some tasks by the ARF Track Two Conference on Preventive Diplomacy in Singapore in September 1997. According to the co-chairman’s Report:

The meeting was briefed on the nature of Map Exercises. They were defined as simulation exercises designed to enhance multilateral understanding and co-operative measures to foster comprehensive security … The meeting discussed the terms “Freedom of Navigation” and “Navigational Rights”, and the possibility of an ARF declaration on the latter as a CBM. Given the diversity of views, it was recommended that the issues raised be discussed in the CSCAP WG on Maritime Security …

The co-chairs agreed to forward the following proposals to the current co-chairs of CSCAP (Malaysia and Japan) with the suggestion that CSCAP explore further:

- The utility and feasibility of Map (Simulation) Exercises.
- The issues raised in the paper on Freedom of Navigation.

The Meeting endorsed the view that close cooperation be enhanced between CSCAP and ARF.9

The ARF ISG on CBMs also found the work of the WG on Maritime Coopera-

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7 “ARF Makes Progress on Confidence Building Measures”, Peace and Disarmament News (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra), June 1999, p. 15.
8 Letter from Nitya Pidulsonggram, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to CSCAP Chairs, 11 July 2000.
9 See the Co-chairman’s Statement on the Singapore meeting, in Ball and Acharya (Eds.), The Next Stage, pp. 289–291.
tion to be quite useful. For example, “CSCAP’s maritime cooperation guidelines” were commended by the ISG at its meeting in Bangkok in March 1999.10

The Bangkok ISG meeting also considered the relationship between the ARF process and second track organizations such as CSCAP. A proposal for a formal link was not accepted, but the meeting agreed to the promotion of informal links.11

Although they were informal, linkages were established, which were quite structured, regularized and even institutionalized. Much of the initiative for that process came from Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, who was Chairman of the ARF from July 1999 to July 2000. In January 2000, the then Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry, Saroj Chavanaviraj, wrote to the co-chairs of CSCAP (Carolina Hernandez and Han Sung-Joo) to explore “ways and means to enhance interaction between the ARF and CSCAP”:

Following the Meeting of the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMs), which Thailand co-chaired with the United States in March 1999, there has been general agreement among ARF participants concerning the value of enhancing interaction between Track 1 and Track 2. Specifically, the sixth ARF Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on 26 July 1999 endorsed the proposal on an enhanced role for the ARF Chairman in interaction between Track 1 and Track 2 ...

As CSCAP is one of the most active Track 2 fora with extensive activities related to regional security matters of interest to the ARF, we feel that it would be beneficial to forge greater interaction between the ARF and CSCAP, although any such link would have to remain informal and inclusive so as not to compromise the integrity and independence of CSCAP nor exclude the ARF from working with other Track 2 fora ...

Indeed, CSCAP’s work has gained increased appreciation from the ARF. Several ARF countries ... dispatch officials to participate, in their private capacity, in the various CSCAP meetings. In particular, we value CSCAP’s contribution regarding preventive diplomacy with the convening by the CSCAP WG on CSBMs of the CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy on 28 February– 2 March 1999 in Bangkok ... CSCAP is planning another Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in conjunction with the next ISG on CBMs in April 2000 in Singapore. These are certainly good examples of how to further promote interface between Track 1 and Track 2.

To further promote the interaction, ... it would be a useful first step for CSCAP to transmit to the ARF Chair through you as co-chair of the CSCAP Steering Committee the results and recommendations of its various meetings.12

11 Ibid.
12 Letter from Saroj Chavanaviraj, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to CSCAP Co-chairs, 28 January 2000.
In June 2000, following discussion of the matter at the Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the co-chairs (Carolina Hernandez and Desmond Ball) informed the Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry, now Nitya Pibulsonggram, that:

The CSCAP Steering Committee wishes to seize this opportunity by:
- encouraging its WGs to submit the outcome of their deliberations on key issues affecting regional security to the ARF Chairs;
- generating policy studies and recommendations on security issues relevant to areas of primary concern to the ARF as well as those which CSCAP believes the ARF should take into serious consideration;
- developing policy memoranda on these issues for transmittal to the ARF Chair; and
- exploring ways by which these policy inputs may be more effectively fed into the ARF processes.13

In subsequent correspondence and “informal meetings”, several possible measures were discussed, including periodic briefings of designated ARF senior officials by CSCAP officers and attendance of ARF senior officials at CSCAP meetings; periodic briefings of CSCAP officers by ARF senior officials; attendance of CSCAP Working Group co-chairs at relevant ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings; the coordination of CSCAP WG and ARF-ISG meetings; and the tasking of CSCAP WGs by the ARF to research particular cooperative measures, such as Preventive Diplomacy and measures to combat transnational crime.

At the seventh ARF meeting in Bangkok on 27 July 2000, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, who chaired the meeting, tabled a “CSCAP List of Proposals on Enhancing Interaction between Track 1 and Track 2”. The Ministers noted “the contribution of non-ARF Track 2 activities, particularly the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)”, “welcomed the informal contact that had been established between the ARF and CSCAP through the ARF Chair”, and agreed that the ARF Chair should further develop the linkages with CSCAP.14

A CSCAP Initiative: Reviewing the Future of the ARF
The monograph on CSCAP published by Desmond Ball in October 2000, which was tabled for discussion at the 14th Steering Committee meeting in Manila on 11 December 2000, devoted extensive sections to description and analysis of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. It proposed that CSCAP should initiate a review of the ARF’s working agenda. It argued that:

13 Letter from CSCAP Co-chairs to Nitya Pibulsonggram, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 12 June 2000.
CSCAP should not wait to be invited by the ARF before it undertakes work which might be beneficial to the ARF process. A useful initiative would be to review the Concept Paper and its role in the ARF’s agenda, and to develop a draft concept paper which might guide the ARF process over the next decade.

Since its endorsement by the ARF Foreign Ministers at the ARF-2 meeting in Brunei in August 1995, the Concept Paper has become a principal yardstick for measuring and assessing the progress of the ARF—and hence of the multilateral security process in the Asia-Pacific region more gener ally. It should be regenerated.\textsuperscript{15}

It also argued that “without an ability to measure progress, to take stock and to develop new initiatives, the process will succumb to inefficiency and irrelevance”.\textsuperscript{16}

The possibility of CSCAP preparing a new draft Concept Paper for the ARF was discussed at length at the 14th Steering Committee meeting, which authorized the CSCAP co-chairs to “consult with the ARF Chair as to whether they would CSCAP to do this and on the mechanisms to proceed”. These consultations were generally positive, and at its first meeting in Canberra in December 2001, immediately prior to the 16th Steering Committee meeting, the reactivated Planning Committee decided “to recommend to the Steering Committee that a paper on [the future of the ARF] be prepared by the Planning Committee”. The paper was “to be formalized in time for the next ARF-SOM meeting”. The recommendation was adopted by the 16th Steering Committee meeting.

\textbf{CSCAP Co-chairs’ “Statement on the Future of the ARF into the twenty-first century”, May 2002}\n
A drafting meeting, chaired by the CSCAP co-chairs, was held in Kuala Lumpur on 24–26 March 2002. It produced a draft “Statement on the Future of the ARF into the twenty-first century”, which was circulated via e-mail by CSCAP Singapore to members for comments and amendments. Some member committees consulted with their Foreign Ministries and provided a range of further comments and proposals. The final document was sent electronically to Brunei on 14 May 2002 for consideration by the ARF SOM on 16 May 2002. It was submitted as a “Statement” by the CSCAP co-chairs, Desmond Ball and Barry Desker, as time had not permitted its consideration by a plenary meeting of the Steering Committee, although it reflected


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p. 54.
“the CSCAP Co-chairs’ sense of the March meeting and subsequent contributions with respect to where the ARF might head in the future”.

The co-chairs’ six-page “Statement on the Future of the ARF into the twenty-first century” contained six policy “menus” designed “to energize” the ARF. The six “menus” were: augment CSBMs; deepen preventive diplomacy; institutionalize and strengthen ARF processes and functions; enhance defence participation; explore transnational/asymmetric security issues; and strengthen linkages between Tracks 1 and 2.

With respect to the linkages between Tracks 1 and 2, the “Statement” noted that:

The second track process facilitates the first track. It provides a robust mechanism for developing new conceptual capital, as the second track networks contain an enormous pool of talents which can be utilized to promote regional security cooperation. However, the contribution which the second track can make to the first track is determined very much by the effectiveness and efficiency of the linkages between them. The first track should provide clear guidelines regarding its preoccupations with which it would welcome new approaches and thinking on. Analysts on the second track must be better acquainted with real-world issues as defined by policymakers. However, Track 1 must be receptive to the work of Track 2 and consider how new theoretical work could provide breakthroughs. This will involve a change of attitude in many official establishments. In this regard, CSCAP should be officially recognized as a Track 2 body to support the ARF.

The “Statement” concluded:

Any serious effort to make the ARF a relevant institution for the early twenty-first century must look beyond its current incarnation as a forum only for the exchange of views. This minimalist framework has served the Forum reasonably well in the past. However, in the wake of the difficulties that have troubled the region, the existing framework has been shown to be deficient. Continuing in the same mode would likely undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the Forum. A more robust institutionalization is needed where problem-solving and measures to prevent and possibly resolve conflicts and disputes are a reality rather than an, abstract ideals. To be sure, evolutionary change, is necessarily incremental, but evolve the Forum should. Indeed it must.

The “Statement” was noted at the SOM in Brunei, which “agreed to develop linkages with CSCAP as a Track 2 mechanism”.17 The various “menus” for “energizing”

17 “Minutes of the 17th Meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee, Kuala Lumpur, 6 June 2002”, item 3.2.1.
the ARF were further articulated by Barry Desker in several publications over the ensuing couple of years. Desker’s perseverance with the subject, beyond his tenure as CSCAP co-chair, deserves much of the credit for the gradual implementation of the “menus”, to lesser and greater extents, over the next several years.

Regularization of the CSCAP-ARF Relationship

The Planning Committee, at its meeting in Jakarta immediately prior to the 24th Steering Committee meeting on 5 December 2005, resolved that “CSCAP should intensify its efforts to engage with the First Track”, and, in particular, that a close relationship should be instituted between the new CSCAP Study Groups (SGs) and the ARF process. Jusuf Wanandi, who had returned for a second term as the ASEAN co-chair (2005–2007), took the lead on this matter at this stage. By 2009, the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF ISG on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF ISG on CBMs and PD) had been regularized. Procedures had been refined for the timely transmission of SG reports to the ISG meetings as well as the SOMs, arrangements had been emplaced for reciprocal attendances by CSCAP co-chairs or their representatives at ISG meetings and by the co-chairs of the ARF ISG at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings. More frequent back-to-back meetings were being organized between the CSCAP SGs and the ISG. Arrangements had also been instituted for regular attendance of the CSCAP co-chairs at the ARF SOMs.

Important elements in this process can be credited to Kusuma Snitwongse, who had served as the ASEAN co-chair in 2003–2005, and her CSCAP Thailand colleagues, who had in 2005–2006 worked closely with the Thai Foreign Ministry on possible ways and means of strengthening the links between Track 1 and Track 2. In May 2006, Thailand presented a Concept Paper on “Enhancing Ties between Track I and Track II in the ARF, and between the ARF and Other Regional and International Security Organizations” to the ARF SOM held in Karambunai, in Sabah, Malaysia. It included specific measures for enhancing linkages between CSCAP and the ARF. The Karambunai SOM endorsed the Thai paper for consideration at the 13th ARF Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 28 July 2006. The ministers “welcomed” the Concept Paper and “entrusted the relevant ARF bodies to proceed in accordance with the guidelines and format contained therein.”¹⁸ They suggested that the CSCAP co-chairs should be invited to present a report on CSCAP activities to a forthcoming meeting of the ISG on CBMs and PD scheduled to be held in Helsinki, Finland, in early 2007. According to a participant in the Karambunai SOM who later briefed the CSCAP Steering Committee, “the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD was the logical point of entry for a productive interaction between CSCAP and the ARF to take place”.

Some of the new SGs, and most particularly the SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific, were already forging their own direct links with ARF ISG on CBMs and PD, most importantly through the organization of back-to-back meetings. The third meeting of the SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD, in Singapore on 26–27 March 2006, was held immediately prior to an ARF Seminar on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Representatives from 12 ARF countries attended the SG meeting. The SG was “strongly encouraged by representatives of ARF participants to continue having SG meetings back-to-back with ARF seminars”.

In 2006, ARF representatives invited CSCAP to organize a one-off meeting on “Best Practices in Preventive Diplomacy”. A CSCAP SG, co-chaired by U.S. CSCAP and CSCAP Singapore, was established at the 26th meeting of the Steering Committee in Wellington on 14 December 2006 for this purpose. The SG organized a back-to-back meeting with the ISG on CBMs and PD held in Bandar Seri Begawan on 30–31 October 2007, at which the SG presented a “Summary of Key Findings”. It included the recommendation that “the ARF should consider developing a Vision 2020 Statement that would clarify the ARF’s objectives and provide specific benchmarks for its progress”. Following the Bandar Seri Begawan ISG meeting, the ARF Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat commissioned Pacific Forum CSIS and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) to produce a report on preventive diplomacy for the consideration of the ARF. The report, entitled “Joint Study on Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Preventive Diplomacy”, was presented at the meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD in Ottawa, Canada, on 2–4 April 2008.

On 28–29 March 2007, on behalf of the CSCAP Steering Committee, Jim Veitch and Carolina Hernandez (representing Jusuf Wanandi) attended the meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD in Helsinki. In addition to presenting their report on CSCAP activities, they were permitted to attend the whole ISG meeting, perhaps because of the great distances they had travelled. They later reported to the Steering Committee that they “had been well received” and that “several participants of the ISG meeting had expressed support for closer cooperation between CSCAP and the ISG, especially on issues such as peacekeeping, maritime security and drug trafficking”. Peter Cozens (representing Jim Veitch) and Mohamed Jawhar attended the next meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD, held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 1 November 2007. Kwa Chong Guan and Ralph Cossa represented the CSCAP co-chairs at the following meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD in Ottawa on 2–4 April 2008. They reported that “many officials who attended the ISG meeting had expressed support for greater interaction between the ARF and CSCAP, particularly in examining issues such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, disaster relief, non-proliferation and disarmament, maritime security, and peace-keeping”. Both CSCAP co-chairs, Mohamed Jawhar and Ralph Cossa, attended the meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD in Singapore on 9 October 2008, at which they submitted a report on recent CSCAP memoranda as well as the activities
of the various SGs. Both CSCAP co-chairs also attended the meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD in Seoul on 19–22 April 2009.

Reciprocally, there is now regular attendance of the co-chairs of the ARF ISG or their representatives at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings. Two representatives of the ISG co-chairs, Pengiran Datin Masrainah of Brunei Darussalam and Weldon Epp of Canada, attended the 28th Steering Committee meeting in Jakarta on 6 December 2007. They briefed the CSCAP Steering Committee on the activities of the ISG and presented the results of the ISG meeting that had been held in Brunei Darussalam in November 2007. They also attended the sixth CSCAP General Conference in Jakarta on 7–8 December 2007. At the 29th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008, the co-chairs of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD were again represented by Pengiran Masrainah, who briefed the Steering Committee on the results of the recent ISG meeting in Ottawa. She also reported that ARF participants were interested in promoting “greater interaction between Track 1 and Track 2”.

In early 2009, the CSCAP co-chairs received an invitation to attend and present a report to the next meeting of the ARF SOM. It was held in Phuket, Thailand, on 19–20 May 2009, and was attended by Mohamed Jawhar as CSCAP co-chair, Carolina Hernandez, on behalf of ASEAN-ISIS, and Kusuma Snitwongse, on behalf of CSCAP Thailand; they stayed for the entire duration of the meeting.

The CSCAP Review, 2008–2009
The Veitch report in May 2008 (“Comments and Suggestions of the Retiring Non-ASEAN CSCAP co-chair, 2006–2008”), described in the previous chapter, discussed the recent developments with respect to the linkages between CSCAP and the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD, and put forward a variety of suggestions for not only strengthening these but also for developing closer relations with the ARF SOM and the ARF Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat. The Veitch report led to the establishment of the CSCAP Review Committee at the 29th meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur on 2 June 2008. The final report of the Review Committee, produced at its third meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 31 May 2009, and adopted at the 31st Steering Committee meeting on 1 June 2009, comprised a “Summary of Recommendations”, the first part of which was devoted to the CSCAP-ARF relationship. It included proposals for instituting arrangements with the ARF-ISM process similar to those that are now obtained with respect to the ISG on CBMs and PD, and for extending the relationship to the ARF Ministerial Meeting itself. It recommended that:

- CSCAP should strive to attend all ARF-ISG meetings to which it is invited with the overall objective of increasing CSCAP’s profile and contribution in the meetings by offering policy recommendations for Track 1 works.
- CSCAP SGs should be held, as far as possible, back-to-back with ARF-ISG meetings to better disseminate CSCAP research to the ARF, e.g. in maritime cooperation and preventive diplomacy.
CSCAP should respond to ARF interests and concerns where it has resources to contribute and where it can add value. At the same time, CSCAP should try to look over the horizon to provide early warning of future threats and security concerns.

CSCAP should seek representation at the ARF itself, following up on the achievement of representation at the ARF SOM.

Attempts should be made to enable co-chairs of the various CSCAP SGs to attend the ISM meetings.

CSCAP should consider holding joint meetings with the ARF.

the CSCAP SG/ARF-ISM linkage be institutionalized.

It also stressed, with respect to CSCAP SGs, that “the work of SGs should be synchronized with ARF and ARF-ISG interests by close collaboration between member committees and their ARF counterparts in each country”, and that, “when submitting reports to ARF-ISG Meetings …, CSCAP SGs should focus on providing recommendations with policy relevance and interest”. It also recommended that “CSCAP should establish links to the ASEAN-based ADMM Plus [ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus] which has potential to gradually evolve into an ARF Defence Ministers Meeting”.

The ARF Perspective, November 2009
The 32nd meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Jakarta on 16 November 2009 was attended by Dr. Suriya Chindawongse, Counsellor in the ASEAN Affairs Department of the Thai Foreign Ministry, and an active participant in the ARF SOM process. He tabled copies of the “ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement”, which was adopted by the 16th meeting of the ARF foreign ministers at their meeting in Phuket on 23 July 2009, and which said that the ARF should develop “fruitful partnerships and networks of cooperation amongst various security organizations and fora in the Asia-Pacific region” and, more specifically, that “Track 2 organizations, including the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs), ASEAN ISIS and CSCAP … can provide useful ideas and policy inputs and help raise public awareness of the ARF”.19 In his “interactive session” with the Steering Committee, Dr. Suriya reviewed the development of the relationship between the ARF and CSCAP, including the contributions of the CSCAP SGs, and particularly mentioning the work on countering proliferation of WMD, and outlined the ARF’s plans for implementing the Vision Statement. He suggested four “possible CSCAP contributions” to the ARF’s “next steps”: first, to explore how to best implement the ARF Vision Statement; second, to examine the scope of preventive diplomacy measures in the ARF; third, to help refine the future role of the Defence Track in the ARF; and, fourth, to review the

role of the ARF in the evolving regional architecture.

CSCAP should respond expeditiously with policy-relevant studies in each of these four areas. They are all not only important subjects; they also fall within CSCAP’s remit and areas of CSCAP’s core expertise. Timely fulfilment of this multi-pronged agenda provides the opportunity for substantially reinforcing the ARF’s appreciation of CSCAP’s utility.
PART 2
CRITIQUES OF CSCAP

In recent years, Track 2, or non-official, diplomacy has enjoyed considerable attention as a new form of confidence-building measure (CBM). It has received particular attention in specific conflict situations and peace-making processes.¹ In these cases, Track 2 diplomacy aims to facilitate peace-making through meetings of private individuals or organizations from the various sides of the conflict. However, one area of Track 2 diplomacy that has seldom been analysed is the non-official counterparts of regional security organizations. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has a Track 2 counterpart known as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), consisting of academic, other non-governmental security specialists, and government officials in their “private capacities”, who meet regularly, convene working groups (WGs), and prepare reports to influence their Track 1 (official) counterparts. Current literature on this form of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia Pacific tends to be more descriptive than analytical; and there has been only one study completely devoted to the Track 2 approach.² Desmond Ball’s study assesses CSCAP in terms of its WGs and publications. This project hopefully complements Ball’s work through interviews with CSCAP and ARF members, examining the manner in which each sees the CSCAP role in assisting inter-governmental deliberations.

In more theoretical terms, this paper constitutes an effort to apply some of the perspectives from the epistemic community literature which propose that experts outside government will be utilized by governments to deal with issues considered too politically sensitive for Track 1 meetings. Additionally, Track 2 specialists, unencumbered by governance responsibilities, can gaze into the future, anticipating issues that could become international problems and thus devise coping strategies.

However, outside experts may also be co-opted by governments to justify policy positions taken by states prior to Track 2 investigations. In such cases, Track 2 activities may be used to lend prestige to official decisions reached independently of outside expert inputs.3

Other theoretical frameworks that inform this study include the placement of the CSCAP-ARF relationship into realist, neo-liberal, and constructivist perspectives. Desmond Ball notes that “CSCAP is an experiment in liberal institution building, being undertaken by realists”.4 By this he means that CSCAP deals with the stuff of realism: military capabilities and competing national interests; but it does so by searching for ways of moving from competitive security to common and cooperative security via regional confidence building. This process, undertaken through Track 2 dialogues and WG projects, is designed to create ideational changes and social learning ultimately leading to new mechanisms for international security cooperation. Hence, the combination of realist, neo-liberal, and constructivist insights.

**Background: The ARF and CSCAP**

Unlike Europe, where the Cold War created a robust multilateral institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has assisted in the adjustment to a post-Cold War security environment, although East Asia has no such formal multilateral security organization. Security arrangements have been almost entirely bilateral and, since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, have predominantly been focused on Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, it was ASEAN—Southeast Asia’s key multilateral political organization—that has provided the impetus for tentative security multilateralism in East Asia: the ARF. Formed in 1994 and composed of virtually all East Asian states (except Taiwan), the ARF is the most comprehensive security gathering in the world, encompassing East Asia, North America, Europe, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and India.5

The ARF is different from NATO in that it is not an alliance; there is no commitment to a common defence. Rather, the ARF is a venue for the promotion of

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5 Current participants in the ARF are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Canada, China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam.
cooperative security; reassurance rather than confrontation. The membership includes states with mutual territorial disputes: for example, ASEAN members and China over the South China Sea. The ARF’s purpose is to reduce conflict among its members, promote cooperation, and ultimately facilitate the resolution of existing disputes. However, because the membership is so disparate, the ARF itself has been very cautious about dealing directly with conflicts among its members. The ARF approaches conflict reduction and resolution through such indirect measures as security dialogues, military personnel exchanges, the voluntary publication of defence white papers, and shared concerns, such as disaster relief and maritime search and rescue. These are all modest but useful activities.

Nevertheless, ARF members avoid addressing each other’s core security concerns. Defence per se is either solely a national responsibility or embodied in bilateral alliances that have survived the Cold War—as in the U.S. security treaties with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ARF, then, has not been a source of security innovation. Cognizant of this limitation, several ARF members—particularly the original five ASEAN core states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and the ROK—have encouraged Track 2 organizations within their respective countries to develop more innovative approaches to security.

National Track 2 groups exist in most ARF states, consisting of academic and other non-governmental security specialists. They are informal advisers to ARF official delegations. Track 2 deliberations deal with issues that may still be deemed too sensitive for governments to grapple with: for example, the annual Indonesian-sponsored meetings on the South China Sea islands. Track 2 projects may develop policy studies on issues that governments have not yet had the time to address, such as regional nuclear energy practices. Ideally, then, Track 2 activities should inform Track 1 deliberations according to the epistemic community literature. Track 2 organizations should think “outside the box”. They should address issues that are not yet on governmental security agendas as a kind of early warning mechanism. Additionally, they might provide fresh approaches to problems that seem to be at an impasse in deliberations among officials. Track 2 studies could redefine issues such that policymakers might see new ways of resolution.

CSCAP fits Peter Haas’s definition of epistemic communities perfectly: “An epistemic community is a network of professionals with an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within their domain.” The conflict and uncertainty inherent in interstate negotiations generate the need for expertise in developing each country’s policy position. In so far as epistemic communities develop common understandings of problems and solutions cross-nationally, they may help their respective governments reach convergent solutions. From the perspective of constructivist

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theory, this may entail new learning and discourse. Epistemic communities may be particularly suited for developing alternative scenarios for various courses of action, thus informing decision-makers about who the winners and losers may be for each policy choice. They could also help decision-makers anticipate conflicts of interests among states and how to build coalitions to ameliorate these conflicts. And, of course, epistemic communities can be used by policymakers to justify or lend prestige to policies that have been reached on other grounds—a not unknown political perversion of the ontology of these groups.

Epistemic community ideas are diffused through conferences, research publications, and both formal and informal communications to policymakers. CSCAP has employed all these techniques. At the bottom, they are devices for the political infiltration of governing institutions, laying the groundwork for the acceptance of the epistemic community’s beliefs. For epistemic community advocates,

... foreign policy [is] a process by which intellectual innovations (which epistemic communities help produce) are carried by domestic and international organizations (in which epistemic communities may reside) and are selected by political processes to become the basis of new or transformed national interests. Likewise, under specified conditions, we can view international politics as the process by which the innovations of epistemic communities are diffused nationally, transnationally, and internationally.

Given the opportunity, epistemic communities can identify and define issues, and frame the context in which new data and ideas are interpreted. Thus, they can attempt to provide boundaries for the range of collective discourses on policy and guide decision-makers in the choice of appropriate norms. This influence may be particularly effective if decision-makers are unfamiliar with an issue. Then, the epistemic community can frame the issue and help define the policymakers’ interests. In some cases, an epistemic community may even set the policymakers’ agenda: for example, the international NGO campaign that led to an international treaty banning land mines.

Still, Track 2 organizations as epistemic communities are frequently cross-pressured, if not actually on the horns of a dilemma. The process brings officials and non-officials together, but seeks to maintain their independence. Moreover, it looks to encourage exploration of new and possibly radical ideas while insuring both policy-relevant output and recommendations acceptable to mainstream decision-

7 Ibid, p. 6.
8 Ibid, p. 15.
makers. Does this mean, as some critics charge, that Track 2 security recommendations are often reduced to a low common denominator or banality?\(^{11}\)

Not necessarily, if epistemic community deliberations raise a sense of urgency about unresolved issues and proffer new ways of addressing them. One could argue that Track 2 activities are successful if they:

- produce some new concepts and proposals;
- gain the attention of decision-makers in member governments—for our purposes, that CSCAP studies gain the attention of ARF government representatives;
- spark interest in an international attentive public through media treatment, thus kindling some public debate; and
- demonstrate enough shelf-life that some of the principal concepts and proposals remain part of the international dialogue over several years.\(^{12}\)

Track 2 security efforts also constitute common security, proposals designed to alleviate the security dilemma by demonstrating that security can be mutually achieved. The ARF’s progression from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and finally to conflict resolution are steps on the ladder to security goals based on mutuality rather than power balancing or hegemony. As the ARF’s Track 2 counterpart, CSCAP’s WGs climb this same ladder, hoping to clear pathways for their governmental counterparts. Of course, this does not mean that realist policies would atrophy as a result of multilateral organizations such as CSCAP/ARF. Rather, their common security approaches are designed to ameliorate the hard edges of security realism.\(^{13}\) The various Inter-sessional Support Groups (ISGs) of the ARF and the CSCAP WGs serve to build a limited consensual security identity even if security agreements are confined to relatively low-level (that is, non-threatening) undertakings such as sharing information on military doctrines. Cooperative security, then, builds comfort and trust among its participants through reassurance, multilateralism, and a preference for non-military solutions. However, it does not replace national power and armed forces. Rather, the goal of cooperative security is to reduce the probability that national power

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will be exercised to resolve conflicts. Cooperative security explores alternative ways of building confidence and resolving differences before they become full-blown conflicts.

How effective have the Track 2 counterparts been in influencing the official policies of their governments? In order to answer this question, one needs to examine the relationship between the Track 1 and Track 2 groups. Does one group mainly affect the other, or do they influence each other? In theory, Track 2 groups were created to influence their government counterparts by providing studies on issues that officials had neither the time nor the expertise to address, or that were too sensitive to be raised in official meetings. The idea was that non-official specialists would influence the deliberations of government policy. In reality, however, government officials may ask for Track 2 studies that would provide the data and analysis to justify decisions already reached by governments. Additionally, governments may discourage Track 2 counterparts from embarking on certain topics by implying that Track 1 officials will pay no attention to the resulting studies. Therefore, the influence flows both ways between the two groups.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the independence of the Track 2 groups. In theory, Track 2 groups are independent of governments. They are composed of non-governmental experts who are beholden to no particular political group, who speak out independently on issues. In reality, some Track 2 groups are extensions of governments, particularly in communist states where the idea of independent specialists on security issues does not prevail, such as China, Vietnam and Laos. One way of determining independence is to see how Track 2 members are chosen. Are they appointed or elected? How long do the specialists serve on the group? Is there a hierarchy within the Track 2 group? Who determines the agenda of study? By addressing these questions, one can assess the independence of Track 2 groups in various ARF member states.

Through examination of these issues, this study assesses the independence, influence, and policy deliberations of selected CSCAP member committees. Because over 20 countries are involved in the ARF and CSCAP respectively, this study selects a subset of significant members, consisting of the United States, Canada, China, the ROK, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. All of these states have been actively involved in CSCAP and the ARF, and their approaches represent distinct national perspectives. This group also represents a range of regime types, from mature democracies, relatively new democracies, soft authoritarian states, to a communist regime. In sum, then, the questions this study addresses, but only partially answers, for Track 2 Asian security efforts include:

1. How do epistemic communities of security experts influence the agenda and deliberations of governments?
2. How significant for Asian security are the topics addressed by CSCAP, and are they transmitted to the ARF?
3. Do the deliberations and studies produced lead to changes in government security policies?
4. How inhibiting is the consensus-style decision-making in the CSCAP?
5. What is the future for cooperative security mechanisms such as the CSCAP for the Asia Pacific?

The CSCAP as an Epistemic Community
The origins of CSCAP may be traced to the early collaboration of the ASEAN Institutes of Security and International Studies (ISIS), themselves founded for the most part in the 1980s. The original ASEAN Five (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia) all housed Track 2 security institutions consisting of academics, journalists, former government officials, and other specialists on Asian economic and political/security issues. In 1984, these institutes inaugurated regular meetings and collaborative efforts to establish, as Brian Job put it, “an ideational agenda of cooperative security”. In due course, the ASEAN-ISIS sponsored the annual Kuala Lumpur Roundtable each July, which became the forum for CSCAP to meet and discuss its activities. The underlying goal enunciated by the ASEAN-ISIS founders of CSCAP was to create an alternative conception of security in the Asia-Pacific based on cooperation rather than military balances. This did not mean that neoliberal proposals were supposed to supersede military-security arrangements as the foundation for international security. Rather, cooperative security was seen as a supplement to the existence of armed forces and a mechanism through which potential rivals could find common ground for cooperation and, therefore, reassurance.

Based on the ASEAN-ISIS experience, then, CSCAP was formed in June 1993, bringing together institutional counterparts to the ISIS from throughout the Asia Pacific. With 20 member countries and regions covering East Asia, South Asia, North America and Europe, it constitutes the broadest Track 2 security organization in the

world.\textsuperscript{16} CSCAP’s institutional design of member committees, a Steering Committee comprising member committee representatives, a limited Secretariat (located in Malaysia’s ISIS) and WGs is similar to the pattern established in regional Track 2 economic cooperation. As the Track 2 counterpart to the ARF, CSCAP debates the extent to which its agenda should either “follow” or “lead” that of the ARF as well as the balance CSCAP should strike among conceptual and abstract analysis—dear to academics—and scenario generation and policy research of greater relevance to policymakers.

As in the formation of the ARF, the ASEAN states took the lead in CSCAP. And, also as in the ARF, the continued viability of ASEAN’s leadership is in question in the aftermath of the region’s 1997–1998 economic crisis. Political and economic instability in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and most especially Indonesia have forced these states to focus inward; and both CSCAP and the ARF are loath to deal with members’ domestic difficulties. Indeed, the international spill-over of such “domestic” security concerns as communal violence, money laundering, drug trafficking and financial due diligence are high on Asia’s new security agenda. Whether CSCAP and the ARF are able to deal with them remains to be seen.\textsuperscript{17} If not, then it may no longer be viable to maintain the current CSCAP co-chair arrangement with one of the two co-chairs of the Steering Committee as well as the Working and Study Groups (SGs) that are always selected from an ASEAN state. (The exception to this arrangement is the North Pacific Working Group (NPWG), which is outside the ASEAN region.)

As voluntary organizations based in the private sector, the CSCAP members also have serious financial problems. Member committees must find ways of funding themselves. Wealthier member countries tend to have relatively large memberships and rely upon member assessments and foundation grants. Smaller and less affluent CSCAP members have smaller delegations and sometimes request assistance from their richer counterparts to attend meetings. For some CSCAP members, government subsidies provide budgets, blurring the distinction between Track 1 and Track 2.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} CSCAP comprises member committees from Australia, Cambodia, Canada, China, the DPRK, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the ROK, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. The directors of the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the UN Department of Political Affairs (East Asia and the Pacific Division) enjoy affiliate/observer status. Taiwan security specialists participate in working sessions in their private capacities.

\textsuperscript{17} Sheldon W. Simon (Ed.), \textit{The Many Faces of Asian Security} (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

\textsuperscript{18} Author’s interviews with CSCAP and ARF members in the United States, Canada, and Asia, spring and summer of 2000 and May 2001.
Moreover, CSCAP delegations are frequently quite eclectic. As Paul Evans notes, they balance “insiders and outsiders, generalists and specialists, those close to government and those more independent in their orientation.” Since CSCAP meetings are based on national delegations, there is no guarantee of continuity. Member attendance depends on funding, availability, and interest in the subject matter under discussion. Beyond a common commitment to promoting multilateral security dialogue and a preference for peaceful resolution of disputes, there are more differences than similarities among the participants. Unsurprisingly, then, CSCAP memoranda display a blend of “lowest common denominator statements and some creative efforts to move beyond existing national positions.” These latter are frequently critical of government policy or at least attempt to challenge the status quo by suggesting new ways of conceptualizing and resolving regional security issues.

In the case of the ASEAN-ISIS—CSCAP’s founders—access to their governmental counterparts has been institutionalized since 1993 with annual foreign ministry consultations during ASEAN Senior Officers Meetings. No national CSCAP has this kind of regular access except perhaps for those in communist states (China, Vietnam, Laos, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) where the public-private distinction is problematic. Moreover, the ASEAN-ISIS seems to be involved more directly in the current security concerns of their governments than the CSCAP members as a whole. For example, in recent years the Philippine Institute for Security and Defence Studies has drafted memoranda on Cambodia, the South China Sea, the admission of Vietnam and Burma to ASEAN, as well as criteria for China-ASEAN relations, all of which were submitted to the Philippine government.

By contrast, CSCAP WGs are more functional and long range in nature. Currently, five WGs report annually to CSCAP in Kuala Lumpur. They comprise: (1) confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which are defined to include

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nuclear safety; (2) comprehensive security, which covers economic issues; (3) maritime security, in recognition of the fact that the Asia Pacific encompasses significant sea space; (4) the North Pacific security dialogue, the only WG not co-chaired by an ASEAN member; and (5) transnational crime, CSCAP’s newest endeavour.

Emerging from WG activities are papers, memoranda, and even symposia books. Representative of the latter are *Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, edited by Sam Bateman, and *The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region* and *Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia-Pacific Maritime Cooperation*, both edited by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates for the Maritime WG. Other WGs have produced similar volumes—collections of symposia papers representing scholarly and specialist work on their WG mandates. Much of this work is thorough and future-oriented. As a matter of course, the studies are provided to CSCAP members and the ARF. According to Carolina Hernandez, chair of the Philippine CSCAP, many of the ideas and recommendations find their way into ARF deliberations through member committees. By networking with their own foreign ministries, CSCAP’s input has been effective in several areas, most particularly preventive diplomacy (discussed below). However, it should be noted that CSCAP dialogues may be less important for the recommendations they generate, which after all depend on governments for implementation, than for the suspicions they allay and the norms they reinforce.

The Working Groups: Some Selections

Examining the activities in the CSCAP WGs is a good way of discovering how Asia-Pacific security epistemic communities are defining security issues in the region.

Confidence- and security-building measures

Among the most active of the WGs, the CSBM WG has focused on developing a roadmap by which the ARF can advance to the second of its three stages of development: preventive diplomacy. Toward that end, the CSBM WG held a workshop in early March 1999 immediately prior to the ARF’s counterpart ISG on CBMs. ISG members were invited to the CSCAP Workshop; 19 of the ARF’s 22 member states attended.

The workshop hammered out a “working definition” and “statement of principles” on preventive diplomacy based in part on preventive diplomacy case studies prepared by CSCAP specialists. These statements, in turn, built on earlier CSBM

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23 Ibid, p. 95.
24 This discussion draws extensively from Ralph Cossa’s presentation to the June 1999 Kuala Lumpur Roundtable. Cossa has been co-chair of the CSBM WG since its inception. See Ralph A. Cossa, “CSCAP and Preventive Diplomacy: Helping to Define the ARF’s Future Role”, Paper presented at the Kuala Lumpur Roundtable, June 1999.
WG conclusions with respect to confidence building, many of which may seem banal but which, taken together, form a useful basis for cooperative security:

- CSBMs cannot work in the absence of a desire to cooperate;
- CSBMs must be viewed in “win-win” not “win-lose” terms;
- CSBMs are most effective if they build upon regional/global norms;
- foreign models do not necessarily apply;
- CSBMs are stepping stones or building blocks, not institutions;
- CSBMs should have realistic, pragmatic, clearly defined objectives;
- gradual, methodical, incremental approaches work best;
- unilateral and bilateral approaches can serve as useful models;
- the process may be as (or more) important than the product;

and, with respect to Asia-Pacific CSBMs in particular:

- the Asia Pacific is not itself a homogenous region;
- there is a preference for informal structures;
- consensus building is a key prerequisite;
- there is a general distrust of outside “solutions”; and
- there is a genuine commitment to the principle of non-interference in one another’s internal affairs.

Based on an agreement to start with small and consensual projects in hopes that positive experiences at this level will lead to an ability to deal with larger, more controversial, issues, the CSBM WG has examined the applicability of the UN Conventional Arms Register to the Asia Pacific and developed a generic outline for defence policy papers—both important transparency measures.

The WG has also addressed nuclear safety and non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific, exploring the prospect of formalizing a Pacific Atomic Energy Community. Along these lines, the WG has sponsored a Nuclear Energy Experts Group, which has collaborated with the U.S. government’s Cooperative Monitoring Center. These deliberations have led to a proposal for the creation of a Nuclear Energy Transparency website.

CSCAP’s preventive diplomacy deliberations link Tracks 1 and 2 in that the ARF first identified preventive diplomacy as a potential future role and then called upon CSCAP for suggestions. Epistemic community theorists would see this request as an opportunity for innovative thinking by specialists who are not beholden to preconceived government positions. This innovative prospect, however, is tempered by the fact that many CSCAP members have close associations with their governments, are familiar with their thinking, and may, therefore, be less innovative than if these efforts were purely academic exercises. In fact, as Ralph Cossa notes:

Politically sensitive issues relating to Preventive Diplomacy applications, principles, and definitions were debated by both independent security specialists and government officials (acting in their private capacity) in
an open, plenary session. A select group of non-governmental specialists was then convened during the Workshop to draft a working definition and statement of principles based on the earlier presentations and debate. Their effort was then reviewed by the group at large and, with minor adjustments, was subsequently forwarded to the co-chairs of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building Measures for their consideration.\(^\text{25}\)

CSCAP discussions revealed an overlap between CSBMs and the lower end of the preventive diplomacy spectrum, particularly with respect to preventing conflicts and limiting their escalation. The preventive diplomacy workshop developed a set of principles, which became the basis for an ARF agreement reached in Kuala Lumpur at the group’s April 2001 meeting.\(^\text{26}\) The principles emphasize that preventive diplomacy is based on non-coercive diplomatic action designed to prevent interstate disputes initially arising from and subsequently escalating to armed confrontation. If such confrontation nevertheless occurs, preventive diplomacy’s task is to prevent its spread geographically. Preventive diplomacy can only be activated with the consent of the parties involved. The mediators must be seen by the contestants to be neutral in the dispute and honest brokers. Finally, mediators must follow the principle of non-interference in states’ internal affairs.\(^\text{27}\) As stipulated, these precepts are extremely cautious, designed as much to protect the sovereignty of contenders as to prevent conflict escalation.

The workshop tabled a number of cases illustrative of these principles, including the ASEAN Troika experience in Cambodia created to mediate between Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranarridh; Indonesia’s role as a facilitator in the dispute between the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front; and the Thai-Malaysian joint development area aimed at preventing border conflicts. Interestingly, the first two of these three examples dealt with the mediation of domestic conflicts—perhaps a harbinger of sources of instability in Southeast Asia, which will particularly challenge the ARF’s non-interference norm.

Additional suggestions emerging from the workshops urged: (i) regular reports by ARF member states on existing and potential security concerns; (ii) creation of an ARF Information and Research Centre, which would disseminate these reports and serve as a clearing house for additional information; (iii) formation of an ARF Eminent Persons Group composed of respected specialists who would be available


for fact-finding and mediation; and (iv) establishing ARF links to organizations specializing in “non-traditional” security issues involving the environment, nuclear safety, and human rights. The workshop concluded by recommending that CSCAP itself could assess the ARF’s progress in implementing CBMs, many of which had been adopted from CSCAP recommendations.28

Within the CSBM WG, nuclear energy has become a prime interest.29 The focus has been on safety measures and proliferation concerns. The nuclear focus in CSCAP has not been on weapons, which are considered too sensitive and conflictual for the regional body but rather on the security implications of nuclear energy. The CSBM WG addressed nuclear energy initially in 1995; and it has been a significant component of its agenda ever since.

The underlying rationale for this examination has been the Asia Pacific’s growing energy requirements, which exceed any other region and the fact that for many Asian states nuclear energy is an important means of meeting these needs. The presence of nuclear materials and technology poses both short- and long-term problems, including nuclear waste, the safety of plant technology, and the possibility of weapons-grade plutonium by-products. Examples of these concerns include the prospect of Taiwan’s nuclear waste disposal in North Korea and the stockpiling of plutonium for nuclear reactors in Japan.

The WG examined the possibility of a nuclear cooperation forum for Asia, which would address the above concerns and asked whether the EURATOM experience could be transferred to Asia (EURATOM provides for common ownership of fissile materials, jointly conducted regional safeguards, and shared reprocessing of spent fuels). However, this model was deemed inapplicable to Asia as the underlying political community does not exist.

Instead, there was agreement that the lowest common denominator for Asian nuclear cooperation would entail a focus on safety procedures. This could include an exchange of information on operational experience, including accident response procedures. Under the initiative of the U.S. CSCAP, the U.S. Department of Energy invited the CSBM WG to visit the Cooperative Monitoring Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in May 1998 to observe how cooperative monitoring might enhance transparency among nuclear energy users in Asia.

The WG also proposed that the ARF consider the creation of an Asia-Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation (PACATOM) project, which would primarily be limited in its early stages to collecting and disseminating information on nuclear safety procedures in Asia. Taking account of international bodies already engaged in nuclear

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28 Ibid, pp. 8–9.
29 The discussion of nuclear issues within the CSBM WG is drawn from the WG’s reports from 1997 through 2000. Note that matters associated with nuclear weapons, including no-first-use proposals, missile control regimes, and various arms control measures remain outside CSCAP’s purview.
safety cooperation, the WG encouraged all states to sign individual protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would place their programmes under enhanced safeguards. The WG agreed at its 1998 meeting that the problem of what to do with spent fuel had not been sufficiently addressed by current international efforts. The WG could reach no agreement on how to deal with the back end of the fuel cycle since no CSCAP member was prepared to recommend disposal in countries other than those of origin. Less controversial and more consensual were process recommendations, such as joint training of plant operators in safety procedures and greater sharing of information and security standards, techniques, and accident response procedures. Also important was intelligence cooperation on threats to nuclear facilities in member countries.

While the PACATOM idea was considered premature, especially given reduced government budgets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the WG urged the regular publication of an *Asia-Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Handbook*, which would include all current nuclear energy policies of member states as well as discussions of future proposals, such as PACATOM. The Cooperation Monitoring Center in New Mexico offered a research grant to start the handbook and agreed to post it on the Monitoring Center’s website. The WG also will develop a generic nuclear energy white paper for members (similar to the earlier defence white paper) to promote greater transparency among nuclear energy users. As Desmond Ball observes, the CSBM WG efforts on nuclear matters and preventive diplomacy constitute CSCAP’s closest working relationship with the ARF.

**Working Group on Maritime Cooperation**

The Maritime Cooperation WG underlines the Asia Pacific as a maritime region in both security and economic terms where navies and merchant ships dominate ocean policy. It has produced five volumes of edited papers and a CSCAP memorandum, *Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation*. The edited volumes constitute excellent and well-balanced reference material on the prospects and pitfalls for Asian maritime cooperation.

Essentially, the Maritime Cooperation WG seeks consensus on good ocean management, law and order at sea, resource exploitation, coping with maritime crime, and instruments for dispute settlement. It grapples with a cornucopia of problems, including claims to offshore sovereignty, unresolved maritime boundaries,

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potentially restrictive interpretations of freedom of navigation, widespread illegal fishing, illegal population movements by sea, drug smuggling, and the ever growing problem of piracy. These are all sources of “maritime disorder”. A number of these issues can be influenced by cooperative security efforts, including fisheries, ocean pollution, and the marine environment. Others are characterized by “high politics”, such as sovereignty claims and maritime boundaries and, therefore, are less congenial to multilateral resolution. Nevertheless, if serious multilateral discussions were to be held on high political concerns, then CSCAP would be the venue for their initiation where sensitive issues can presumably be addressed in a non-official setting.

Sensitive to CSCAP's primary role as a security issue forum, the Maritime Cooperation WG has decided to consider future memoranda dealing directly with such security issues as illegal activities at sea.33 The group’s CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation notes the particular difficulty found in the configuration of East Asian seas and their adjacent land spaces for security cooperation. Areas of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas lend themselves to overlapping maritime jurisdictions.

Generally, the CSCAP Guidelines seem unexceptionable. They appear to enunciate a minimal consensus on maritime cooperation principles and constitute a useful compendium of interstate maritime practices. Nonetheless, Memorandum No. 4 notes that some CSCAP members took exception to some of the Guidelines on Naval Cooperation and Surveillance, illustrating the difficulty of achieving unanimity on what are, for the most part, standard international maritime practices. However, the fact that the memorandum was approved despite reservations demonstrates the way in which CSCAP’s decision-making procedures emulate ASEAN’s consensus concept. Rather than insisting on unanimity—which in effect is a single-member veto arrangement—CSCAP employs a consensus rule. As long as all participants are comfortable with a position—even if they register reservations—CSCAP endorsement can proceed. The understanding is that dissenting members will permit policy recommendations to be made, but are not expected to comply with those portions to which they take exception.34

Indicative of the cooperative security approaches found in CSCAP memoranda are the recommendations in the Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and search and rescue. On the SLOCs, the underlying premise is that all agree that safety of navigation and marine environment protection are in every state’s interest. Therefore, exchanges of information

33 Sam Bateman (Ed.), *Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Canberra: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 132, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999), p. 168.
and training in search and rescue, marine safety, and law and order at sea should be agreeable to all. The last, in particular, goes to a major maritime sovereignty concern: “Threats to or security incidents relating to sea lines of communication.” Thus, CSCAP lays a basis for subsequent studies and recommendations on sensitive issues ranging from piracy to monitoring ocean pollution violations.

Recent deliberations in the Maritime Cooperation WG reveal how controversial multilateral approaches can be. Discussions in 1999 on maritime jurisdictions led to China’s insistence that issues of sovereignty be confined exclusively to bilateral contacts, while most of the other participants contended that pollution and other maritime environment problems, by their very nature, could only meaningfully be addressed through multilateral cooperation.

To its credit, the Maritime Cooperation WG has not demurred from discussing politically controversial issues, including the South China Sea. Although CSCAP’s governing Steering Committee has avoided taking any position on the Spratly Islands because of China’s strenuous objections, the Maritime WG has commissioned papers on the topic. At its 1997 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, a paper by the East-West Center’s South China Sea specialist, Mark Valencia, identified several scenarios for resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute based on a multilateral management authority. The ensuing discussion clarified a number of issues that would have to be resolved in overlapping maritime zones. Among the obstacles were military objections to sharing marine data that could compromise naval deployments; the fact that country capabilities to meet various obligations under a multilateral regime vary; and the tendency of Spratly claimants to devote their attentions exclusively to territorial claims, ignoring the larger issues of ocean governance, which include resource management, environmental protection, and security implications.

The Maritime Cooperation WG concluded that rival maritime claims in the Asia Pacific are destabilizing, and that there is an inherent conflict between the suspicions of defence officials who see transparency as compromising security and those who are concerned with resource development, commercial shipping and the environment. A significant contribution of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation WG, therefore, could be an effort to reconcile these differences and come up with “practical, innovative proposals on issues which may have been either set aside by ARF or be premature for it.”

As Sam Bateman, the Australian co-chair of the group, mournfully notes:

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38 Ibid, pp. 6–7.
There are slim prospects of naval arms control in East Asia or even of multilateral security dialogues that could constrain regional force development plans ... If regional navies engage in confidence- and security-building activities, they might be working themselves out of a job—and that they are not going to do.\(^39\)

Bateman concludes ruefully that the optimism that pervaded the early deliberations of the Maritime Cooperation WG has not been justified. He points to a new surge in post-financial crisis naval spending in East Asia as an ominous sign. Naval budget increases are being explained less in terms of modernization and more explicitly now as responses to perceived regional threats. Moreover, these navies will increasingly invest in capabilities for information warfare and naval missile technology.

### Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security

The Comprehensive and Cooperative Security WG is more conceptual/theoretical than the other WGs.\(^40\) Its purview is wide-ranging, addressing elements of the new security agenda, particularly the interface among environmental protection, economic development, peace, and security. Efforts to define its role led to CSCAP Memorandum No. 3, The Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security. To differentiate its agenda from other WGs—particularly the one on CSBMs—the Comprehensive Security Group (CSG) emphasizes non-military cooperation. By delving into economic and environmental issues, however, this WG has in some ways become the most controversial because it is concerned with the internal affairs of member states.

Taking its name at face value, the CSG in CSCAP Memorandum No. 3 declares that security is multi-dimensional and covers economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental dimensions. Cooperation in these categories would seem, therefore, to require discussion of the domestic situations and policies of members insofar as they impact others. For example, social unrest, political turmoil, and illegal population movements resulting from the 1997–1998 regional financial crisis require addressing both domestic and foreign policies. Widespread drug abuse threatening the health of the individual and the community can be treated simultaneously as both a security and a social problem. Since the CSG associates domestic peace and political stability with environmental protection and prosperity, domestic issues must have a prominent place on its agenda.

Controversy over the linkage of domestic situations to international security has

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\(^40\) Space limitations preclude extensive discussions of the North Pacific and Transnational Crime WGs, though they are mentioned where appropriate in this paper.
characterized CSG meetings. Indeed, the CSG addressed this issue head-on at its December 1999 Seventh Meeting in Seoul. Indicative of the high regard in which the sovereignty principle is held—even in one of the most innovative Track 2 WGs—no one challenged the fundamental validity of the non-intervention principle. Non-intervention is seen as particularly important for the protection of small and weak states. Nevertheless, involvement in others’ affairs is appropriate if a state requests assistance as embodied in a variety of ASEAN approaches sometimes called “flexible engagement” (The appointment of three ASEAN members to mediate between two contending Cambodian political groups in 1997–1998 is a case in point). Additionally, the principle of humanitarian intervention was deemed permissible if authorized by the UN Security Council. However, even that prospect was conditioned on consent from the local population (however that was to be determined), clear and limited objectives, and a high probability of success.

Intervention decisions are further complicated by the availability of peacekeeping, peace-making, and diplomatic expertise as well as their financing and agreement on the appropriate form the intervention should take. Moreover, the CSG raised some difficult political considerations: for example, self-determination by a people versus secession from an established state. This issue, of course, is hardly hypothetical given recent developments in Indonesia. And, it is noteworthy that although several ASEAN members agreed to deploy peacekeeping forces to East Timor once then-President B. J. Habibie requested them, all ASEAN states voted against a UN resolution to conduct an international investigation on what happened in that troubled former Indonesian province.41 For ASEAN, then, intervention in Southeast Asia remains acceptable only if limited to regional states.

**Evaluating CSCAP: Has It Been Effective?**

There is little doubt that since its 1994 inception, CSCAP has produced a number of thorough and well-balanced policy studies on Asian security ranging from nuclear power and conventional arms; through ways of dealing with transnational crime,
piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal population movements; to an array of CBMs and ways of achieving preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. If nothing else, these studies have enriched the scholarly inventory on these important issues; a number have certainly been perused by government officials in the ARF. However, these notable publications are not the primary measure of CSCAP’s success. As a Track 2 organization, CSCAP must be evaluated on several dimensions:

1. As epistemic communities, has CSCAP generated innovative thinking on Asian security?
2. Does CSCAP draw upon a range of expertise in each member country?
3. Are contending viewpoints represented in CSCAP discussions and proposals?
4. Do CSCAP recommendations have an impact on the ARF—their Track 1 counterpart?

CSCAP memberships

Members of each country’s CSCAP are selected in a variety of ways. There are no overarching membership requirements for all councils. Each CSCAP determines its own criteria, although to become a country member, a CSCAP must have an institutional home responsible for membership selection, finances, and representatives for the WGs and annual Steering Committee meetings in Kuala Lumpur.

United States43

In the United States, the institutional home for CSCAP is the Pacific Forum, the Honolulu-based office of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. With a very small executive, Pacific Forum initially chose a core group of Asian security specialists from academia and think tanks to inaugurate U.S. CSCAP (In 2000, Pacific Forum’s executive body consisted of James Kelly and Ralph Cossa. By 2001, Kelly had become Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, and Pacific Forum was directed exclusively by Cossa). Soon thereafter, U.S. CSCAP accepted membership from any American-Asian security specialist who wished to affiliate and agreed to pay modest annual membership fees. That larger group, in turn, elects a rotating Board of Directors of about 20. The Board, however, is essentially honorific.

There is no government subsidy for U.S. CSCAP, thus insuring its independence. It seeks grants from private foundations and relies on member dues. U.S. participation in CSCAP WGs is self-selected in the sense that Pacific Forum normally agrees to back any U.S. CSCAP member to represent it if he or she can afford to cover their own expenses. Nevertheless, some continuity exists; for example, in Cossa’s co-chairing of the CSBM WG as well as Stanley Weeks’s continuing membership in the Maritime WG.

43 Author’s interview with U.S. CSCAP leaders in Honolulu, 27 March 2000.
The most onerous financial problem for U.S. CSCAP is its US$20,000 annual assessment by the international CSCAP Steering Committee. These are the highest national dues assessed. Although Japan and the European Union pay similar amounts, their financial obligations are subsidized by their respective governments. U.S. CSCAP has no such support, which means it is constantly scrambling to meet its obligations.

**Australia**

The Australia CSCAP executive is located at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University, where specialists dominate. With about 35 members from throughout the country, approximately 10 are government officials in their “private capacities”. The Centre invites specialists to participate, unlike the American election process. But, according to co-chair Stuart Harris of the ANU, “We hope to be comprehensive to get all specialists in the field, including politicians and businesspeople.”

**Singapore**

Initially located in the civilian private sector at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, in 1995 Singapore’s CSCAP moved to the Ministry of Defence think tank, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, which now funds its activities. CSCAP members are invited from think tanks, academia, and government. While the Singapore CSCAP is well represented in the WGs and Steering Committee, its chair, Kwa Chong Guan, readily admits that CSCAP deliberations, with their emphasis on cooperative security, are not given high priority by the Singapore government, which adheres to a realist paradigm of international politics. For example, when Singapore’s CSCAP was approached to co-chair the Transnational Crime SG by Australia, it only reluctantly agreed. CSCAP’s government counterparts in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence could not see transnational crime’s relevance to Singapore’s security. By contrast, the government—and, therefore, Singapore’s CSCAP—is strongly interested in preventive diplomacy because it fits realist concerns. Thus, Singapore has played host to both CSCAP and ARF meetings on this topic.

**New Zealand**

The New Zealand CSCAP was created by its first chair who selected a broad-based group of academics, businesspeople, and government officials from the armed forces, police, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Parliamentary Select Committee.
on Foreign Affairs. Thus, government representation is quite prominent. The current chair, David Dickens, has expanded New Zealand’s CSCAP to bring in younger scholars and specialists who initially were chosen to represent CSCAP on WGs, but were not at that time CSCAP members. Dickens is expanding New Zealand CSCAP to 40 members with an indefinite term of office.

**Malaysia**

The Malaysian Institute for Strategic and International Studies is both Malaysia’s CSCAP home and the host institution for the CSCAP Steering Committee’s annual gathering of all CSCAP members. As with many of the Asian CSCAP committees, government officials in their “private capacities” are members alongside academics specializing in security matters. Some Malaysian specialists have not been tapped by the national CSCAP because of personal differences. In one case, a prominent Malaysian security specialist is regularly invited to Singapore’s CSCAP meetings, but is not informed of Malaysia’s activities. He believes that Malaysia’s CSCAP is essentially a monopoly of ISIS.

**Thailand**

In Thailand, CSCAP is located in the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) at Chulalongkorn University. The 30-member organization includes academics, military officers, government officials, and representatives of the business community—all chosen by CSCAP-Thailand’s executive board from Chulalongkorn. The academic members are primarily from Bangkok’s two premier institutions, Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities. All members were selected because of their reputations in strategic studies.

**The Philippines**

Housed in the University of the Philippines’ Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, the Philippine CSCAP membership, as in its ASEAN counterparts, consists of a combination of academic, media, business, and government officials from the National Security Council, the Foreign Service Institute, and the Congress. Carolina Hernandez and Herman Joseph Kraft commented that the size of the CSCAP membership and members’ varied backgrounds ensured that a variety of viewpoints

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47 Author’s interviews with Mely Anthony, Malaysia ISIS officer and a member of Malaysia’s CSCAP Secretariat, Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Dean of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and J. N. Mak of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, 6–7 June 2000.

48 Author’s interview with Kusuma Snitwongse, founding member of Thailand’s CSCAP, Bangkok, 12 June 2000.

49 Author’s interviews with Carolina Hernandez, co-chair of the CSCAP Steering Committee and chair of the Philippine CSCAP, and Herman Kraft, member of the Philippine CSCAP, Quezon City, 19 June 2000.
would be articulated. However, these differences frequently made it difficult to reach consensus on policy positions.

**Indonesia**

Jakarta’s CSIS, as the other ASEAN-ISIS institutes, is home to Indonesia’s CSCAP. CSIS determines CSCAP’s membership and draws them from the foreign and defence ministries, other think tanks, and from the University of Indonesia. Generally, CSCAP members have known and worked with one another over an extended period. They form a core of strategic studies specialists, which probably makes them comfortable with one another, but at the same time, may limit innovative thought.

**Republic of Korea**

South Korea’s CSCAP has an academic home at the prestigious Yonsei University’s Graduate Institute of International Studies. With a membership of over 60, less than 10 people control the organization. The local Steering Committee determines who is invited to join. Consequently, a small coterie determines what the ROK CSCAP does. As a prominent scholar and CSCAP member put it: “The epistemic community has become static.”

**China**

Any distinction between Track 1 and Track 2 is difficult to detect in China’s CSCAP. Its institutional base is the State Council’s think tank, the China Centre for International Studies; and the China CSCAP’s leaders are both serving ambassadors. Most Chinese specialists selected for the WGs come from the Beijing and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; and all are vetted by the Foreign Ministry. Since WG members are drawn from think tanks and sometimes universities, though, expertise from outside the government is available; and new thinking on WG topics may be tapped. The China CSCAP’s membership is about 40 and expanding. Members are chosen by the organization’s core leadership, itself consisting of two senior diplomats, a People’s Liberation Army general, and a high-level State Council official.

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50 Author’s interviews with Clara Juwono, Angorro, Rizal Sukma, and Si Wiryono—all with Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies and members of Indonesia’s CSCAP, Jakarta, 30 June 2000.

51 Author’s interview with a prominent South Korean academic and ROK CSCAP officer, Laguna Beach, California, 24 February 2001.

52 Author’s interview with Hui-yung Feng of China’s CSCAP, and Ms Feng’s interviews with other China CSCAP members, August 2000 and January 2001 in Tempe, Arizona, and Beijing respectively. Interviews in China were conducted with Ambassador Shi Chunlai, Secretary General of China’s CSCAP, Le Rongrong, director of the China CSCAP Secretariat, and Liu Xuecheng, China CSCAP member. All are affiliated with the China Institute of International Relations.
While all formally are participating in their “private capacities”, it is unlikely that their policy orientations vary from their government bases. (Of the 45 members listed for China’s CSCAP roster in 2001, only 15 were from universities, and think tanks that were not integral components of government agencies. Moreover, only one of the 45 was from outside Beijing.) When a particular kind of expertise is required for a WG, the China CSCAP consults a related government agency for a specialist: for example, Maritime Affairs for the Maritime WG and the National Police for the Transnational Crime WG.

Canada

Canada’s CSCAP moves its institutional home with the location of its academic Co-chair, currently Brian Job at the University of British Columbia. Its other co-chair is drawn from non-academic members who range from retired officials to representatives of the media and business communities. Canada’s CSCAP is relatively small; its 30 members are chosen by the Co-chairs for their general interest in Asian affairs, their influential positions in Canada, and location in different regions of the country. The Canada CSCAP’s tasks are to generate ideas for the WGs, help implement their recommendations, and secure funding for CSCAP activities.

Funding for Canada’s CSCAP is split between the government and private sectors, once again blurring the line between Track 1 and Track 2. Indeed, most of the Canada CSCAP’s funds originate with government—the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). A unique feature of the Canada CSCAP’s membership is that about six of the 30 are serving deputy ministers and directors general of the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA, whose responsibilities involve either Asia or international organizations.

Curiously, the Canada CSCAP does not generate its own studies. Rather, it turns to a larger organization composed primarily of academics—the Canadian Council on Asia-Pacific Security (CANCAPS)—for thoughtful papers that are frequently discussed in Canada CSCAP meetings. CANCAPS, although composed of scholars, is funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Its studies cover a broad range of security issues, though all are within a general understanding of Canadian interests and values.

Evaluating the Working Groups

Numerous obstacles confront WG activities. One is breadth and continuity of membership. While each CSCAP is invited to participate in all five WGs, this inclusivity is rarely achieved. Some CSCAP members lack the expertise; many lack the resources. Even the wealthiest have difficulties. U.S. CSCAP admits that its representatives to the WGs self-select because they have to fund their own travel. Thus, the most

53 Author’s interviews with Canada’s CSCAP leaders, Paul Evans and Brian Job, at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 21 May 2001.
appropriate experts for the subject matter may not attend. Moreover, whenever a topic is broached for a WG, the CSCAP member that suggests the topic must be prepared to fund its study.\(^54\) This limits WG projects to those with the resources to follow through. The arrangement particularly favours the CSCAP members with direct links to governments or private foundations. Thus, Sam Bateman, co-chair of Australia’s Maritime WG, was able to obtain support on oceanic issues from Canberra; Japan and Canada provided official funds for the NPWG; and Ralph Cossa was confident of obtaining grant-making foundation and government support for the CSBM WG, particularly with respect to nuclear energy safety. For the latter, the U.S. Department of Energy provided a $70,000 subvention.

In fact, as in such Track 1 organizations as the United Nations, some of the wealthier members are asking that their annual financial obligations be reduced. The CSCAP Steering Committee at its June 2000 Kuala Lumpur meeting agreed to lower the U.S. annual contribution of US$20,000 by 10 per cent (Europe and Japan pay similar fees but have agreed to sustain them because they are both subsidized by government).\(^55\)

As mentioned earlier in this study, of all the groups, the CSBM WG has had the closest ties with the ARF. Co-chair Ralph Cossa attributes this to being able to schedule WG meetings at the same time as those of the CBM ISG. Thus, members of both have worked together to discuss how to move the ARF to its second stage of preventive diplomacy. The CSCAP WG concept paper was modified and adopted by the ARF’s CBM group before being submitted to and be adopted by the full ARF in 2001. If one considers the definitional work growing out of CSCAP as the product of epistemic community expertise, then the ARF adoption of the CSCAP proposal appears to be an important example of successful epistemic community impact on Track 1.

Other examples exist as well. The CSBM WG crafted a prototype defence white paper based on an extensive review of existing documents, and discussions on provisions such documents should include to provide transparency and reassurance. The prototype was adopted by the CBM ISG and has been employed by Mongolia and Vietnam in white papers they produced. It was partially applied by China in its second and third defence white papers and has even been used by Taiwan.\(^56\) Less successful, however, was the CSBM effort to establish an Asia-Pacific counterpart to the UN Conventional Arms Register. China balked at the proposal, seeing it as too close to an intelligence operation.

One of the tasks of CSCAP as an epistemic community is to address issues that are considered too sensitive to be placed on the Track 1 agenda. Nuclear power concerns fall into that category. Unlike defence white papers or definitions of preventive

\(^{54}\) Author’s interviews with U.S. CSCAP officers, Honolulu, 27 March 2000.

\(^{55}\) Author’s notes from discussions at the 3 June 2000 CSCAP Steering Committee meeting, Kuala Lumpur.

\(^{56}\) Author’s interviews with U.S. CSCAP officers, Honolulu, 27 March 2000.
diplomacy, nuclear power and the related issue of fissile material have not made it to the ARF. Instead, the CSBM WG has approached this issue indirectly by looking at nuclear energy transparency and safety procedures. The WG has particularly urged Japan to be more transparent about the weapons-grade plutonium it uses in its nuclear energy industry. By examining the “back end” of the nuclear fuel cycle—when weapons-grade plutonium is produced—the WG addresses the issue of weapons of mass destruction under the guise of nuclear safety. Within the CSBM WG, experts from EURATOM have been invited to discuss the applicability of their procedures to Asia. The WG has also set up a website on nuclear energy transparency at Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico. China’s CSCAP provides information on Chinese nuclear power to this site, as does Taiwan. While the nuclear energy users in Asia do not talk directly with each other, the website at Sandia provides a way to pool nuclear energy use information. Access to the website is fee-based, which means that CSCAP actually earns money from its operation. These resources, in turn, help fund other CSCAP activities.57

Sustaining the parallel between CSCAP WGs and ARF ISGs, the ARF added transnational crime and maritime issues to its agenda in 1999. The transnational crime brief covers narcotics, money laundering, illegal population movements, small-arms smuggling, and piracy (Maritime issues were discussed earlier in this paper). China, Vietnam, and Malaysia expressed reservations about the addition of transnational crime to ARF deliberations. They are concerned that discussions of criminal activity would lead to an examination of the internal politics of member states.58

A dilemma exists in CSCAP WG relations with their ARF counterparts. The epistemic community literature views Track 2 experts as independent of government and, therefore, freer to explore innovative approaches to problems facing those governments. However, as we have seen, in the CSCAP-ARF relationship, virtually all CSCAP WGs as well as national memberships include government officials. Moreover, even non-governmental experts may dismiss certain intellectual approaches to problem solving because they believe that governments will not take them seriously. A prominent Australian academic CSCAP member noted that in his experience at a workshop of the NPWG, there was little interest in developing new ways of thinking about theatre missile defence because some members from major powers believed that governments would not be interested. Thus, a potential Track 2 contribution was aborted on the horns of CSCAP’s most characteristic dilemma: innovation versus policy relevance.59

57 Author’s interviews with U.S. CSCAP officers, Honolulu, 27 March 2000.
58 Author’s interview with a U.S. diplomat assigned to the ARF, Washington, DC, 11 April 2000.
59 Author’s interview with an academic member of Australia’s CSCAP, Brisbane, 20 May 2000.
There is no established, consistent procedure governing WG activities. Generally, the chairs set the agendas and determine research topics, and their authors, though other group members may offer suggestions. Leadership expertise is particularly important because WG chairs will select the specialists whose research provides the basis for policy recommendations. In the Transnational Crime WG, specialist research papers include policy recommendations that are discussed within the group and, if approved, sent on to other WG chairs and to the CSCAP Steering Committee as “action items”. If approved by the Steering Committee, the recommendations are sent to the ARF, usually through its Senior Officers Meeting (SOM). However, another channel exists to place such CSCAP WG recommendations on the ARF agenda. WG proposals can also be transmitted by any country’s WG member to its own government for consideration.60

Most CSCAP studies fall into the first of the three ARF stages of development: confidence-building activities, though as indicated earlier, CSCAP also prepared the initial working paper and definitions for the ARF on preventive diplomacy. Because the Transnational Crime WG deals with issues that are directly involved in a country’s internal affairs, this group has been careful to focus on ways of assisting law enforcement that would not address internal practices. Thus, the WG has studied protocols on criminal intelligence that could be shared cross-nationally; however, it has not addressed such issues as terrorism (see note 28). To do so would require analysing the domestic politics of both those countries where terrorism originates and those that are targets.

The political proximity of several Southeast Asian CSCAP members to their governments is revealed by how some national CSCAP studies are chosen. In Singapore, for example, if a CSCAP WG has a project in which Singapore is involved, the CSCAP will approach the Foreign Ministry for financial support based on the premise that the CSCAP effort will be directly relevant to government policy.61 On the other hand, Southeast Asians normally go through a cumbersome process before they initiate a WG proposal. ASEAN CSCAP members clear proposals they wish to make with each other before presenting them in WGs. Consequently, few WG studies originate from ASEAN proposals.62 An important exception has been the Philippine proposal that human security be added to the agenda of the WG on Common and Comprehensive Security. Because human security must address societal practices, the Pandora’s Box of domestic politics has now been opened at the Track 2 level. It remains to be seen, though, if policy-relevant recommendations

60 Author’s interview with John McFarlane, former co-chair of CSCAP’s Transnational Crime WG and currently executive director of Australia’s CSCAP, Canberra, 23 May 2000.
61 Author’s interview with Kwa Chong Guan, chair of Singapore’s CSCAP, Singapore, 26 May 2000.
62 Author’s interview with Derek da Cunha, senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 30 May 2000.
emerge from human security studies and discussions.

The most prominent instance of positive symbiosis between CSCAP and the ARF is found in the procedures leading to the preventive diplomacy concept paper ultimately accepted by the ARF. Initially unable to agree on what preventive diplomacy entails, the ARF asked CSCAP to organize two meetings to see if consensus was possible. The first in Singapore in 1999 included both ARF and CSCAP members. It canvassed the disagreements to make them transparent. The second meeting in Bangkok a year later used a background paper prepared by Desmond Ball to reach an agreement on the definition, which was then sent on to the CBM ISG.63 While a working definition of preventive diplomacy has now been adopted by the ARF, the concept’s implementation is another matter. Preventive diplomacy requires involvement in the domestic affairs of states that may be or have become disputants. China is particularly wary of preventive diplomacy’s application to the South China Sea conflicts. Most CSCAP members interviewed for this study believed that the level of trust necessary for the implementation of preventive diplomacy has not been attained within the ARF.

Only two WGs have prepared memoranda that have immediate policy implications: Maritime Cooperation and Transnational Crime. Their efforts have had mixed results. When the Maritime Cooperation WG first prepared a memorandum on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation in 1998, the ARF’s Maritime Cooperation ISG rejected it, apparently because a U.S. naval officer on that ISG believed that any commitment to new maritime regulations would hamper the United States’ freedom of naval action.64

More recently, the Maritime Cooperation WG has jointly crafted a memorandum on Law and Order at Sea with the Transnational Crime WG. This memorandum deals with such complex jurisdictional issues as piracy, smuggling, and pollution. The complexity of the issues, however, makes ARF implementation problematic at best. In fact, the kind of maritime cooperation envisioned by the Maritime Cooperation WG is virtually non-existent in the Asia Pacific. Even with respect to something as basic as search and rescue, there are no established multinational procedures.

Currently, the Maritime Cooperation WG is working on a new memorandum that grapples with interpretations of uncertainties found in the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. This new project will cover fisheries and navigational rules, both of which are vague in the treaty. The proposed memorandum will attempt to flesh out their meanings. At the bottom, however, maritime issues do not seem to be good candidates for international regulation. Big powers, including the United States and China, are suspicious of international rules for differing reasons. The United States

63 Author’s interview with Desmond Ball, co-chair of the CSCAP Steering Committee, Kuala Lumpur, 3 June 2000.
64 Author’s interview with Sam Bateman, Australian chair of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation WG, Kuala Lumpur, 4 June 2000.
is concerned with freedom of the seas, while China objects to any international involvement with territorial issues such as the South China Sea islands because they deal with sovereignty concerns. Therefore, neither CSCAP nor the ARF can take on the tough issues of, say, naval armaments, deployments, or ownership of oceanic territories (islands).

The CSCAPS Members: Political Sensitivities, Early Warning Prospects, and Relations with the ARF

Epistemic community advocates argue that one of the advantages of Track 2 deliberations is their ability to confront issues that are too sensitive for governments to address because they encroach on politically volatile areas, such as human rights or illegal population movements. By dealing with these at the Track 2 level, political conflict can be minimized and new ways of conceiving solutions to these problems may be found. Moreover, Track 2 may possess the time and expertise to look ahead and identify problems on the horizon that could become subjects of political conflict among states, thus serving an “early warning” role. Have the CSCAP members performed in this manner?

On the sensitivity issue, the CSCAP respondents for the most part did not see their organizations out in front of their governmental counterparts. There are several explanations for this. First, because most CSCAP members include government representatives as well as non-governmental members who have worked closely with governments, there are both explicit and implicit inhibitions against innovation. CSCAP and its WGs tend to focus on projects that they know are of immediate interest to governments and have practical implications. Second, conceptual innovation is received with considerable suspicion. At a recent meeting of the NPWG, one member, in hopes of breaking an impasse in the discussion of theatre missile defence, suggested that the topic be approached as a confidence-building issue rather than a re-statement of government positions. That suggestion was dismissed as impractical, as apparently are other innovative ways of conceiving topics. Third is the fear of embarrassing countries whose practices violate international norms. A member of the Transnational Crime WG proposed an examination of corruption only to have it rejected as too sensitive. On the other hand, the same WG has agreed to study problems in human trafficking, apparently because Asian governments do

65 Author’s interview with J. N. Mak of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, 7 June 2000.
67 Author’s interview with a prominent Australian CSCAP member, Brisbane, 20 May 2000.
not give this issue high priority—that is, it is not considered sensitive.68 Meanwhile, the single most sensitive issue that could lead to war in East Asia—the China-Taiwan relationship—is excluded from CSCAP discussions by China.

CSCAP workshops—as distinct from WGs—seem to be more successful in addressing sensitive issues. The 1999 Seoul Workshop brought together CSCAP and ARF members for a discussion of humanitarian intervention, a topic of some sensitivity. The workshop developed a consensus on conditions for humanitarian intervention—no mean achievement. However, the agreement was hardly path-breaking. Humanitarian intervention is justified only with the consent of the target government and with the UN Security Council support.69 In effect, this is simply a re-statement of current practice. Nevertheless, the timeliness of this agreement is important. It followed the NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the UN intervention in East Timor. The latter was particularly relevant since a number of East Asian states have been part of the UN force in East Timor; and, in the Timor situation, Indonesia invited the United Nations to assist the transition to independence after elements of the Indonesian military attacked the East Timorese when they opted for independence.

Other workshops have been held on sensitive concerns. The CBM WG conducted a simulation on the Muslim secession movement in Mindanao, but only after the Philippine CSCAP granted permission. Moreover, Jusuf Wanandi, co-chair of Indonesia’s CSCAP, convened a meeting in March 2000 to discuss the crisis in his country. Although even China agreed to attend, some of its CSCAP members were concerned about the precedent it may have set on dealing with domestic matters.70 Generally, China’s CSCAP prefers to follow what its Track 1 counterpart has initiated rather than lead.71

As for CSCAP deliberations as early warnings of impending security problems, the record is not encouraging. The most obvious confrontations that could lead to war—the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea islands—are not on CSCAP’s WG agendas because of objections from China and the DPRK. On the other hand, some WG deliberations could be considered early warnings of problems that should be addressed. These include nuclear energy management, transnational

68 Author’s interviews with John McFarlane and Sandy Gordon of the Australia CSCAP, Canberra, 23 May 2000.
69 Author’s interview with Kwa Chong Guan, head of Singapore’s CSCAP, 24 May 2000.
70 Author’s interviews with Carolina Hernandez, co-chair of the CSCAP Steering Committee, Quezon City, Philippines, 19 June 2000; and with Clara Jowono, Angorra, Rizal Sukma, and S. Wiryono, all of Indonesia’s CSCAP, Jakarta, 30 June 2000.
71 Hui-yung Feng’s interviews with China’s CSCAP, Beijing, January 2001. Also, the author’s interview with Brian Job, co-chair of Canada’s CSCAP, Vancouver, 23 May 2001. Job’s view of China is based on a number of CSCAP meetings.
environmental issues such as ocean pollution and the regional spread of forest fire haze, and the future of theatre missile defence.

Also, the Transnational Crime WG could be considered an early warning, consciousness-raising activity for Southeast Asia for these issues were not on the region’s agenda prior to WG meetings.\(^{72}\) Southeast Asian governments have taken some interest in the findings of CSCAP work on transnational crime. Malaysia found the WG’s work on document fraud useful.\(^{73}\) Indeed, transnational crime may be the clearest example of CSCAP-initiated deliberations which generated ARF interest that had not already existed prior to CSCAP actions.

China’s CSCAP defines its primary role to be long-term planning (a kind of early warning) for government consideration. In its own meetings, the China CSCAP always includes an assessment of China’s long-term regional security environment and how China’s interests would be affected by the activities of the WGs.\(^{74}\)

Because CSCAP defines one of its most important roles as advising the ARF, an exploration of that relationship is essential. CSCAP WGs have had some success in providing studies for ARF action, particularly in maritime matters. As Desmond Ball notes:

> ... there has been considerable progress with the development of maritime information data bases ..., a multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents produced by the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation, and submitted to the ARF in early 1998; and exploration of “the idea of joint marine scientific research” and other aspects of ocean management.\(^{75}\)

These achievements tend to be practical, low cost, mutually beneficial, and peripheral to states’ core security concerns.

By contrast, CSCAP studies and proposals for a regional arms register, zones of cooperation in the South China Sea, arms control, and the institutionalization of conflict resolution mechanisms have stagnated. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in this paper, CSCAP was interested in convening joint seminars with the ARF to help reach an agreement on the overlap between CBMs and preventive diplomacy. A number of preventive diplomacy components were jointly developed by the CSBM WG and the CBM ISG. These included a conceptual paper on what preventive diplomacy entailed, an enhanced role for the ARF chair in providing good offices, the

\(^{72}\) Author’s interview with John McFarlane, former co-chair of the Transnational Crime WG, Canberra, 23 May 2000.

\(^{73}\) Author’s interview with Mely Anthony of Malaysia’s CSCAP, Kuala Lumpur, 6 June 2000.

\(^{74}\) Author’s interview with Hui-yung Feng of China’s CSCAP, Tempe, Arizona, 1 August 2000.

development of a register of experts and “eminent persons” as potential mediators, and production of an *Annual Security Outlook* on a voluntary basis. The Bangkok ARF meeting in July 2000 endorsed these ideas and praised CSCAP for its continuing provision of WG recommendations and guidelines for maritime cooperation, CBMs, and preventive diplomacy.\(^7\)

The CSCAP Steering Committee seized the opportunity offered by ARF at its July 2000 Kuala Lumpur meeting to institutionalize the submission of WG reports to the ARF chairs and generate CSCAP policy studies for ARF ISGs. In subsequent discussions between ARF senior officials and CSCAP officers, several additional proposals were broached, including reciprocal briefings of ARF senior officials and CSCAP officers; attendance of ARF senior officials at CSCAP meetings; attendance of CSCAP WG co-chairs at relevant ARF ISG meetings; and, for the first time, the tasking of CSCAP WGs by the ARF to develop implementation measures for preventive diplomacy and transnational crime. CSCAP could now organize workshops, prepare papers, and promote discussions by other NGOs on these subjects, helping to crystallize implementation options for the ARF.\(^7\)

Acceptance of these CSCAP proposals by the ARF would undoubtedly move Asia-Pacific Track 1-Track 2 security diplomacy closer together. It would probably increase CSCAP’s impact on ARF deliberations. However, from the perspective of the epistemic community literature, would it increase innovative thinking about the security problems being faced or simply reinforce conventional, politically acceptable approaches to these problems? That is, would CSCAP become even more like government think tanks? Put another way, does the closer one gets to power reduce new and politically volatile ways of conceptualizing solutions?\(^7\)

**Conclusion**

It has been less than 10 years since CSCAP came into existence. During that period, non-official security specialists with a wide range of expertise from most Asia-Pacific countries have written numerous papers, held scores of meetings, and produced multiple memoranda primarily designed to influence their governmental counterparts in the ARF. These security dialogues “strive to be inclusive (i.e. to engage parties from contending perspectives) and non-confrontational. Their goal is to achieve a


\(^7\) Canadian government officials in the ARF have told Canada’s CSCAP that Track 2 thinking is frequently more conservative than Track 1, perhaps because of CSCAP concern over what would be politically acceptable to governments. Author’s interview with the Canada CSCAP co-chair and former co-chair Brian Job and Paul Evans, Vancouver, 23 May 2001.
mutual understanding of perceived threats and security goals ... [and] to identify new perspectives and innovative solutions and concepts.\textsuperscript{79}

Has CSCAP met these criteria? In many respects, the answer is affirmative. The WGs have produced innovative and useful studies which have found their way into the academic literature and onto ARF ISG agendas. ARF officials from a variety of countries have uniformly expressed appreciation for CSCAP proposals and have positively evaluated their utility.\textsuperscript{80}

Nevertheless, this assessment is not entirely positive. Perhaps the most important CSCAP shortcomings echo ARF limitations. Neither body regularly deals with internal security; nor have they successfully addressed military build-ups and their attendant mutual suspicions. These two issues constitute the hard core of national security concerns for they encompass both the domestic and international components of both regime and state survival. Not surprisingly, states are loath to open these core concerns for international deliberation. For this kind of scrutiny to occur, much more mutual confidence than currently exists in the Asia Pacific would be needed.\textsuperscript{81}

A less severe shortcoming in the CSCAP process is found in what one analyst refers to as its “group think”.\textsuperscript{82} CSCAP tends to bring together those specialists who have worked together over many years in prominent think tanks and universities, who know and are comfortable with one another’s ideas, while frequently excluding those from institutional rivals or individuals whose perspectives are outside the mainstream. In this study, the author was told of instances in Southeast Asian states where prominent security specialists who were not members of the ASEAN-ISIS research institutes were excluded from their countries’ CSCAP membership. If these same CSCAP members are closely linked to their governments, then the


\textsuperscript{80} The CSCAP CSBM and Maritime Cooperation WGs have been particularly successful in this regard. The latter has produced a number of useful studies ranging from how to deal cooperatively with ocean pollution to ways of avoiding incidents at sea among navies. The CSBM WG, among other recommendations, developed the concept paper for preventive diplomacy recently incorporated by the ARF. As for ARF appreciation of CSCAP, the author’s interviews with ARF officials from the United States, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia from March to July 2000 recorded unanimous praise for CSCAP. Somewhat ironically, CSCAP members’ self-evaluation was frequently more critical than their ARF counterparts. That is, ARF respondents believed that CSCAP has more influence on ARF matters than CSCAP members believed.

\textsuperscript{81} John Garofano, “Flexibility or Irrelevance: Ways Forward for the ARF”, \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia}, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1999, pp. 84–89.

\textsuperscript{82} Herman Joseph Kraft, “Unofficial Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The Role of ASEAN-ISIS”, \textit{CANCAPS Paper}, No. 22, 2000, p. 10.
question arises whether CSCAP offers new, independent perspectives or merely helps legitimate government policy. Of course, the counter-argument to this criticism is that, far from being a drawback, CSCAP’s access to governments enhances CSCAP influence on policy.

As Brian Job and Paul Evans of Canada-CSCAP insist, CSCAP has created networks of Track 2 specialists on Asian security which have affected governments. The fact that both the United States and China are active participants in Track 1 and Track 2 Asian security is indirect evidence of the impact of epistemic communities on the importance and legitimacy of multilateral security fora for great powers. In both countries, cooperative security norms are articulated, though neither appears to compromise perceived national interests. And, indeed, China sets conditions for its CSCAP entry: no discussion of Taiwan or disputed sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

Finally, worth noting is some new thinking within CSCAP designed to open the process beyond national security organizations to other NGOs and society at large. Inspired by the success of NGO actions in promoting UN votes for the anti-landmine convention, some CSCAP members are discussing prospects for creating a Track 3 in security matters. Should such assemblies be born, they will probably be more critical of government actions and have less access than their Track 2 predecessors. Track 3 might well emphasize human security—an interest that has so far been confined to the Philippines at the Track 2 level. Should a CSCAP Peoples’ Assembly be convened (somewhat akin to the November 2000 ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly), would Track 2 then broker the Assembly’s views to Track 1; or will Track 3 develop its own separate approach to governments?

While Track 3 may be an additional stage for multilateral security discussions in Asia, this prospect is by no means assured. When first proposed for ASEAN in 1999, objections by Laos and Vietnam led initially to its cancellation. Neither Vientiane nor Hanoi wished to legitimate NGO involvement in their socio-economic affairs. Although the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly finally was convened, considerable suspicion about its deliberations characterized ASEAN’s communist members. Nevertheless, Track 3 could be another device for opening the internal affairs of Asia-Pacific states to international scrutiny, thus broadening the purview of Asian security dialogues to such important concerns as the policies that foment economic crises, social unrest, and illegal population movements. If an incipient Track 3 and Track 2 collaborate, ultimately Track 1’s agenda may expand as well.

83 Author’s interviews with Brian Job and Paul Evans, Vancouver, Canada, 23 May 2001.
Postscript, 2009

Over the past several years, Track 2 security organizations have worked particularly closely with Track 1 on non-traditional security (NTS). Illustrative of this focus is the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. While it is unlikely that the ARF will become a dispute resolution mechanism for its members, nevertheless, the attention the forum has devoted in recent years to NTS seems to have breathed new life into the organization. Unlike recurring and essentially fruitless discussions at annual meetings that urge Burma’s military junta to improve its human rights record or repeated endorsements of the Six Party Talks on denuclearization of North Korea, the NTS agenda threatens no national prerogatives. On the contrary, success in dealing with health pandemics, disaster relief, maritime security, and counter-terrorism redound to the benefit of all ARF members.

Exchange of information on best practices also characterizes the ARF as its reliance on Track 2 organizations such as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies and the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific increases. ARF Inter-sessional Group meetings and CSCAP committee gatherings co-occur in many instances so that the latter’s recommendations can be shared with their Track 1 counterparts in real time.

By 2008, the ARF was developing Work Plans—that is, practical measures—for counter-terrorism cooperation: identifying priority areas such as border control and setting targets for training border and customs officials to identify the movement of terrorist personnel and explosive materials. Pre-planning for disaster relief is also underway. Understandings on the roles of foreign militaries in assisting natural disaster recovery operations are being discussed by defence officials in ARF meetings so that a kind of status-of-forces arrangement is reached by ARF members. This understanding will provide guidance for militaries that deploy to countries that have experienced earthquakes, hurricanes, and other natural disasters for which armed forces are frequently best equipped first responders.85

ARF plans for a disaster relief exercise scheduled for May 2009 and coordinated by the Philippines and the United States include a substantial number of the forum’s 27 members and will involve representatives of their armed forces, according to Scot Marciel, the U.S. envoy to ASEAN. This exercise will be a test for the recently developed guidelines mentioned above. An important goal of the exercise will be to see how effectively militaries of third countries can operate in the territory of the state affected by the “disaster”86

Other issue areas in which the ARF is planning practical collaboration include maritime security and arms control. CSCAP has particularly focused on maritime

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85 Author’s discussion with Blair Parks Hall, Jr., Director of the Office of Regional and Security Policy, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 25 September 2008.
86 “Joint Exercise: Asia Sets Stage for Disaster Relief Exercise with Key Powers”, Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 13 July 2008.
security cooperation, publishing the results of its SG on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific in July 2008. The report provides “a set of fundamental non-binding principles to guide maritime cooperation in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas of the region”. The memorandum urges closer collaboration on “law and order at sea”, specifying the need for protocols among navies to deal with piracy, maritime terrorism, proliferation of WMD, illegal arms, drugs, and human trafficking as well as search and rescue, navigational safety, and marine environmental protection. Of course, this is a massive agenda and will take years to implement—if ever. But, CSCAP emphasizes the recommendations are “in line with the ARF’s long-term objective of becoming a mechanism for conflict prevention”. The memorandum lists a series of best practices in the maritime domain and urges the ARF to work collaboratively toward their realization.

In many cases, the ARF and CSCAP SGs work together closely; however, when sovereignty concerns arise, cooperation can be stymied. Some ARF members wish to create an ISG on non-proliferation of WMD. However, because other Southeast Asian governments foresee that such a body could intrude into the domestic affairs of members, no such ISG has been formed.

For the ARF to remain useful to the security needs of its members, the forum must engage more fully in preventive diplomacy. The NTS exercises discussed above are evidence of efforts to do so. Nevertheless, the ARF will not become a major decision-making body for its members. Unlike the EAS and the APEC, heads of state do not attend. ARF will remain a ministerial-level forum. As such, it can bring together foreign and defence ministers—the two national bureaucracies most involved in international security planning. By urging these ministries to develop practical plans and exercises for NTS challenges, the ARF can reassert its relevance for Asian security; and because these non-traditional challenges require collaboration, no member should feel threatened by engaging in their resolution. CSCAP will continue to provide non-official expert studies that governments can utilize as the basis for policy discussions. The Track 1-Track 2 nexus continues to prove its worth.

This chapter explores an apparent anomaly—namely, the influence of non-governmental institutions and unofficial processes on the development of the security architecture of an avowedly state-centric region order. Over the last several decades, a community of intellectuals, academics, and officials, operating trans-nationally through think tanks, universities, and private and public foundations, has been central to the establishment of economic and security structures in the Asia Pacific. Their achievements have been instrumental in fostering the formation of such institutions as the APEC forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but fundamentally their impact has been ideational. In this regard, they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities (both individual and collective), and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security. This has been accomplished through methods of diplomacy and dialogue outside the formal governmental system. Scholars, experts, journalists and politicians have engaged with officials (military and civilian) acting in their private capacities in what has come to be termed “second-track diplomacy” or simply Track 2 processes.1

The intriguing questions concerning the impact of Track 2 on the form and function of the Asia-Pacific security order arise from the complex and symbiotic relationships between the national and transnational, the unofficial and official, and Track 1 and Track 2 processes. Certainly changes in structural conditions have been important. The end of the Cold War in Asia created a climate of fluid

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power transitions, uncertainty regarding roles, and risk rather than threat in both the economic and security domains. Governmental and non-governmental actors alike have manoeuvred strategically to utilize Track 2 processes and institutional forms to advance their interests in light of changing power balances and altered national circumstances. But structural factors alone have not dictated the particular direction and content of the transformations that lie at the heart of the regional and subregional security complexes of the contemporary Asia-Pacific order. Ideas matter. Indeed the development of Asia-Pacific economic and security institutions is the story of the norm entrepreneurship and socialization associated with the advance of “open regionalism”, “cooperative security”, and the “ASEAN Way”.

To understand such changes, we must shift from realist and neo-liberal perspectives, focused on material interests and instrumental rationalities, to constructivist perspectives focused on the creation of identities (individual and collective), processes of social learning and the formation of communities (epistemic communities and security communities), and the acceptance of norms of conduct governing economic behaviour, political decision making, and dispute settlement. Most analysts write from one theoretical perspective or the other regarding the rationale for, and utility of, regional multilateral security institutions in the Asia Pacific. Realists such as Leifer, Dibb, and Buzan have emphasized structural characteristics, power capabilities, deterrence, and alliances and stress the ineffectiveness of regional multilateral institutions, including ASEAN and the ARF, to deal with persistent security issues. Those attuned to liberal and constructivist notions of interdependence, integration, and the potential for alteration of identities and interests, by contrast, focus on the promise of dialogue, networking, and informal institutions to create a new regional order, skirting questions of their incapacity to resolve current crises and historical animosities. With few exceptions (such as Acharya’s), Higgott’s complaint

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about the absence of careful research exploring the relationship of ideas, interests, and identity in the Asia-Pacific context remains valid.\(^5\)

This chapter takes a few steps to correct this problem. In conceptual terms, it does not hold to a single theoretical perspective, adopting instead what Katzenstein and Okawara have described as an “analytically eclectic” mode of inquiry.\(^6\) In substantive terms, the chapter focuses upon a sub-set of the broad spectrum of unofficial, public diplomacy and informal diplomatic processes, namely the development of what has come to be called “Track 2”, regional and sub-regional multilateral security dialogues throughout the Asia Pacific and sub-regions during the 1990s. Thus, it parallels Acharya’s treatment of the efforts of the states of the Asia Pacific at formal, multilateral institution building.\(^7\) These two regional dynamics of official and unofficial diplomacy cannot be considered separately. In a complex symbiotic relationship, both proceed within the same structural context and operate according to similar norms concerning security, sovereignty, and inter-state relations. Both reinforce each other in positive and negative ways and are conducted by cohorts of national elites with many common characteristics. Both face important challenges if their respective agendas are to move forward in the current decade.

Two difficult sets of questions must be confronted: First, reflecting on the past, to what extent have Track 2 processes had an impact on determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture of the Asia Pacific? In other words, has the expenditure of time, funding, and human resources in Track 2 security dialogue activities generated results? What evidence can be mustered to bolster any claims of “success”? Second, looking to the future, have the Track 2 processes of the 1980s and 1990s run their course? To what extent are its participants capable of sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities of sub-regional and regional security cooperation in what many observers believe is a transformed security environment?

The informal nature of Track 2 activities themselves, combined with the lack of agreement about what constitutes criteria for success and the absence of methodologies and institutional mechanisms for data gathering and analysis, frustrate the systematic, empirically-based study of the record of and progress of Track 2 (and Track 1) institutional development. A preliminary accounting is attempted in this chapter, leading to several observations. Perhaps, somewhat controversially, analysis

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of the record serves to reinforce a concern that Asia Pacific Track 2 activities may have peaked in the mid-1990s and have been failing to sustain momentum since then. In part, this stalling can be attributed to preoccupation on the part of elites with the various political and economic crises that have beset their region since 1997. However, more critical observers point to two other sets of factors: First, the achievements of the 1990s were the product of a particular, positive correlation of structural conditions and actor interests—the combination of post-Cold War climate of economic growth and optimism and the relaxation of political/security tensions particularly among the major powers, on the one hand; and, on the other, the effects of the concerted action of a cohort of regional elites who successfully advanced both ideational and instrumental goals (in effect an idiosyncratic generational effect). Second, Track 2 security dialogue processes, as currently constituted, have confronted an “autonomy dilemma”, an inherent tension between advancing ideas and initiatives and maintaining credibility with governments. In sum, have we reached what Paul Evans has described as the “end of the beginning” of a process that will continue to effectuate change, or are we at the “beginning of the end” of Track 2 security dialogue phenomena that have made their mark but will not be sustained, at least in many of its current institutional forms?

The Security Dialogue Process
Much has been written about the impact of the end of the Cold War: the cessation of bipolar strategic and ideological competition, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ascendance of the United States to global power status, the aspirations of China, India and Japan to assume major power roles on the regional and world stages, and the dramatic acceleration of economic growth. One must remember, however, that significant forces of change had been unleashed in Asia in the decades prior to 1989. With China’s modernization beginning some 10 years before, the tide of economic reform had been set in motion. With ASEAN’s founding a full 20 years earlier and the build-up to APEC’s establishment in 1989, multilateral institutionalization on economic and security dimensions had taken hold. What the ending of the global Cold War fostered, therefore, was twofold. First, it brought into question the rationale and institutional forms of the existing regional security architecture. Rooted in the structural and ideational context of Northeast Asia, this architecture was based on a pattern of bipolar alliance commitments—grounded in a logic of

9 See, for example, Rosemary Foot, “Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue”, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Eds.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
collective defence and deterrence against the Soviet Union and its client states, organized around a notion of security oriented toward external military threat, and devoted to norms of closed regionalism. Second, it facilitated the realization throughout Asia that to ensure the peace and stability fundamental to sustaining the now number one priority of economic growth, a reorientation of regional security institutions (informal and formal) was essential. Such efforts were spearheaded by the states of ASEAN, the peripheral “middle powers” Canada and Australia, and in certain instances by Japan. Their efforts, especially during the early 1990s, coalesced to advance the principle of cooperative security as the ideational foundation for a new security order. Thus, when the United States and China came to modify their resistance to regional multilateral security institutionalization, in part due to the atmosphere created by these norm entrepreneurship activities and in part due to reconsideration of their strategic interests, the path was cleared for the institutional innovations at both Track 1 and Track 2 levels in the Asia Pacific.

Cooperative Security

Again much has been written on the subject of cooperative security. Cooperative security envisages security as a value that cannot be achieved through unilateral action or exclusively defensive behaviour. Security is advanced by promoting cooperation rather than confrontation. Inclusion rather than exclusion of non-like-minded actors is to be promoted. Security is conceived in broader terms than the absence of military threats to national security—that is, in terms of alleviation of threats to environmental conditions, social and political stability, economic well-being, and cultural preservation.

As a concept, therefore, cooperative security draws on elements well grounded in Asian (particularly Southeast Asian) thinking: “comprehensive security” in advancing a non-military definition of security that embraced national and regional well-being; “common security” in its inclusion of the non-like-minded and its emphasis on mutual reassurance; and “collective security” in promoting the UN principles of peaceful settlement.

The key champions of cooperative security during the early 1990s were Australia and Canada, states for whom the principles of multilateralism and region-wide institution building were seen as essential both to their self-interest in sustaining a voice in global and regional affairs and to broader goals of sustaining peace and

10 One of the key initial works in this regard was David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1–16.

11 Jusuf Wanandi, “The Future of ARF and CSCAP in the Regional Security Architecture”, in Jusuf Wanandi (Ed.), Asia Pacific after the Cold War (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies 1996), p. 120.
stability over the long term.\textsuperscript{12} Their initial overtures, seen by Asian states as efforts to promote the transference of formal European-style institutional mechanisms to the region, were met with scepticism. Such modalities simply were out of tune with the “security culture” of the Asia Pacific. But, once such notions were dispelled, both sides came to realize that efforts to advance cooperative security through gradual, incremental, and unofficial processes were in tune with the norms, ideas, and institutional strategies developed over the years by the ASEAN states—encapsulated in the phrases “ASEAN Way” and “soft regionalism”. Thus the principles and practices of the ASEAN Way—soft regionalism, multilateralism, inclusion of the non-like-minded, avoidance of confrontation and arbitration, decision making by consensus, and an aversion to formal institutions and agenda setting—all resonated comfortably with those in ASEAN. Cooperative security thus became the conceptual cornerstone of their collective post-Cold War efforts at developing a multilateral regional security order, one that Acharya has characterized as “a cautious, informal, gradualist and consensus-seeking approach” that emphasized unofficial over governmental channels.\textsuperscript{13}

Track 2 Diplomacy and Security Dialogue

Traditional modes of inter-state diplomacy were neither sufficient for, nor necessarily sympathetic to, multilateral institution building around cooperative security principles. The Asia-Pacific region is still a decidedly state-centric environment in which governments guard their monopolies of authority both in domestic contexts (thus the preoccupation with non-interference) and in international relations (thus the strong advocacy of UN principles of sovereignty and equality). This was particularly true of the major regional powers concerning security matters during the Cold War era. Multilateral security institutions and principles of multilateralism held little interest for the major powers. Nor did they appeal to many smaller states suspicious of the prospects of engaging in inter-state regional fora in which their voices would be overwhelmed by regional powers.

The dynamic of Southeast Asian institution building arose as a reaction by these non-major powers (“small state” is an inappropriate term to apply to Indonesia) to this broad geopolitical dynamic. The initial formation of ASEAN was motivated by their desire to gain a collective voice in regional affairs as well as the coincidence


of interests among their national leaders to ensure the security of their respective regimes from internal and external challenges. In time the ASEAN collective, under the leadership of several of its prominent statesmen, took on a greater role in sub-regional and later regional affairs. This was not, however, accomplished through traditional diplomacy or formal institution building. It was attained through the nurturing of informal, unofficial networks—frequent and sometime regularized meetings of experts, business leaders, officials, and political figures designed to advance functional cooperation and promote mutual trust and confidence, i.e. Track 2 activities.

In the Asia-Pacific context, Track 2 has two connotations. At times, it refers to the entire complex of informal networking activities, unofficial channels of communication, and people-to-people diplomacy, across national and regional levels, including official and non-governmental diplomacy, undertaken across social, political, and economic realms of civil society.\(^\text{14}\) In this sense, Track 2 characterizes an overall dynamic of changing norms, identities, and institutions.\(^\text{15}\) It evokes notions of socialization, community building, nurturing of collective identity, and progress toward establishing a security community. Jusuf Wanandi makes this clear in the ASEAN context:

Since 1985, activities of NGOs, “second track” networking, and people to people diplomacy have given a new impetus to ASEAN’s existence and strengthen ASEAN as an organization. It has also added another element to ASEAN, namely the transformation of ASEAN from a gesellschaft (or modern social entity that has been founded on rational organizational requisites) into a gemeinschaft (an “organic” entity, that has elements of emotional or psychological ties between its members, that brings deeper, wider and stronger relations than in a gesellschaft.\(^\text{16}\)

But the term Track 2 is used in a narrower context as well, with reference to a particular form of dialogue activity associated, during the 1990s, with the promotion of cooperative security and multilateral security regionalism. Paul Evans refers to this form of Track 2 activity as "blended" dialogues “involving meetings of academics, journalists, and occasionally politicians and also ... government officials ...”

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15 Note, for example, the title of Desmond Ball’s 1994 article: “A New Era in Confidence-Building: The Second-Track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region”.

attending in their ‘unofficial’ or ‘private’ capacities”17. The key components of Track 2 diplomacy are meetings organized to engage participants from several countries in discussions concerning security issues of mutual concern. These have come to be called multilateral “security dialogues”. Here, the term “dialogue” is used to distinguish such meetings from the “negotiations” of Track 1 officials. Simultaneously they strive to be inclusive—that is, to engage parties from contending perspectives—and non-confrontational. Their goal is to achieve a mutual understanding of perceived threats and security goals. As such, they do not tend toward highly technical or scientific treatments of weapons systems and the like but seek to identify new perspectives, develop innovative solutions, and advance confidence and security building mechanisms (CSBMs).

Advocates of Track 2 security dialogues reject the notion that state officials should monopolize consideration of security matters. They seek to engage participation of leaders from the academic, financial, social, and political sectors of society in order to bring expertise and new ideas to the table and, more important, to foster transnational understanding and confidence building. Officials are not to be excluded, however. Indeed they are regarded as an essential component of the Track 2 dialogue process.

In principle, government officials are supposed to function in their “private capacities”, attending and participating without having to represent their governments. This freedom of discussion is meant to facilitate consideration of sensitive subjects and the exploration of ideas too abstract or too creative for the interstate negotiating table. As Sheldon Simon puts it, the engagement of officials in this mode was to facilitate thinking “outside the box”, providing opportunities to “address issues ... not yet on governmental security agendas as a kind of early warning mechanism, ... [to] provide fresh approaches to problems, ... [and to] redefine issues such that policymakers might see new ways of resolution”18. At the same time, the involvement of officials presumably brings to discussions informed representations of government policy positions and a focusing of attention on the need to advance practical and immediate, rather than abstract or distant, options for action.

In practice, however, the prospect of engaging governments and officials in spontaneous and unrestricted dialogue is inherently problematic, as will be discussed below. A deep tension is created by expecting individuals to function both as uninhibited participants and as informed representatives. Furthermore, governmental interests, political constraints and societal norms intervene. Some governments have viewed Track 2 diplomacy as another strategic tool for the promotion

of their regional security interests. Certainly Australia and Canada have pursued this approach. And if such engagement is benign and facilitative—if their officials and participating citizens are allowed the free rein of discussion desired in Track 2 fora—then an optimal result is achieved. But political and cultural considerations constrain many Track 2 representatives in the Asia Pacific, who cannot or do not wish to stray from their government’s official position. Thus, many analysts have come to regard the notion of officials acting in a private capacity as a polite fiction at best and discount the promise of Track 2 security dialogues for innovation and path-breaking initiatives.19

Institutional Forms

Asia-Pacific security was a growth industry during the first half of the 1990s. Both official and unofficial dimensions of activity burgeoned as states established bilateral relations with former adversaries, were swept up in the regional and global economic boom, and opened their societies—to a greater or lesser degree—to information about and participation in regional affairs. The cast of characters involved in security dialogue activities has grown dramatically.20 Table 5.1 outlines the range of participants. Focused on multilateral entities, it draws a distinction between governmental and non-governmental institutions and further divides them according to their sub-regional, regional, or inter-regional scope.21

Table 5.1 draws the reader’s attention to several points. First, note the twinning of Track 1 (governmental institutions) with their Track 2 (non-governmental) counterparts (ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS; ARF and CSCAP; APEC and PECC).22 Second, note the emergence in of non-Asia Pacific, inter-regional entities, i.e. insti-

20 Paul Evans, for instance, estimates that in the short span of 1989 to 1994, the numbers of dialogue mechanisms increased from only three or four to more than 50—with a corresponding increase in the number of institutions or actors involved in these meetings. See Paul Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis”, in Paul Evans (Ed.), Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), pp. 297–318.
21 This categorization is limited to multilateral entities and does not attempt to classify the diverse set of groups that sponsor regional or sub-regional meetings. For a running record that includes both official and non-governmental events, see Dialogue Monitor (1995–1998). Subsequent updates are posted at www.pcaps.iar.ubc.ca/pubs.htm.
22 Note that there is a third component of institutions such as APEC, CSCAP, ASEAN, and ISIS, namely national-level member committees, think tanks, and secretariats.
Thus one can point, respectively, to ASEM and CAEC set up in 1996; the EALAF, established in 1999; and the SCO, reconstituted from the previous Shanghai Five in 2001. Third, note that the Asia-Pacific security institutional framework does not encompass all of Asia’s geographic sub-regions. Only India is a member of the ARF, thus effectively precluding the forum’s consideration of South Asian matters. In

Table 5.1

**Types of multilateral institutions engaged in Asia-Pacific security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governmental Multilateral Institutions (Track 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-regional³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-governmental Multilateral Institutions (Track 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-regional institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. There are commonly accepted designations of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. Note, however, that in order to encompass Canada and the United States, the term North Pacific is employed (as in CSCAP’s North Pacific Working Group).


c. Defining “Asia Pacific” is the subject of much debate. For our purposes, the ARF designation of Asia Pacific will be used—thus including India but excluding the rest of South Asia.


g. See [http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/caec](http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/caec).

23 Membership in “Asia Pacific” institutions is idiosyncratic. North America (Canada, the United States, and Mexico) is a full partner in regional economic institutions (such as APEC) but not in security institutions (such as the ARF and CSCAP) in which only Canada and the United States are members. Indeed, the United States is a member of many so-called Asian institutions. On the other hand, the Pacific Islands have never really been a part of the Asia Pacific, at least not until very recently. Only PNG is in the ARF; and the Pacific Islands Forum only became an observer at CSCAP in December 2001.
Table 5.1 the governmental institution label is reserved for organizations formally constituted with states as members, with officials attending as representatives of their respective governments, and with decisions taken on behalf of governments—that is, Track 1 institutions. There are few such institutions; indeed, their relative paucity has distinguished the security architecture of the Asia Pacific.

The role of governments and the direct linkages of Track 1 to Track 2 institutions varies. In part, these are the issues referred to earlier, i.e. of governments and officials not functioning in their “private capacities”. However, there are also a set of cross-over institutions, i.e. institutions in which government set the agendas and participants for un-official consultations or in which officials in their “private capacities” dominate the meetings. Indeed a separate designation, “Track 1.5”, has been coined to refer to such institutions.24 Examples of Track 1.5 institutions would include the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)—a security dialogue organized by an American university that directly invites uniformed military and foreign ministry personnel as participants in their official capacities—or the so-called “Track 2” workshops officially organized under the auspices of the ARF (rather than through CSCAP).25

The number and frequency of meetings of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating transnationally in the Asia Pacific defies precise classification or accurate count.26 Their degree of institutionalization varies widely. The examples in Table 5.1, such as the ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP, are chartered organizations with a central secretariat, annual budgets, member organizations, and regular meetings. But this leaves out a gamut of “semi-institutionalized” Track 2 activities, some of which have played very important roles in promoting cooperative security. There is, for instance, the annual Asia Pacific Round Table, sponsored by ASEAN-ISIS, that brings together more than 200 people from countries throughout the region to debate a full range of contemporary security issues. The Round Table has evolved in size and agenda to become the largest, regular and most inclusive, regional Track 2 event of the year.27 Another much-cited example of confidence building through semi-institutionalized Track 2 activity has been the series of workshops organized by Indonesia (and funded by Canada) that have brought together representatives

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25 For more on the NEACD, see www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/.
27 See, for instance, the annual volume of conference proceedings produced by ISIS Malaysia.
of China and the other claimants in the South China Sea dispute for non-confrontational technical discussions.28

Efforts to catalogue NGOs in the Asia Pacific have been made, including a survey of institutions with mandates for education and policy research and an ambitious effort to account for NGOs with transnational agendas relevant to economic and security issues (broadly conceived).29 Although no groups representing civil society have been engaged in the Track 2 process, either by choice or by design, their importance is undoubtedly growing.30

Leadership and Norm Entrepreneurship

Richard Higgott has noted: “The presence of a big idea is not of itself a sufficient motor for progress. Ideas need articulate intellectual-cum-policy elites to carry them forward onto the political agenda.”31 Recent scholarship concerning changing norms and the development of institutional identities points to the key role played by so-called norm entrepreneurs in this process—those who take on the advocacy of alternative norms and attempt through creative tactics to promote their adoption.32

29 Paul Evans, Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto: University of Toronto–York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994; and Tadashi Yamamoto (Ed.), Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan Council of International Education, 1995). But, given the difficulties inherent in keeping track of the fluid world of non-governmental bodies, these surveys are probably capable of capturing trends in numbers and functional distribution rather than precise data.
30 It is intriguing to consider whether or not “virtual” networks and on-line dialogue mechanisms on the Internet should be included in our considerations. With the expansion of Internet connectivity and its use throughout the region, the number, scope, and quality of such instruments is growing rapidly. In my view, they represent a significant, possibly transforming, factor in the future development of the Track 2 phenomenon. The most prominent example to date would be the security dialogue networking projects and e-mail news services of the Nautilus Institute (www.nautilus.org). With a region-wide set of corresponding institutes and relatively open access for participation by security experts across the region, the Institute’s website and related archives, conference proceedings, and so forth increasingly function as an ongoing, regional, Track 2 dialogue mechanism.
In the Asia-Pacific context, the role of norm entrepreneurs in advancing cooperative security through multilateral institution building in the 1990s has been assumed variously by Australia and Canada, by Japan, and by the ASEAN states acting separately and in tandem. Canada and Australia—experienced internationalist middle powers—both had established track records of norm entrepreneurship, particularly in international trade and in non-proliferation regimes. As peripheral regional states, both believed that unless the norms and operative principles of the Asia-Pacific security order were changed, they could not gain the voice and place in regional affairs to which they aspired and, moreover, the region would remain unstable in fundamental ways that threatened their security interests. Thus, both championed initiatives for multilateral security institutionalization in Asia, particularly through the skilful advocacy of Track 2 processes. Their reliance on Track 2 reflected a geopolitical reality: Track 1 channels on security were largely closed to them, and both the United States and Asian states were uneasy with schemes to create regional multilateral security institutions. But it also reflected the mobilization in each country of a combined cohort of academics and non-governmental experts with their senior counterparts in their respective foreign ministries. Together their energies were instrumental in advancing initiatives such as CSCAP, encouraging the engagement of the non-like-minded, and generally promoting norms of good governance, human rights, and human security—the last particularly by Canada under an activist foreign minister in the late 1990s.

The other agents for regional change were the ASEAN states as a collective, but especially Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. That the ASEAN states should assume a lead role in advancing regional institution building was not a surprise in light of their long experience in nurturing Track 1 and Track 2 collaboration in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN states had a strong common interest in promoting cooperative security in a regional context. Thus, they acted in concert as entrepreneurs for multilateral institutional initiatives that maintained a key role for ASEAN management and ASEAN norms of inclusion and decision making. For them, too, focusing on Track 2 diplomacy and establishing non-governmental

33 Andrew Fenton Cooper & Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993).
34 It is also noteworthy that Mikhail Gorbachev, in the late 1980s, made some initial efforts at regional norm entrepreneurship concerning the establishment of an Asia-Pacific security framework.
institutions as precursors or supporters of Track 1 institutional counterparts was critical. Unlike Australia and Canada, the ASEAN states were more comfortable with minimal levels of formal institutionalization oriented toward dialogue rather than dispute arbitration.

Japan, on the other hand, has taken a lower profile and more cautious stance as an institutional innovator; and, as a result, its role as a norm entrepreneur probably has been underestimated. Although seen as constrained by cultural attitudes, hindered by political and bureaucratic rigidities, and wedded to a bilateral approach to security matters, Japan has adroitly promoted regional multilateralism—particularly on the economic front but also in the political-security dimension, as with the ARF.

But leadership has an important personal dimension as well, which in the Asia Pacific Track 2 realm is seen in two ways. First, the norm entrepreneurial activities of key states have been associated with the high profile taken by activist national figures, in particular their foreign ministers: for Australia, Gareth Evans; for Canada, Joe Clark and Lloyd Axworthy; for Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan. Each of these figures was willing to challenge the established consensus and norms to provoke debate and action on new initiatives. Indeed the ebb and flow of regional Track 1 and Track 2 innovation over the last several decades can be correlated to a considerable extent with the appearance (and inevitable receding) of these men from the regional political scene. Second, there is a cohort that can be characterized as the “Asia Pacific Track 2 elite”—a set of individuals whose commitment to regional multilateralism transcends national barriers and who, by virtue of their advantaged positions as directors of think tanks, holders of prominent academic posts, and the like, have been remarkably effective in coordinating their energies to advance institutional innovation. These people come from the upper ranks of the educated, urban, middle and upper classes. In many instances, they will have been “Western educated”, particularly those from Southeast Asia (and Korea in Northeast Asia). Well travelled outside the borders of their own countries, they represent a thoroughly internationalized subset of the population. Many will have served in office as elected representatives, party officials, or senior bureaucrats. Often, they will hold multiple roles, serving simultaneously in leadership positions in their countries’ PECC and

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38 Certainly, this is true of Canada, the case most familiar to me. For instance, the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue initiative of the early 1990s was advanced by Joe Clark, but abandoned by his successor. Lloyd Axworthy’s activist human security agenda, with its significant Track 2 and NGO components, is likely too, to be downplayed by future foreign ministers, especially in the aftermath of September 2001.
APEC teams, on CSCAP member committees, and in high-profile national institutes. Those within ASEAN especially will have developed close personal relationships. Indeed this tightly knit, cohort of ASEAN think tank leaders, supplemented by select individuals from other countries, including the United States, has been the driving force of economic and security regionalism over the last several decades.39

Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific

It is worth pausing to note the historical antecedents to the Asia-Pacific regional NGOs of today. These roots extend back to the early decades of the last century—to the founding of the Pan-Pacific Union in 1907 and the establishment of the Institute of Pacific Research (IPR) in 1925.40 The IPR operated with distinction for many years as an agent for mutual understanding, emphasizing educational activities and cross-cultural programs, until 1960 when it fell victim to McCarthy-era politics in the United States. Woods notes: “In its form, function, and impetus … the IPR represents the institutional precursor of the INGOs today” involved in Pacific economic and security cooperation.41

One can draw several lessons from the IPR experience. First, the moments in the wake of major systemic upheaval provide the best opportunity for institutional innovation. The IPR was formed at a time when the cosmopolitan business, social, and education elites from both sides of the Pacific engaged to improve relations

39 I know of no studies that systematically identify the members of what might be called the ASEAN or Asia Pacific Track 2 elite—that is, network studies that chart their individual backgrounds, career paths, and interactions. Various observers have noted in passing the importance of key figures like Yusuf Wanandi (Indonesia), Noordin Sopie (Malaysia), Carolina Hernandez (Philippines), Paul Evans (Canada), Desmond Ball (Australia), and Joe Jordan and Ralph Cossa (United States)—all, for instance, instrumental in the founding of CSCAP. See, for instance, Herman Kraft, “Security Studies in ASEAN: Trends in the Post-Cold War Era”, in Paul Evans (Ed.), Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto: University of Toronto–York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994); Herman Kraft, “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track 2 Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2000, pp. 343–356; Paul Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis”, in Paul Evans (Ed.), Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto: University of Toronto–York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994); Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2000).

40 The record of Asia Pacific non-governmental diplomacy through the twentieth century is analysed perceptively by Lawrence Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993).

41 Ibid, p. 39.
among their countries and peoples. Second, the institutional format, premiered by the IFR, involving a region-wide council, whose membership in turn is composed of representatives from respective national committees, has proven to be the common, and generally successful, pattern for non-governmental regional institutions in the Asia Pacific. Third, the apparent asset of having privileged access to high-level decision makers may prove to be a liability if the political climate changes dramatically—a fate that befell the IPR. Finally, institutions that are basically elite bodies will falter when placed under critical scrutiny or plagued by controversy unless they have attended to maintaining broad-based public support and identification with the interests of civil society—again the fate of the IPR.

Economic Regionalism

The development of economic regionalism in the Asia Pacific has been studied and chronicled extensively. Clearly, the economic dimension sets the context for regional security developments. As Acharya states: “The demand for multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific is fuelled … [by] a desire to build upon, exploit and maximize the pay-offs of economic liberalization and interdependence.” Security multilateralism, therefore, is instrumental to advancing the conditions of peace and stability necessary to sustain economic prosperity. Economic regionalism, having predated the end of the Cold War by almost two decades, implanted norms and institutional forms, which through their success, became precedents for Asian states when they took up the reformulation of their regional security architecture.

Indeed, one can point to several factors that have influenced the evolution of Track 2 security dialogue processes during the past decade. With the abandonment of ideology and adoption of market economic principles, norms of regional interaction were reoriented to centre on principles of market-led integration and open regionalism. The notion of divorcing economics from political-security matters and issues of governance has eroded as economic interdependence has increased, and social issues associated with economic disparities and social safety nets have

42 The IPR’s membership included leaders from all major sectors of public life. Holders of public office and serving officials, however, were not actively engaged—a contrast to contemporary Track 2 processes. The institute was privately funded by its national councils. Its mandate was to avoid discussion of contemporary political problems, national and international.


risen on the regional agenda. Moreover, economic regionalism has firmly established the role of non-governmental actors in regional institution building. The tripartite engagement of academic experts, private-sector representatives, and government officials has been an accepted principle of regional economic institutions for more than three decades. Select “policy academics” have served as norm entrepreneurs for economic cooperation and played key roles in determining the fundamental choices for domestic economic reform and cooperation among Asia-Pacific states. Analysts point to the emergence of an influential community of “neoclassical economists and free trade acolytes” as the norm entrepreneurs for institutional development.46

As well, the setting up of semi-institutionalized, non-governmental institutions as confidence-building instruments and ground-breakers prior to the founding of official multilateral institutions has become an established practice. Thus, PAFTAD (established in 1968) and PBEC (begun in 1980) preceded the establishment of APEC by almost a decade. At the same time, formal institutionalization and centralization of capacities for agenda setting, policy research, and regulation have been resisted. Consistent efforts have been made to socialize and positively engage the non-like-minded. Criteria for membership in economic institutions have been formulated creatively to allow for representation of non-state actors (Taiwan and Hong Kong).

Good economic times during the 1980s and 1990s instilled a false sense of confidence and tended to moot disagreements over principles within regional institutions. With the recent disruption in the economic environment, these disagreements have come to the fore and challenged the capacities of institutions, raising questions as to their representative character and thus their adaptability and long-term viability.

Track 2 Security Dialogue: Major Trends, Common Characteristics

The beginning of the 1990s was a particularly opportune moment for the advancement of cooperative security and associated strategies of multilateral institution building. Asian economies were booming. Confidence in regional institutions, such as ASEAN and the APEC forum, was high. No security crises, either domestic or regional, loomed to threaten the region’s stability. At the same time, states began to realize that the Cold War security architecture would not suffice. New thinking and new options were required. This set the stage for the surge in Track 2 security dialogue activities, its momentum emanating largely from the institutions and processes already firmly established in Southeast Asia and supported by multilateralists such as Canada and Australia. Although less hospitable ground for such initiatives was found in Northeast Asia, here too there were significant shifts in attitudes toward multilateralism. In South Asia, by contrast, geopolitical conditions and entrenched hostility sustained an atmosphere allowing only tentative efforts at dialogue.

Each sub-regional environment in the Asia Pacific is itself a unique security complex—a blend of historical experiences of conflict and conquest, cultural affinities and tensions, perceptions of threat, and combinations of regime types. Before contrasting their quite different experiences, however, it is useful to step back and reflect on region-wide similarities of the Asia Pacific Track 2 record of the last decade. These common features may be consolidated around nine points:

1. Track 2 security dialogue multilateralism was motivated by the perceived need to engage both the United States and China in the region’s security architecture. The formation of the ARF and CSCAP in the mid-1990s, supported by these two major powers, thus has been the landmark in post-Cold War security cooperation institution-building in the region.

2. The non-major powers looked to multilateral fora to voice their individual and collective interests. The states of Southeast Asia, working through ASEAN, sought to foster the formation and management of regional security institutions. In short, ASEAN was the primary engine of the Track 2 process.

3. The “soft multilateralism” of Track 2 processes ensured a minimalist approach to institution building—inhibiting the establishment of bureaucratic capacities, independent secretariats, or monitoring or action capabilities in both Track 1 and Track 2 formations.

4. Membership in Track 2 institutions is confined to states. Security-oriented institutions such as CSCAP have no counterpart to the representation granted Taiwan and Hong Kong in regional economic institutions.

5. The Track 2 enterprise has remained an essentially state-centric process. Individuals—whether from governments, think tanks, universities, businesses, or NGOs—are chosen to participate in Track 2 fora only as national representatives. (This does not mean they necessarily advocate national policy positions.)

6. The security issues considered in Track 2 fora continue to be defined largely by states. The various elements of comprehensive security beyond traditional military threats have gained a place on the agenda, but internal security matters have been kept off the table.47

7. Inclusion of the non-like-minded has been a consistent priority in Track 2 processes and has shown results. Laos, Vietnam, Burma and North Korea have all been engaged in multilateral fora. Lines of regional membership

47 But this too is changing in both Track 1 and Track 2 fora. At the ARF, for instance, Burma’s domestic situation has been raised by proactive officials. Within CSCAP, the internal economic and political situation of countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, has been openly considered, indeed with the orchestration of these two respective CSCAP members. Of course, APEC finds its annual leaders’ meeting increasingly focused on political/security issues of a domestic nature.
have been drawn, however. The Asia Pacific of Track 2 includes India, but purposely omits the rest of South Asia.

8. Track 2 is process-oriented and process-driven. Dialogue is seen as having intrinsic value as a confidence-building and socializing measure. From this perspective, rather than from a results-oriented outlook, Track 2 security dialogues are regarded as important and successful by most participating Asian states.

9. Economic institutional forms continue to serve as models for the design and operation of both Track 1 and Track 2 institutions.

Southeast Asia

Behera, Evans and Rivzi have outlined the key features of the essence and exceptionalism of the Southeast Asian context in this statement:

ASEAN began with a political agreement conceived at the head of state and ministerial level operating well ahead of bureaucratic institutions, policy institutes, the private sector or the general public. In a second phase, bureaucracies and policy institutes have played a major role. Only in the last decade has the private sector been a significant part of the process. The public remains only partially engaged.48

Security institution building in Southeast Asia, therefore, began with a path-breaking Track 1 experiment. Chroniclers of ASEAN, notably Leifer and Acharya, point to the special combination of regional and global conditions and idiosyncratic leadership that brought the original member states together.49 In effect, Indonesia chose to renounce sub-regional dominance and join a cohort of smaller states to pursue common goals through multilateral collaboration. Track 2 institutionalization therefore advanced in the wake of the success of official diplomacy and state-to-state cooperation—an exception to the expected sequence of Track 2 laying the groundwork for Track 1 institutions.

ASEAN-ISIS was established in 1984, some 17 years into ASEAN’s existence.50


Regarded as the primary Track 2 agent of Southeast Asia, ASEAN-ISIS merits special attention. In Herman Kraft’s words, “Track 2 in Southeast Asia is largely synonymous with ASEAN-ISIS.” 51 It functions as a network of security institutions, one from each state. Its leaders are among the movers and shakers in the political life of their own states, as well as figures in the ASEAN and regional elite, acting as norm entrepreneurs and institution builders in both economic and political-security dimensions. To a substantial degree, ASEAN-ISIS became a personalized institution reflecting the close relations among its directors. Its success reflects their ability to manoeuvre in tricky political waters as well as their abiding commitment to the Track 2 process. With its own governments, ASEAN-ISIS has succeeded in gaining a direct voice in ASEAN by holding meetings each year since 1993 with both the ASEAN foreign ministers and senior officials. It therefore exercises influence at the governmental level attained by few other Track 2 institutions in the region.

ASEAN-ISIS has served a critical role as an agent of socialization and identity building not only within the Southeast Asian context but also, even more significantly, at the regional level. It has worked to engage, influence, and develop capacity in non-member countries prior to their joining the ASEAN fold. It organizes numerous meetings, including the annual Asia Pacific Round Table. It has been cautiously innovative in broadening the security agenda toward human security and human rights issues. It has also functioned as a gatekeeper, limiting the role for other institutions and restricting invitations and access to meetings. 52

In recent years ASEAN-ISIS may be reflecting the symptoms of ASEAN itself. Both have struggled with the entry of new members and the de facto two-tiered organizations that have resulted. Tensions within the network have arisen not only because of the reticence and conservatism of new members but also because of the uncertainty arising from states undergoing dramatic political upheaval. Generational shifts in leadership are also under way, as new figures look to place their own stamp on the organization. Though ASEAN-ISIS has not stalled, as has ASEAN, its capacity for action has been slowed—thus demonstrating the vulnerability of Track 2 institutions to shifts in their larger political-security environments.

The ARF and CSCAP

Although the number and variety of regional Track 2 activities grew rapidly in the early 1990s, most of them were ad hoc and not fully inclusive. The feeling grew among the Track 2 elite that an inclusive, regularized, regional institution was needed to ensure a cumulative and lasting impact. ASEAN-ISIS played a critical role in orchestrating the ASEAN project to lead the establishment of regional multilateral

52 Ibid, p. 349.
security institutions. It served as the main organizer of a series of meetings during 1991 and 1992 that brought together a select group of the region’s Track 2 elite to design a lobbying strategy for what until this point had remained a vision—namely, an inclusive, region-wide Track 2 institution. These efforts culminated in the Kuala Lumpur statement of 1993 establishing the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

To its adherents CSCAP is “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused, and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters.” CSCAP is organized according to the design and practice of the PECC. Each member state is directed to maintain a broadly representative member committee from which delegates are selected to participate in CSCAP activities. China effectively stalled CSCAP for several years by making its participation contingent on denying direct representation to Taiwan. Five working groups (Maritime Cooperation, CSBMs, Cooperative and Comprehensive Security, Transnational Crime, and North Pacific) were formed for the joint purposes of confidence building, informed debate, and development of policy proposals to be directed to the ARF. Certainly the working groups have been busy. CSCAP has established itself as a viable and valuable organization, although it too is experiencing critical scrutiny from those who want it to be more proactive.


54 Besides the directors of ASEAN-ISIS, the group included Canadian, Australian, Japanese, Korean, and U.S. institute directors or their representatives.


57 In a complex formula, experts from Taiwan may be invited to attend CSCAP meetings as “other participants”. Furthermore, these individuals must be chosen from a short list of names agreed upon in advance by CSCAP China and the CSCAP co-chairs.


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The ARF’s formation followed shortly after CSCAP’s establishment—the result of effective coordinated action at both official and unofficial levels. Canada, Australia, and Japan joined forces with the ASEAN states to persuade the less multilaterally inclined United States and China not to oppose the forum. The ASEAN-ISIS played a key role in the establishment of the ARF, not only in actively promoting its establishment but also in seeking to ensure that ASEAN maintained a central role in the ARF’s direction and management. Thus ASEAN-ISIS was instrumental in writing the 1995 ARF Concept Paper, a document that cemented the primacy of ASEAN norms of operation and guaranteed roles for ASEAN states in decision making.

Much emphasis has been placed on the need to establish links between CSCAP and its Track 1 counterpart, the ARF. Progress on this front has been limited, however. Although the ARF has made gestures toward CSCAP, most of these have not gone beyond rhetorical acknowledgment of the positive support of Track 2 activities. Some promising results have been achieved on issues of maritime cooperation. However, CSCAP’s singular success in this regard—what has been hailed as an “exemplary initiative” demonstrating the supportive role that Track 2 diplomacy can play for Track 1—has been its work to overcome the logjam the ARF encountered in defining “preventive diplomacy”. CSCAP ran a “workshop” on preventive diplomacy in Bangkok in 1999 and another in Singapore in 2000. These succeeded in producing a “working definition and statement of principles” that were subsequently taken on by the ARF, with acknowledgement to CSCAP, in 2001.

As Desmond Ball observed just prior to assuming the role of CSCAP co-chair in 2000, CSCAP as a Track 2 organization contains “inherent sources of tension”. Proclaiming the achievement of direct utility to the ARF as one its central goals has diverted attention from the broad value of the confidence and community building achieved through CSCAPs ongoing programme of meetings. Furthermore, it has

59 See, for instance, Carolina Hernandez, *Track Two Diplomacy, Philippine Foreign Policy and Regional Politics* (Manila: CIDS-University of Philippines Press, 1994).
61 See Desmond Ball & Amitav Acharya, *The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999). Note CSCAP “workshops” are ad hoc meetings of selected individuals drawn together under the sponsorship of one or more CSCAP member committees. They are not meetings of CSCAP’s regular Working Groups.
62 I am indebted to Ralph Cossa for clarification on this issue.
fuelled a rather sterile debate within the organization over “the issue of conceptual/policy balance.”

**Northeast Asia/North Pacific**

Nomenclature is important. Thus the distinction between Northeast Asia and North Pacific has taken on significance—especially as it has come to be applied to Track 2 security activities. The most common label, “Northeast Asia”, while obviously applying to the countries on the Asian continent, has generally also counted the United States as a member of this sub-regional cohort that involves Japan, the two Koreas, China, Russia, and more recently also Mongolia. The term “North Pacific”, by contrast, denotes a sub-region with a trans-Pacific dimension, as its members include the states of Northeast Asia, the United States and Canada. It is the latter phrase, “North Pacific”, which has been adopted by CSCAP and Canadian Track 2 activists to describe institutional working groups and initiatives.

There is a striking contrast in the differing levels of receptivity to multilateral cooperative security initiatives and associated Track 2 activities between North-east and Southeast Asia. Even the most tentative efforts to promote multilateral institutional initiatives, official or unofficial, met strong resistance in the Cold War years. In a security complex dominated by major-power relations centred on the residual Cold War divisions of the Korean Peninsula (until 2000) and over the Taiwan Strait, traditional logics of deterrence and instruments of alliance have prevailed.

Nevertheless one can point to two notable developments over the last decade in the Northeast Asia security order. The first concerns the evolving character of major-power relations, particularly those involving China and the United States. Although their bilateral relationship continues to reverberate with the tensions inherent in a situation where a rising regional power encounters a dominant global actor, Washington and Beijing have collaborated to devise solutions. Certainly, this has been evident in the management of the various crises instigated by North Korea. One senses as well that a tacit agreement was reached between the two after the 1995–1996 crises concerning Taiwan. Some analysts have gone so far as to speak of an informal concert of powers, including Japan and at times, Russia, operating in Northeast Asia. They point to the establishment of KEDO, the initiative of the

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Four Party Talks, and the direct and indirect coordination of humanitarian assistance to North Korea as examples of concert behaviour. But as Acharya points out, these efforts, though multilateral, are largely functional arrangements devised as ad hoc responses to crises. The antipathy among the major powers toward establishment of an inclusive, sub-regional, Track 1 security institution remains. Although a long-term resolution of the Korean Peninsula problem undoubtedly will require setting up a major multilateral institutional structure, recent calls for a Track 1 consultative mechanism with up to seven members (including Mongolia) have not received support.

A quite different picture emerges when one turns to the Track 2 dimension of Northeast Asian/North Pacific relations. Here, one can point to significant advances in cooperative security, confidence building, and multilateral security institutionalization over the last decade. It was not surprising that Canada has emerged as a vocal norm entrepreneur in Track 2 diplomacy in this sub-regional context. Seeking a regional voice—but with limited financial and human resources and finding that official, multilateral security institutionalization was firmly resisted—the Canadian government in the early 1990s focused its efforts on opening Track 2 channels. Thus, its North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (1991–1993) broke new ground. Though it did not succeed in establishing a sub-regional dialogue institution—the general feeling was that it was far ahead of its time—it did set in motion networks of contacts that have flourished throughout the balance of the decade. It also introduced a set of policy-oriented academics who rapidly became accepted as members of the regional Track 2 elite.

With the removal of Cold War barriers, the opening of official bilateral relations among the states of Northeast Asia (excepting North Korea until very recently) set in motion a corresponding tide of Track 2 bilateral and trilateral consultations among institutes and think tanks that continues to flourish. Government attitudes toward Track 2 multilateral security mechanisms, however, were another matter. Washington, in particular, was vocal in its scepticism about their utility—“solutions in search of a problem”, in the words of one senior U.S. official. In Tokyo and Beijing, for different reasons, multilateral fora were rejected as inappropriate for the discussion of bilateral security matters. Gradually, however, these attitudes altered. By 1993, President Clinton was endorsing “the promotion of new multilateral regional dialogues

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on the full range of common security challenges.” Chinese attitudes evolved, too, as Beijing began to realize it could advance its interests and gain regional influence through participation in Track 2 activities.

But in relative terms, Northeast Asia/North Pacific still lagged in its support for multilateral security dialogues. CSCAP’s establishment of its North Pacific Working Group (NPWG) provided the first inclusive Track 2 vehicle. It remains the sub-region’s only “full-house” security dialogue, having consistently engaged North Korean and Mongolian participation in its meetings. The NPWG realizes both the advantages and disadvantages of this full participation. On the one hand, it has promoted mutual understanding of the threat perceptions and security concerns of all sides. On the other hand, it has had to restrict its agenda to consideration of general and non-sensitive matters and thus has not produced policy papers setting out new initiatives. And because of sensitivity, particularly China’s, to the consideration of self-defined “internal” security matters, issues such as the Taiwan Strait cannot be brought to the table.

Extra note should be made of another prominent Track 2 forum: the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). Administered through the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the NEACD appears in the eyes of some Asian states to remain as a U.S.-led activity. It took up the reins following the Canadian NPCSD initiative, but has not sustained itself as an inclusive institution: Canada has been excluded from membership; North Korea has not participated beyond attendance at its initial planning session. As a Track 1.5 dialogue mechanism, the NEACD avowedly seeks to advance, if not become itself, a Track 1 forum.

South Asia

South Asia remains essentially inhospitable to Track 2 diplomacy. By and large, sub-regional conditions fail to meet the minimal levels of trust and incentives for official and unofficial interaction necessary to support Track 2 security dialogue processes. The geopolitical asymmetry of South Asia, unlike Southeast Asia, has not been overcome. India’s dominance of economic, political, and security matters has increased in the post-Cold War period. Hostility between the key actors, India and Pakistan, is sustained by ongoing conflict and inflamed by domestic political

70 Reports on CSCAP North Pacific Working Group meetings may be accessed through www.iir.ubc.ca.
actors. Practical barriers to communication, caused by technological problems or imposed by rigid government regulations and influence over the media, inhibit people-to-people interaction across the borders.

There is no regional counterpart at the Track 2 level for the SAARC, the South Asian Track 1 institution. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the other sub-regional contexts, the Pakistani and Indian governments do not encourage Track 2 dialogue. Serving government officials have almost always refused to take part—dismissing them as “dove to dove debates [that] lack credibility” or as initiatives by outsiders, e.g. the United States, seeking to meddle in sub-continental affairs. While there have been a number of attempts to orchestrate dialogues between retired or former government officials, these have apparently reverted to “mini-government forums” and rehearsals of standard government lines.

Nor has Track 2 dialogue among non-governmental experts developed. Over the years, their respective governments have systematically sought to marginalize voices within their own societies that are viewed as dissenting from or challenging government security policies, such as their government’s nuclear stances or their hardline stances on the Kashmir problem. As Shah states:

71 Amitav Acharya, in “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change”, in Muthiah Alagappa (Ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 210–240, considers the nature and record of the South Asian Track 1 institution, the SARC. The discussion in this section is limited to the India-Pakistan situation, leaving aside Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Certainly, various attempts, official and un-official, initiated from South Asia and by outsiders, have been made to end the tragic Sri Lankan civil war. At time of writing, a cease fire proposal brokered by Norwegian Foreign Ministry appeared to hold out some hope.


73 This discussion draws heavily on Behera, Evans, and Rivzi (1997). Their cataloguing of the non-official dialogue activities in South Asia is, to my knowledge, the only systematic effort of its kind. Their accounting stops with 1996. The Dialogue Monitor referred to in note 5 and elsewhere does not take into account sub-regional South Asia activities. It does, however, monitor the participation of South Asian members in regional dialogues.


In both the countries, Track 1 and Track 2 rarely interact. The bureaucracies on both sides have an interest in maintaining the status quo and are suspicious of non-governmental dialogue as it poses a threat to their monopoly over bilateral interactions.77

Those from both on and outside the sub-continent who look to the prospect and potential of ultimately establishing a viable Track 2 security dialogue process on the sub-continent, have looked instead to the initiation of “unofficial” dialogue activities as a starting point. Indeed, there have been a substantial number of unofficial dialogues (perhaps 40 to 50) organized (usually with the direct or indirect support of outside institutions such as the Ford Foundation) to bring together leading citizens from various walks of life in an effort to establish better understanding and a common ground for reconciliation. Some reach back to the 1950s, but most are recent formations of the 1990s that Behera, Evans, and Rivzi attribute to a changing social and political climate, that evidences some positive prospects for progress. Thus, while state-to-state security relations may remain in stasis (and indeed lurch from crisis to crisis in the post-1998 nuclear environment), the economic engagement and the opening of society to the outside world, particularly by India, moves forward quickly. Regional non-government elites are becoming more attuned to transnational and unconventional security issues. Behera, Evans, and Rivzi cite the influence of the diaspora of highly educated South Asian students who, from their places of employment abroad or upon their return to the sub-region, voice their frustration with what they regard as outmoded security and defence postures. For the generation of the younger, urban, educated, middle-class aspirants, located on or off the sub-continent, increasingly, government elites are regarded as part of the problem—and thus to be side-stepped rather than engaged in dialogue. The hope for change, therefore, is seen to lie in establishing people-to-people dialogue between “younger”, engaged professionals78 and efforts to bring experts together to solve functional problems, such as water distribution or environmental concerns, rather than attempts to tackle directly the conduct of official-non-official Track 2 security dialogues as they are found elsewhere in the region. A prime example of the former are the workshops sponsored by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) in Colombo, which since 1997 have been bringing together selected cohorts of “third generation” professionals from the private sector, academia, NGOs, and the media to “create a network for sustained interaction … to [facilitate] the evolution of alternative approaches with a regional perspective, [and] ... advance the cause of


78 Of course, one must always be cognizant of how the designation of someone as “young” is a subjective determination that varies considerably in the cultures on both sides of the Pacific.
cooperation, conflict resolution and conflict management in the region.”

While there has at times been speculation that the heightening of tensions to crisis levels on the sub-continent may crystallize the need for tension reduction and confidence building activities, there appears to be little evidence in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests, the Kargil incident of 1999, and the events after 11 September 2001, that any sustained Track 2 security dialogue processes have taken hold.

Finally, South Asia’s place in the regional context of multilateral security cooperation is very restricted. India is an invited participant in both Track 1 (the ARF) and Track 2 (CSCAP) institutions. Indeed Behera, Evans, and Rivzi note the increased participation of South Asians in these and other regional settings. But issues of inter-state or intra-state security in South Asia are not on these agendas. India is neither willing to take part in such discussions nor amenable to extending membership in regional institutions to the other South Asian states. Nor are the members of regional institutions, such as the ARF and CSCAP, interested in inviting Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka to join them, presumably seeking to avoid entanglement in the intractable inter-state conflicts of South Asia but also to avoid the implications of bringing the tensions arising from political/religious societal conflict more directly into their institutions. In sum, South Asia has been and is likely to remain largely isolated from the broad impact of the evolving norms and confidence-building practices of Asia-Pacific security regionalism.

Track 2: Record, Achievements, and Future

Although Track 2 activities, by virtue of their unofficial character, informality, and largely ad hoc nature, are difficult to track in a complete and systematic fashion, an attempt has been made to chart Asia-Pacific multilateral security dialogue over the course of the 1990s. The data in the Dialogue Monitor yield useful observations regarding general trends and patterns.

Preliminary data and patterns

Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1, respectively, provide a tabular and plotted summary of Track 1 and Track 2 dialogue activities from 1993 to 2000. The overall pattern is striking. The peak years of activity were 1994 and 1995. The frequency of Track 2 events rose dramatically prior to 1994, fell off quickly, and then stabilized to about half of

79 See the www.rcss.org website.
81 Indeed, CSCAP India boycotted CSCAP meetings for a period of two years after CSCAP passed a resolution commenting negatively upon its and Pakistan’s nuclear testing in 1998.
82 One should be reluctant to subject these data to extensive interpretation, however, given the extent of non-reporting that may be involved.
Track 2 activity shows a quite different pattern: building quickly in the early 1990s, but remaining relatively stable since then. There could be several explanations for this main finding. None is particularly satisfactory, however, or capable of being confirmed on the basis of current data. One conclusion is that Asia was simply the hot topic of think tanks, foundations, and academics during the immediate post-Cold War period. After an initial surge of activity and attention, perhaps other topics or regions captured the spotlight for sponsorship, funding and attendance. Or instead of representing the rise and fall of a fad, perhaps these numbers reflect a rise in regional confidence levels and a general sense of regional peace and stability. Perhaps, observers concerned with the prospect of the Asia-Pacific security order unravelling after the Cold War came instead to regard the region by 1995 as having weathered the storm. (This logic would also suggest an upsurge in activity around the storm of the Asian financial crisis, but this is not seen in the data). Perhaps more intuitively satisfying is the explanation that the establishment of the ARF and CSCAP resulted in the consolidation of Track 2 activities into patterns of regular meetings of the same groups. Thus, for example, the five CSCAP working groups now hold, on average, two Track 2 meetings per year; the ARF schedules its ministerial inter-sessional and working group meetings on a regular basis.

With regard to national participation rates, Paul Evans, director of the Dialogue Monitor project, offers a number of observations. European participation has risen

Table 5.2
Multilateral Track 1 and Track 2 meetings on Asia-Pacific security issues, 1993–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governmental meetings: Track 1</th>
<th>Non-governmental meetings: Track 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>23 (9)a</td>
<td>85 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18 (3)</td>
<td>70 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17 (2)</td>
<td>46 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11 (2)</td>
<td>49 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17 (15)</td>
<td>38 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000b</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note These figures should simply be regarded as indicative of trends, not precise data. Information about meetings is provided to the Dialogue Monitor on a voluntary basis; there is no “official” registrar of Track 2 meetings.

a. The figures in parentheses refer to “reserve” meetings that do not fit the normal requirements of the first two categories. That is, they may be bilateral rather than multilateral or deal primarily with countries outside the Asia Pacific region. See Dialogue Monitor, No. 3, Aug. 1996.

b. Reserve entries are not included for 2000.
substantially—presumably reflecting the new interest in Asia demonstrated by the formation of ASEM and its Track 2 counterpart, the CAEC. China's participation had also increased by 1996–1997, possibly reflecting a significant change in its attitude towards regional multilateral engagement, and signified by its entry into institutions such as CSCAP. Japanese participation appears to have picked up around the same time. North Korea took on greater involvement toward the end of the decade, though at modest levels given its limited resource base and its apparent continued uncertainty about the pace of its external engagement. In June 2000, South Asians were estimated to be in attendance at about one-quarter of the meetings. But there were few signs of their engagement in the broad regional network of inter-institutional connections.

Note: Data from Dialogue Monitor, Nos. 1–5, July 1995 – March 1998; subsequent updates posted at www.jcie.or.jp. These figures should simply be regarded as indicative of trends, not precise data.


84 Note that CSCAP India boycotted dealings with CSCAP for two years following the organization’s criticism of India’s nuclear testing.
The thematic tone of the dialogue meetings apparently has changed as well. The connection between economic and security issues became a hot topic in late 1997. Since then, the security dialogue agenda has been further broadened. Evans notes that “unconventional security issues such as transnational crime and energy, the new concept of “human security”, and topics related to sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and governance questions received greater play.”

Assessment

Assessing the impact of Track 2 activities, which are by nature informal and relatively unstructured, is no easy task. Over the last several years, a lively debate has emerged in the academic and policy analysis literatures along several dimensions: What has been the “success” of multilateral institution building in the Asia Pacific in general? What is the track record of Track 2 security dialogue activities within this regional framework? And, what sorts of indicators and data can be marshalled to facilitate “objective” analyses on these matters?

The first question relates to the overall context of the Asia Pacific security environment and its changing character over the last decade. In this regard, there continues to be a consensus that the region remains generally inhospitable terrain for multilateral institution building, i.e. a strongly state-centric system prevails, articulated around a set of bilateral, defence arrangements, despite the many positive developments since the end of the Cold War. Thus, even active supporters of security multilateralism in the region, such as Desmond Ball temper their conclusions by acknowledging that “the emerging regional security architecture will be firmly grounded in national self-reliance, with strong and important bilateral connections, and a gradually thickening but still very thin veneer of multilateralism.” This being admitted, they go on (as Amitav Acharya has) to point out the remarkable changes in the regional institutional landscape. The very formation of the ARF, APEC, and their Track 2 counterparts are empirical indicators of substantial change.

Sceptics, however, respond by arguing that institutional formation, per se, does not constitute sufficient evidence. Hence, as Ellis Krauss argues: “The real test of an institution’s influence is its ability to change the preferences of its constituent actors … and to substantially affect outcomes in the form of bringing

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about [state action].”88 This, however, is a difficult challenge. While an increase in dialogue meetings and surge of institutional activity is easily measured, it is hard to demonstrate direct links between such changes and shifts in national policy, particularly, critics demand, for states who “make a difference”, i.e. the major powers. In response, advocates point to the United States and China—Washington’s change of attitude regarding participation in regional multilateral security institutions (in particular, the ARF) and Beijing’s recently expanded participation in Track 1 and Track 2 regional security activities. In the latter regard, Alastair Johnston’s recent work is notable for its carefully nuanced insights—pointing on the one hand to evidence of socialization toward cooperative security principles and the development of specific communities among Chinese scholars and experts (especially related to arms control), but on the other hand emphasizing the manner in which Chinese participation serves instrumental national interests.89 Ralph Cossa, among others, has charted the dynamic of post-Cold War U.S. administrations as they came to support regional, multilateral security institutions in the Asia Pacific, “provided that they complement and do not seek to replace America’s bilateral alliances”.90

An alternative approach is to focus on the issue of ideational change. In other words: Have key states changed their attitude toward cooperative security and the formation of regional and sub-regional multilateral non-governmental security institutions? Is there evidence that these institutions and their associated security dialogue processes have altered the manner in which states perceive their security interests and formulate their grand strategies? These are harder questions that have

perplexed analysts and policymakers alike. In general, however, there appears to be acceptance that attitudinal shifts have been set in motion (certainly within Southeast Asia and within Northeast Asia, almost undoubtedly on the Korean Peninsula after the 2000 summit). Even, or perhaps better phrased “especially”, the major powers, over the course of the decade, have altered their stance toward cooperative security and associated regional institutional mechanisms, at both Track 1 and Track 2 levels. As David Capie argues, the promotion of cooperative security, multilateral institutionalism, and associated Track 2 modalities, served to create a “normative social environment” where the reputational costs and advantages to the United States and China were altered, “especially when weighed against the relatively undemanding institutional form” of multilateral dialogues and soft institutions. He concludes by asserting that “to be a legitimate member of the emerging Asia-Pacific community required a commitment to a certain set of Asia-Pacific norms. Track 2 [processes and institutions] helped to make clear to them what the rules of that alternative regional order [could] be, i.e. non-threatening, inclusive, soft-institutionalism” that did not impinge on either their national or bilateral core security interests.

The Benefits and Shortcomings of the Track 2 Process

Track 2 diplomacy cannot be viewed as a self-contained process. Its scope for action and room for innovation are largely determined by the parameters of the overall Asia-Pacific security situation: the geopolitical distribution of power, the impact of global economic and political forces on the region, the climate for cooperation among the major powers, and more. Expectations must be tempered by reality and appreciation of the constraints faced by regional Track 2 norm entrepreneurs. But, then what criteria should be employed to assess the success of Track 2 within these circumscribed boundaries?

Again, one can point to the formation of institutions themselves as markers. However, this raises a tricky question. How was the process supposed to have proceeded? From unofficial, informal interactions to the formation of Track 2 institutions, which in turn are to set the stage for Track 1 institutions? This is certainly is the implicit, if not

91 Alastair Johnston has taken some important first steps towards sorting out the conceptual and empirical issues associated with attempting to distinguish between change in state behaviour due to persuasion (i.e. socialization due to factors of identity, culture, and ideology) or social influence (i.e. inducement of behaviour conforming to norms caused by the distribution of social rewards and punishments). While his arguments cannot be pursued further here, his central idea is that the design and process of institutions are critical to creating effective environments for socializing actors to redefine their interests. Furthermore, his suggestion that the most effective environments for this purpose would be “informal, weakly institutionalized, [and] consensus-based”, has a distinct resonance to the Track 2 logic of the Asia Pacific. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2001, p. 511.

92 David Capie, personal communication with the author, January 2002.
explicit, assumption found in much of the literature on Track 2. But, the Asia-Pacific experience has contradicted this model at key junctures, while affirming it at others. Thus, for instance, ASEAN, a Track 1 institution, preceded the formation of ASEAN-ISIS. But, once established, ASEAN-ISIS played a role in the establishment of the ARF and CSCAP. CSCAP, itself, however, was not responsible for the creation of the ARF and really only became functional a couple of years following its formation. The relationship between Track 1 and Track 2 institutionalization, therefore, is symbiotic; but it has not been not linear or consistent (as could be expected of processes heavily influenced at times by key personalities or small cohorts and/or by sharp structural changes in domestic or regional economic or security factors).

Another approach could be to assess the results of Track 2 institutions according to the institutional goals they set for themselves. Thus, the ARF should be evaluated according to its three-stage progression from confidence building to preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution.93 CSCAP, in turn should be evaluated according to goals of advancing the norms of cooperative security, confidence building, inclusivity, and positive support for the ARF. Both Ball and Simon have recently undertaken just this task.94 Ball focuses much of his attention on the products of CSCAP’s Working Groups, pointing out the work of the CSBM Working Group in breaking the logjam on the defining of preventive diplomacy (and later forwarding this to the ARF) and the Maritime Working Group’s production of several codes of conduct memorandum on naval and ocean matters, as specific achievements in connecting the ARF and CSCAP. But, both Ball and Evans agree that CSCAP’s major success has been “in establishing process norms, legitimating multilateral discussion, and the habits of dialogue.95

Simon takes a somewhat different tack, setting out four criteria for CSCAP performance: (i) production of new concepts and proposals, (ii) gaining the attention of decision makers, (iii) sparking interest in an international attentive public, and (iv) demonstrating “enough shelf-life that some of the principal concepts and

93 See, for instance, Paul Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP”, in Hung-mao Tien & Tun-jen Cheng (Eds.), The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000); How San Khoo (Ed.), The Future of the ARF (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 1999); and Desmond Ball & Amitav Acharya (Eds.), The Next Stage.


proposals remain part of the international dialogue.”\textsuperscript{96} He, like Ball, focuses attention on the linkage between CSCAP and the ARF. All told, his assessment is mixed: On balance, CSCAP as a Track 2 “epistemic community” has played a significant positive role. However, the report card is not entirely positive. “The most important CSCAP shortcomings echo the ARF’s limitations” in its failure to have grappled with the significant security tension spots in the region such as the Taiwan Strait or to have ameliorated the militarization of Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{97}

In summary, a quick review of the positive features and drawbacks of the Track 2 security dialogue process that has developed through the last decade is in order. Proponents point to six positive features.

First: The norms and modalities of Track 2 activities advance the common interests of all Asia-Pacific states in enhancing the stability of the region’s security architecture. From the major-power perspective, they supplement and reinforce the bilateral foundations of the regional order. For the other states in both Southeast Asia and the North Pacific/Northeast Asia, the multilateral character of Track 2 processes mitigates the bilateral bias and exclusionary tendencies of the larger players.

Second: Virtually all participants and analysts of Track 2 cite its most important role as a socialization mechanism. Track 2 institutions have notably engaged the non-like-minded, shifted the attitudes of the sceptical, and built habits of dialogue. Over the course of a decade, there have been changes in the patterns of communication among former adversaries. Though historical legacies and culturally rooted antipathies persist, especially in Northeast Asia and South Asia, their impact at the regional policy debate level has been dampened.

Third: The multilateral settings of Track 2 institutions consistently bring together representatives from all countries regardless of the state of their bilateral relations at any particular moment. Thus face-to-face contact is maintained. The opportunity is there, and often used, to open back-door lines of communication that avoid the spotlight of Track 1 diplomacy.

Fourth: The informality of Track 2 institutions provides another sort of cover as well. Freed from the strictures of having to recite their government’s policy, indeed discouraged from doing so, participants have greater latitude to advance new initiatives and vet policy options in an academic fashion.

Fifth: Track 2 institutions have promoted a broad understanding of security and challenged traditional thinking that focuses exclusively on external and military security threats. The Track 2 agenda has become increasingly oriented toward comprehensive security and cooperative security concerns.

Sixth: The ongoing level of Track 2 activities has fostered the engagement of a core group of policy elites. Kraft observes: “This is of great importance in a region

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, p. 28.
where personal bonds underlie positive relations between governments as well as provide the basis for intellectual and policy exchanges."

Opposition to the conduct of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia Pacific has largely dissipated over the 1990s. The view once held in many foreign ministries—that Track 2 efforts are at best irrelevant and even counter-productive to the management of security affairs—has largely been dispelled. Only in South Asia does one regularly encounter the dismissal of Track 2 activities as those of naive meddlers and amateurs—“well-intentioned people wasting their time and ours”.

Instead the criticisms of Track 2 come from those who believe there is an important role for a Track 2 agenda, but are concerned with the directions and progress achieved to date. While acknowledging the constraints facing Track 2 initiatives in the Asia Pacific, there is increasing frustration that the Track 2 agenda has become too narrow, that Track 2 has become too closely aligned with government, that Track 2 institutions are too limited in their capacity to undertake meaningful tasks, and that Track 2 has become too elitist, that is, isolated from broad social movements and security concerns. Closer attention is merited for each of these concerns: agenda, independence, capacity, and detachment.

**Agenda**

Observers expected Track 2 fora to expand the security agenda beyond its traditional concentration on inter-state military matters while at the same time promoting unconstrained debate over contemporary security problems on which governments were deadlocked in their official channels. For different reasons, neither aim has been accomplished. By vigorously protecting what they regard as the bilateral character of their big security problems, states such as China have effectively blocked consideration of matters such as Taiwan and the South China Sea in regional Track 2 settings. As for the first aim—broadening the security agenda—Track 2 has opened this door and brought issues of unconventional security into the spotlight, especially transnational crime and its role in illegal trafficking of drugs, money, and people. But critics do not see the innovative thinking and translation to action that they anticipated. Increasingly Track 2 fora are being faulted for rehearsing the same topics.


100 Governments have varied in their rigidity and consistency on this point. Although China supported the Indonesia/Canada workshop series on the South China Sea, it has opposed consideration of South China Sea issues by CSCAP. North Korea has vacillated in its willingness to have KEDO discussed in CSCAP meetings, possibly reflecting its attitude of the moment regarding KEDO-DPRK relations and the broader context of U.S.-DPRK relations.
Independence
Track 2 institutions, by definition, are engaged in a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, their success depends on maintaining sufficiently close relations with governments to exercise influence. On the other hand, by becoming too closely intertwined with the official side Track 2 runs the risk of being co-opted or directed by Track 1. Kraft characterizes this as Track 2’s “autonomy dilemma”.101 Government influence over Track 2 takes various forms. In some countries, all representatives to Track 2 activities are government employees expected to articulate government policies.102 In virtually every country, Track 2 institutions and their participants in regional events are dependent on government funding. Even if this funding is provided in a hands-off manner, it places Track 2 entities in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the priorities of new ministers or governments.

Capacity
Track 2 suffers from an extreme form of the Asia-Pacific allergy to formal institutionalization. Reluctant, in the first instance, to create Track 1 institutions with any independent authority or sovereignty-restricting powers, Asian states appear even less willing to give their Track 2 counterparts any decision-making or investigative or monitoring capabilities. The economic and political crises of the late 1990s exposed not only the lack of political will by Asia-Pacific states to mobilize their regional institutions but also the abject inability of these institutions to respond before, during, or after the crisis hit. This condition is reinforced by the “institutional tethering” of Track 2 to ASEAN—not only in the literal sense of having ASEAN institutes as secretariats for many Track 2 organizations but also in the figurative sense of imposing ASEAN norms of management style.

Detachment
Track 2 institutions have come to be perceived as exclusive clubs.103 To many observers, the advantages derived from engagement of elites with privileged access to their

102 One very active participant in CSCAP meetings comments: Government officials at these meetings “usually make it clear that they are there to hear other views [and] to put forth and defend government positions (despite an occasional trial balloon). Even those who start off with “this is my personal view” invariably then spout the party line. They are presumed to be doing exactly that. In fact, when one doesn’t, it causes some confusion.” (Personal communication with the author, January 2002.)
103 Hans Maull, “Call Girls in the Old World: Of Multilateralism Think Tanks, Dialogue Programs and Other Promiscuous Activities In and Around Europe”, in Paul Evans (Ed.), Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto: University of Toronto–York University, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994).
respective governments have become overshadowed in recent years by impressions that Track 2 institutions have become divorced from civil society. To some extent this is a generational phenomenon; in many instances, national Track 2 representatives have held these roles for decades. It is also a reflection of shifting political climates. As the regimes that managed postcolonial nation building and economic transformation are being replaced—usually by overtly populist leaders and more democratic, more transparent, and more domestically preoccupied governments—the established elites of academe, the private sector, and their think tanks run the risk of losing credibility and influence in their societies.

The Future of Track 2 Diplomacy
In sum, then, the movement toward a cooperative security perspective, the surge in multilateral dialogue activities, and the establishment of regional security institutions with the reluctant, then positive, engagement of the major powers in multilateral security institutions during the first half of the 1990s must be appreciated as a major turning point in the evolution of the security order of the Asia Pacific. But these achievements must be appreciated, as well, as the product of a specific configuration of structural, economic, political, and individual factors. In effect, at this juncture the rising momentum of economic growth and economic regionalism coincided with the abandonment of Cold War ideological antagonisms and regional security threats.104 This confluence created a climate receptive to new ideas, to regional institutional experimentation, and to the initiatives of a cohesive and coordinated cohort of elites acting as norm entrepreneurs to advance security multilateralism. The result was a surge in Track 2 diplomacy culminating in the formation of the ARF and its Track 2 counterpart CSCAP. These landmark events structured and regularized what until then had been a fairly spontaneous phenomenon.

These opportune conditions, of course, could not be expected to continue. The economic crisis undercut Asian unity concerning economic priorities and regional strategies and exposed the vulnerability of the underpinnings of domestic security and stability. By the end of the 1990s, elite consensus was fraying. The effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization have brought to the fore issues (such as intervention) and new concepts (such as human security) that do not sit comfortably within the accepted ideational framework. Nor can they be easily taken on by current institutional mechanisms, either Track 1 or Track 2.105

We are entering another transitional period. Whether institutions such as ASEAN-

104 The exception, of course, remained on the Korean peninsula.
ISIS and CSCAP can adapt from within to accommodate these new pressures for change remains to be seen.

There is a growing sense that a new mode of security dialogue and transnational activity must emerge—one whose premises may challenge aspects of open economic regionalism and expand notions of security to encompass elements of civil society in what some have already come to call a Track 3 process. Paul Evans comments:

[Track 3 refers] to dialogues in which (i) representatives of civil society, especially NGO’s, play a more prominent role; (ii) government domination of the agenda is less pronounced and discussions, while policy-relevant, are more frank and academic in character; (iii) there is more room for inclusion of participants [e.g.] from Taiwan who are constrained from full participation in Track 2 processes like CSCAP; and (d) there is the ability to deal flexibly and openly with sensitive questions, including cross-Straits relations and specific territorial disputes.106

Encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order.107 Tentative steps are being taken to counter the perception that ASEAN and related Track 1 institutions are “government clubs” and Track 2 processes are monopolized by security considerations largely irrelevant to the concerns of Asian societies. Thus December 2000 saw the inauguration of an ASEAN People’s Assembly.108

Track 2 needs to develop more open and supple modalities that allow for the inclusion of Track 3 voices without their being marginalized or co-opted.109 In turn, the NGOs and civil society movements need to adopt a less adversarial relationship to security regionalism. Otherwise their voices will continue to be relegated to protests in the streets rather than seats at the table and positive roles within the institutions of the Asia Pacific of the 21st century.


Postscript 2009: Trends in Track 1 and Track 2 Activity in the Asia Pacific since 2000

Introduction
The chapter reproduced above, originally published in 2003, was based upon data and analysis reflecting the experience of the 1990s. The relevance of its findings for the subsequent post-2000 decade therefore must be questioned. This research note looks to provide a preliminary updating of data trends and a reconsideration of the role and relevance of Track 2 activities by addressing two questions: First, has the downward trend in Track 2 activity, seen from 1994 to 1999, continued, stabilized, or been reversed after 2000? Second, have the signals that Job detected of the emergence of “new mode[s] of security dialogue and transnational activity” proved to be accurate, i.e. have new forms and patterns of Track 2 activity taken hold?

A look at the record
Figure 5.2 provides an immediate answer to the first question. There has been a dramatic upsurge in both Track 1 and Track 2 activity commencing in 2000 and continuing unabated for at least the next six years. While care must be taken in interpreting the data published in the annual Dialogue and Research Monitor (DRM) series data as represented in the Figure 5.2, the overall basic pattern leaves no doubt that there has been a fundamental shift in post-2000 levels of both official and unofficial multilateral engagement in the region. The increases are truly dramatic; from 1999 levels, there has been an apparent seven-fold increase in Track 2 events and a 10-fold increase in Track 1 events!

The trajectory of activity levels has been so pronounced that one expects and finds across the board increases in virtually all aspects of Track 1 and Track 2 activities after 2000. However, a closer look at the data reveals important changes have occurred on two dimensions: first, in substantive terms regarding the issues on the multilateral agenda; second, concerning the initiators of multilateral activities.

Four features of the post-2000 substantive agenda of Track 1 and Track stand out:

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110 This postscript was prepared by Brian L. Job and Avery Poole. The authors acknowledge support for research and writing from the Security and Defence Forum Program of the Centre of International Relations, Liu Institute, University of British Columbia as well as the research assistance of Ms Nadine Harris. Opinions expressed as well as any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. As a research note, this piece provides only preliminary results and conclusions. A fuller treatment of the issues raised will be forthcoming. Questions should be addressed to brian.job@ubc.ca.

111 See the appendix to this postscript for a more detailed account of the caveats and qualifications that are involved with the DRM data series. At time of writing, data for 2008 are about to be released; data for 2007 are available, but not included for reasons indicated in the appendix.
Not surprisingly, regional states and institutions are responsive to critical events. Thus, one sees the frequency of Track 2 events rise concerning terrorism after 2001, concerning natural disasters after the December 2004 tsunami, and concerning infectious disease following the SARS epidemic. Such exogenous shocks to regional multilateralism appear to have both short-term and long-term impacts. After a sharp uptick in Track 2 events, the level of activity tends to decline, e.g. the frequency of meetings related directly to combating terrorism dropped after a couple of years. However, the longer-term impact of crises has been to broaden the regional security spectrum; issues such as terrorism, disease, and natural disasters are now regular agenda matters for regional fora.

Consideration of traditional security matters has been sustained (the frequency of Track 2 meetings rising in the overall trend), with debate and dialogue on the usual issues related to North Korea, proliferation of WMD, and the role of the major powers, particularly the United States and in recent years China. But, in relative terms, traditional security issues are occupying a proportionately smaller component of the region’s multilateral engagement. This is a significant development.

“Non-traditional security (NTS) threats” have since 2002 become the greater relative and absolute components of regional Track 2 activity. Certainly, some of this is attributable to the NTS label being applied to include terrorism and related issues such as political extremism. However, a broader agenda-widening effect is clearly apparent with transnational crime (trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, money), and especially energy security and environmental security being the subject of more meetings.

What the JICE terms “community building”—a term that appears to encompass issues of “Asian regionalism” including regional and inter-regional economic integration—has assumed a larger role in Track 1 and Track 2 activities. From 2004 to 2006 these topics rose to account for over a third of all Track 2 meetings, many of them ASEAN-related (the Charter, ASEM, and regional economics predominating).

The organization and hosting of Track 1 and Track 2 meetings can be taken as a signal of a country’s engagement in regional security multilateralism or an institution’s adoption of a more active regional role. In the post-2000 period, three trends appear.

Those states with a tradition of significant regional engagement, especially trans-Pacific engagement—the United States, Japan, and South Korea—remain active sponsors of Track 2 activity. However, for all while the numbers of their efforts rise, in relative terms they account for a smaller proportion of meetings. (Note that this assertion must be qualified because the data do not account for national participation in meetings. Given the overall rise in the number of meetings, the engagement
of officials and non-officials from these countries in regional multilateral contexts almost certainly increased).

- Several countries, as seen through the sponsorship of meetings by nationally based think tanks and institutions, increased their track 2 engagement.\textsuperscript{112} These include Singapore, which is home to several of the region’s most active institutions (the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS, formerly IDSS), ISEAS, and the SIIA); Thailand, whose activity levels have increased marginally; and China, who while still occupying a relatively minor place in overall terms has become increasingly more active as an event initiator.\textsuperscript{113}

- In terms of institutional sponsorship, ASEAN assumes a much larger role as the decade advances. In part, the Association’s Track 2 activity complements (sometimes in anticipation) its increased levels of Track 1 external relations with other regional states (ASEAN-Japan, for example) or with other regions (e.g. with Europe, as in ASEM). However, it also reflects a heightened level of intra-ASEAN Track 2 activity in response to crises events of terrorism in 2001 and 2002 and to institutional reform, especially concerning the Charter process.

In summary, any conclusions reached at the end of the 1990s about the decline towards stasis, and perhaps disappearance, of Track 1 and Track 2 multilateral activity in the Asia Pacific require significant reconsideration. The century’s first decade has been marked by an upturn through the 2000–2006 years, leaving open the question of whether or not activity levels will continue or rise or to stabilize on these significantly higher plateaus. The agenda of security dialogue has changed substantially, reflecting the reaction to the shocks of events such as 9/11 and the SARS crisis, the threat of system destabilization in the short term (e.g. North Korea’s nuclear programmes) and in the longer term (e.g. the “peaceful rise” of China), but most significantly the extensive broadening of the security spectrum to encompass NTS threats.

Continuity and/or change in the modes and modalities of Asia Pacific Track 2 activities?

Having highlighted the quantitative changes in Track 1 and Track 2 activities in the post-2000 period, the question remains as to whether or not one can discern from

\textsuperscript{112} Note that the issue of Track 1.5 activity, i.e. meetings orchestrated or dominated by government (Track 1) but also involving non-official experts and NGO representatives (Track 2), is not considered here in these frequency-based comments but is discussed later.

\textsuperscript{113} The increased presence of Chinese officials, academics, and experts in regional fora and the increasingly proactive participation of Chinese representatives in Track 2 meetings is well-confirmed through anecdotal accounts of regular non-Chinese Track 2 participants.
this record evidence of substantive change. In particular, is there evidence to sug-
gest that the “new modes” of Track 2 activity, which Job hinted at, may be coming
into play?

Complete answers to this and the associated (and much-debated) question of
the efficacy and impact of Track 2 activity are beyond the scope of this postscript. 114
Juxtaposing the arguments raised in Job’s 2003 chapter against the post-2000 record
of activities, reinforces certain conclusions but also suggests the need for additional
careful analysis in light of the ongoing transformation of the regional and global
security environments.

First of all, there remains consensus among analysts that the high point of
post-Cold War Track 2 regional security dialogue activity occurred in the mid-
1990s. It was the particular combination of structural conditions (the imperative of
sustaining rising economic prosperity reinforcing a perceived need to bolster exist-
ing bilateral alliances with regional multilateral institutions), and the presence and
inter-relationships of regional governmental elites and entrepreneurs of multilateral
institutionalization that fostered the creation and effective functioning of Track 2
institutions, such as CSCAP, through this period. However, as Capie argues, these
particular “scope conditions” have not been sustained or replicated as the regional
security environment evolved through the remainder of that decade and into the
next.115

What one might term “traditional” Track 2 institutions continue to wrestle
with how to maintain their relevance—witness the institutional reform efforts of
CSCAP and the continued voices of frustration regarding its capacity to stay out
front of Track 1 and to exert influence on officials in national capitals and regional
fora.116 To a considerable degree, however, regional Track 2 institutions are hostage
to their Track 1 counterparts; the majority of the ARF’s membership simply does not
want to see either Track 1 or Track 2 initiatives proactively advance its preventive
diplomacy mandate. Thus, in this context, CSCAP can do little more than present
memos to the ARF with the hope that they will inform national officials who in turn
may motivate change.

114 The discussion and debate initiated by Job in his 2003 study concerning Track
2 have been advanced effectively, among others, by Desmond Ball, Anthony
Milner & Brandan Taylor, “Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific:
and by David Capie, “When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and
Asian Regionalism”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 2,
(forthcoming June 2010).
115 Capie, forthcoming, p. 3.
116 For a concise statement authored by CSCAP Co-Chairs, see Jawhar Hassan
& Ralph Cossa, “CSCAP and Track 2: How Relevant to Regional Security?”,
cscap.org
Examination of the DRM archive reveals several additional telling features concerning the symbiotic relationship sought with Track 1 by Track 2 proponents:

- As best as one can discern in the post-2000 time period, there is little evidence of direct Track 1-Track 2 relationships on security matters. The record shows few Track 2 meetings organized by institutions that have a clear affiliation with a Track 1 counterpart. (An exception to this may be CSCAP’s recent efforts to court Track 1 by holding its Study Group meetings at times and places coinciding with ARF meetings).

- On the other hand, one does see increasing influence in the other direction, i.e. governments and inter-state institutions exerting control over Track 2 activities. These so-called Track 1.5 activities are on the rise. Indeed, in 2006, between 20 and 25 per cent of labelled Track 2 events appeared closer to Track 1 in character, i.e. these events were hosted/organized/sponsored by governments, had their agendas established by officials, and/or were populated largely by government officials and bureaucrats. While a positive feature of such meetings would be the apparent relevance of their agendas to officialdom, what is often sacrificed by the expansion of Track 1.5 is the freedom to set agendas, invite and debate with non-likeminded, and to consider options not under official consideration. In effect, Track 2’s “autonomy dilemma” appears to be increasing rather than decreasing.

- The broadening of the regional security agenda to include NTS threats has had mixed effects. On the one hand, it has resulted in a significant increase in Track 2 meetings. On the other hand, the Track 1–Track 2 relationship has become more complicated. Consider, for example, the subject of terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, governments rushed to engage both bilaterally and multilaterally, quickly drawing into their closed official meetings trusted non-official experts from think tanks and universities. Track 2 meetings, on the other hand, were avoided by government officials because of their inclusivity and because they could not consider anything regarded as classified information. While such meetings were indeed convened, as apparent in DRM tallies, what they accomplished is uncertain. Their agendas largely dwelt on generalities,

117 Given the multi-faceted nature of many multilateral events and activities, labelling them as either Track 1 or Track 2 in many instances is difficult. The DRM sticks to its dichotomous Track 1–Track 2 characterization. Based on limited analyses to date, it appears that the DRM restricts its designation of Track 1 events that are exclusively inter-governmental, thus resulting in Track 1.5-like events falling into the Track 2 category. Employing a Track 1.5 designation, unless very clear criteria were established, would not likely resolve problems.
were designed to avoid controversial topics (especially anything related to internal or intra-state security), and pursued broad topics such as “root causes”. While terrorism presents the extreme case, situations concerning disaster relief and spread of disease can be similar in that governments at the Track 1 level forge ahead of Track 2 institutions, and in turn, are reluctant to share relevant information.

The bottom-line question for analysts remains what does the burgeoning level of Track 2 activities amount to? Certainly one cannot draw firm conclusions on the basis of five or six years of data whose reliability and consistency requires additional attention. It is also, in our view, premature to expect that analysts and experts, relying on their own experiences albeit for the course of the last decade, can clearly discern the defining parameters of Track 1 and Track 1 multilateral activity in the region. With global economic, political, and security institutional frameworks in flux and with key regional players (not just the United States but also China and India) now shaping their regional strategies on the basis of their systemic priorities rather than vice versa, the Asia Pacific regional security architecture is, and will remain a work in progress for some time.

Track 2’s future depends on its capacities for institutional innovation, i.e. remaining nimble and adaptive to new circumstances, new members, and new security issues; and institutional transference, i.e. sustaining productive relationships with national policymakers and regional Track 1 institutions. Track 2 is supposed to lead and to set agendas, but at the same time not get too far ahead to be seen as impracticable or to be veering towards academic abstraction.118

With these important admonitions in mind, the following tentative observations concerning the recent history and possible future of Track 2 are offered:

- Traditional understandings of Track 1 and Track 2 institutional processes are losing ground. Governments of all varieties have become more comfortable with, and more adept at orchestrating, Track 1.5 activity. This trend, with signs visible in the DRM data, will continue to be reinforced by many Asia-Pacific states’ rigid sovereignty protectionist attitudes, which effectively thwart regional and sub-regional institutions from consideration of relevant security issues.

- Asia’s widening geographic “security footprint” poses challenges to the existing configuration of Track 1 and Track 2 institutions. The security concerns of Asia-Pacific states are increasingly found within the region’s

118 As Ball, Milner and Taylor argue “viable second track processes must constantly adapt in response to changes in the global and regional environment” and must retain “the flexibility and the capacity to focus on new issues at the time they are passing older issues over to Track 1”. Desmond Ball, Anthony Milner & Brandan Taylor, “Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions”, pp. 182–183.
peripheries, i.e. Central Asia, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. However, East Asian states have been reluctant to expand the agendas and memberships of their multilateral institutions accordingly. Change is certainly underway, with India being drawn into Track 2 security fora and being invited to participate in regional considerations such as the East Asia Summit. One can anticipate that these steps (again signalled in the DRM data), are only the beginning of what must become the larger scope of regional Track 2 activity.

- The broadening of the security agenda to encompass NTS threats and crises in the human security conditions of Asian populations has been and will continue to be played out through Track 2 activity. Whether or not the institutions established in the 1990s can extend themselves sufficiently beyond their traditional security foci to cope with the expansion of their agendas, and the need to integrate a broader range of expertise and the involvement of new players, including IOs such as UN agencies and NGOs both regional and global, is less certain. The record to date sees established Track 2 institutions (like CSCAP) trying to adapt, but it also reflects the emergence of new think tanks and centres as hubs of activity (e.g. the Non-Traditional Security Centre at RSIS, Singapore), the increase in ad hoc, functionally-specific multilateral activities, and the trend towards Track 1.5 modalities (as noted earlier).

Finally, taking the widest perspective, there are indications of a generational shift or shifts in the Asia-Pacific multilateral environment. The “first generation” of Track 1 multilateral institutions and actors is giving way to a “second generation”, with perhaps a “third generation” emerging on the horizon. This second generation is distinguished from the first in several ways: The cohort of participants is a more diverse and, of course, younger group of persons, in contrast to the cohesive elite, first generation core that coalesced within ASEAN, together with individuals from Canada, Australia, Japan and the United States. While key regional crises spots remain on the agenda, their attention is increasingly drawn to consideration of NTS threats, in part reflecting the realization that domestic peace and stability, and regime security depends upon addressing human security priorities. In contrast to the figures that provided ideational leadership and initiated institutions in the first generation, identifying norm entrepreneurs within the second generation is difficult. (ASEAN’s claim to be in the driver’s seat is increasingly in question). Established, formal institutions are less relevant to this second generation, as witnessed in the

record of what one might term “ad hoc, as-needed multilateral” activities organized in response to specific problems. However, one can only draw such generational inferences so far. To reiterate what was noted above, with pervasive uncertainty over the form and function of institutional architectures at the global level, regional multilateralism on both Track 1 and Track 2 will remain unsettled.

Figure 5.2
Multilateral Track 1 and Track 2 events on Asia-Pacific security, 1993–2006
(Adapted from the Dialogue and Research Monitor)

Note: See the appendix to this postscript for details concerning the data source and related issues regarding data interpretation.
Appendix

The *Dialogue and Research Monitor* Data Series: Concerns and Qualifications

The *Dialogue and Research Monitor* (DRM) is an “inventory of multilateral meetings on Asia-Pacific security and community building” that catalogues Track 1 and Track 2 events on annual basis from 1998 to the present. It is maintained by the Japanese Center for International Exchange (JCIE) and available on the Internet at www.jcie.or.jp/drm/. Figure 5.2 in this postscript presents a consolidated picture of the DRM’s accounting of Track 1 and Track 2 events from 1993 to 2006.\(^{120}\)

This data series provides a very useful indicator of trends and patterns of the frequencies and types of multilateral meetings over two decades that were marked by significant regional change. However, the DRM data series exhibits significant limitations. In its present form, it cannot be considered sufficiently reliable and consistent to support time series analyses or detailed comparisons across categories.

**General caveats to be kept in mind regarding the Dialogue and Research Monitor**

1. The DRM has been managed by two different teams, with an apparent shift in data collection practices from one to the other.\(^{121}\) Among other ways, this is reflected in a noticeable increase in recording “community-building” and economic events by the JCIE, i.e. after 2003.

2. The JCIE admits that it paid increased attention to its own network of Japanese-based contacts when compiling the DRM (beginning in 2003). However, analysts confirm what the data show, namely that there was a general increase in Japanese activity on Track 1 and Track 2 fronts during the last decade, i.e. beyond what may result from a slightly reoriented data collection emphases.

3. The DRM does not systematically account for Track 3 events. Track 3 activities were separately recorded in 2002, but not for other years.

4. For nine of the years, 1995–2004, the DRM lists “reserve” meetings, i.e. meetings that do not fit the normal requirements for the defined Track 1 and Track 2 categories. This practice appears to have been stopped in 2005. However, some uncertainty remains as to what exactly was being counted, or not counted, over the data series as a whole.

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\(^{120}\) DRM data for 1993–2000 were presented in Brian Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order”, above.

\(^{121}\) Prior to 2003, the DRM was managed by Paul Evans at York University and then at the University of British Columbia; since then the JCIE, Tokyo, has managed it directly.
5. There is variation from year to year concerning the inclusion of certain types of events, thus compromising the ability to perform any detailed statistical analysis or draw exact conclusions. In particular, this appears to apply to annual or regular meetings of Track 1 institutions and the ASEAN-sponsored meetings. Our view is that in most years, the “original” DRM data understates the number of such meetings.\textsuperscript{122}

6. The DRM data for 2007 indicates a remarkable jump in the number of Track 1 meetings, from 174 in 2006 to 278, an apparent increase of almost 60 per cent. Track 2 events, on the other hand, rose only slightly, i.e. from 270 to 284. While the DRM 2007 points out that some of this Track 1 activity level can be explained by the creation of new initiatives (32 of the 104 total increase), this does not appear to be a complete explanation. Additional consistency checks would appear necessary prior to including this data point, in our view. Data for 2008 is not yet available at time of writing to check if 2007 is an outlier or the beginning of a new pattern.

7. The numbers of Track 2 events reflect a substantial increase in UN-related institutional activity, for example as organized by the UNU or the UNDP. The data for 2006, however, involve an apparently sudden increase in UESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia Pacific) to account for over 10 per cent of all meetings held. Whether or not this marks the beginning of a trend or represents a new counting policy for such events needs to be investigated.

\textsuperscript{122} For instance, of the 17 annual meetings recorded for the first six months of 2005, only four of these had been consistently recorded for the prior 2000–2004 years.
Specific qualifications concerning the data presented in Figure 5.2
1. The data presented in Figure 5.2 do not include the “reserve” meeting numbers provided for selected years in the DRM accountings.
2. The data presented in the Figure 1 for 1998–2003 have been modified to account for an apparent undercounting of annual Track 1 meetings. Using 2003 as a baseline of institutions, annual meetings held by these institutions in prior years were added to the data set.
3. The 2002 Track 2 total of 113 includes 23 meetings initially recorded as Track 3 by the DRM, but that upon our review (and in light of apparent counting practices for other years) were deemed to qualify for inclusion as Track 2 events.
Track 2 diplomacy has been a key aspect of regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific and particularly in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Operating through its own networks, this diplomacy has contributed towards the success of such key initiatives on regional security as the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). This chapter examines the prospects for Track 2 networks for Southeast Asia, particularly the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). It also looks into the initiatives collectively known as Track 3 activities and their impact on the expansion of security dialogue in the region. The success of Track 2 processes was made possible largely because of their linkages with governments in the region. In a security environment in flux, these linkages have raised questions about the autonomy of these processes from state influence. The dilemma of greater efficiency versus lower autonomy has opened a debate on the continuing relevance of Track 2 diplomacy.

Unofficial Diplomacy: The Role of ASEAN-ISIS
Unofficial diplomacy in the Asia Pacific has been instrumental in the expansion of multilateral channels for regional exchanges on security cooperation. Its roles have been important in a region where security is officially defined to be comprehensive, and includes economic, military, political and social facets. This approach ensures that all issues receive due attention in appropriate fora, and that disputes and problem areas can be solved for the general benefit using the collective wisdom of all the participants.

A key feature of this diplomacy has been multilateralism, which John Ruggie defined as an institutional form coordinating the action and policies of three or more states based on general principles of conduct. It involves the collective promotion of and commitment to a standard of behaviour. After the Cold War, increased economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region paved the way for the development of institutionalized multilateral processes that promoted cooperation and peace. Multilateralism facilitated the emergence of pluralism in discussions and agenda-setting on regional security through the involvement of expert networks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs have organized informal, non-official meetings on regional security issues or the general condition of Asia-Pacific security. At least 93 of these meetings were non-official in nature.

Unofficial meetings, also referred to as dialogue mechanisms, have been generically called Track 2 diplomacy. The term is attributed to Joseph Montville, a U.S. Foreign Service officer, who defined it as:

unofficial, non-structured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic, and strategically optimistic, based on best care analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to goodwill and reasonableness.

This definition implies a willingness on the part of the participants to go beyond the usual state-interest basis of official diplomatic negotiations. Realists tend to find

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5 For more information on these meetings, see University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Dialogue Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security Studies, Nos. 1–6, 1995–1998. In 1998, this became Dialogue and Research Monitor and is currently published by the University of British Columbia.


limited use for Track 2 activities precisely because of this overly optimistic, if not naïve, approach to international negotiations. The designation “Track 2” is meant to distinguish non-governmental or non-official meetings from official and formal diplomatic channels referred to as “Track 1” activities. Government officials participate in “Track 2” activities in their private capacity; however, the nature of this participation is generally considered to be a “polite fiction” as the line demarcating what is official and non-official in such meetings is unclear.8

This distinction is even more blurred in meetings referred to as “track one and a half diplomacy”. The term itself was introduced by Paul Dibb to describe a workshop on regional confidence building organized for the ARF and held in Canberra in November 1994. The meeting was unofficial but was attended mostly by military or government people. Track one and a half (1.5) has also referred to unofficial meetings with an agenda set by government officials. Such was perhaps the case with a meeting held in Manila in May 1994 that discussed an initiative towards the establishment of a regional entity, which would encompass the 10 countries of Southeast Asia. While the distinction employed is in essence subjective, Track 2 and Track 1.5 meetings are supposed to be differentiable through their relative independence of the interests of participating estates.9

The literature on security dialogues in the Asia Pacific gives little attention to these distinctions and considers Track 2 diplomacy as almost synonymous with the entire spectrum of non-official diplomatic activities. Yet, these distinctions and their implications for foreign policy processes show the increasing complexity of the world of non-official diplomatic activities. The dichotomy between Tracks 1 and 2 no longer suffices to cover the extent of these activities.10 More importantly, obsfus-

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10 The Institute for the Multi-Track Diplomacy uses a framework identifying nine different tracks of diplomatic activity based on the participants involved, the form of activity, and the issue area. It is largely ignored, however, by the Asia-Pacific dialogue networks. See Louise Diamond & John MacDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A System Approach to Peace (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996), pp. 1–1.
cating these distinctions raises questions about the extent to which these activities are independent of governments and their interests.

Track 2 networks have always been active in promoting Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. However, it is in relation to regional peace and security that unofficial diplomatic activities have grown dramatically. In Southeast Asia, organizations and individuals engaged in Track 2 activities have especially been involved in policy advocacy and formulation through the provision of policy frameworks for officials too busy to put together proposals themselves. Their efforts have helped establish “building blocks” for supporting cooperative arrangements at the official level.11 Among the most important of these is the series of informal workshops and meetings on “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” organized by Ambassador Hasjim Djalal in 1990 with support from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These meetings provided a forum for claimants to discuss the issues involved without having to deal with the question of jurisdiction. Beyond the political aspect of the issue, the meetings have expanded the range of discussions to include technical scientific concerns as well.

Research institutes like the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore have also made strong contributions to security dialogue in the region. ISEAS has organized seminars and conferences that discuss a range of regional security issues from an academic point of view rather than a policy-oriented one. Nonetheless, government officials have found the discussions in these meetings useful as a means of exploring possible initiatives.

Largely, however, Track 2 in Southeast Asia is largely synonymous with ASEAN-ISIS. Founded in Bali in September 1984, this is currently made up of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Indonesia), the Institute of Foreign Affairs of Laos (IFA), the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS, Malaysia), the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS, Philippines), the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS, Thailand), and the Institute of International Relations (IIR, Vietnam). Since 1993, representatives of these institutes have consulted annually with the ASEAN foreign ministers.12 Their recommendation was a factor in the establishment of the ARF in

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12 ASEAN has Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam as members.
ASEAN-ISIS has become a key component of the networking efforts and organized a large number of security dialogue activities. The Asia Pacific Roundtable is the largest and among the most important of them, with over 250 scholars, diplomats, military officers, and journalists participating every year. Together with five research institutes from Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and the United States, ASEAN-ISIS was involved in the formation of CSCAP, a key institution in confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The unofficial nature of these activities gives ASEAN-ISIS and other Track 2 channels an inherent advantage over official diplomatic processes. Track 2 has been able to provide governments with the cover under which extensive low-profile exchanges and negotiations take place without risk of undue embarrassment. In this way, it opens doors for official channels in areas where they would otherwise be completely blocked. Second, Track 2 activities arrange for the socialization of regional cooperation and behaviour. Third, unofficial diplomatic channels are the venue where personal relationships between participants develop. This is of great importance in a region where personal bonds underlie positive relations between governments as well as provide the basis for intellectual and policy exchanges. Track 2 mechanisms have made key contributions towards the enhancement of official interaction and mutual confidence and towards the development of relevant discourse; they have become essential to the way ASEAN conducts business.

The Problems of Track 2 Diplomacy

Despite the achievements of Track 2 diplomacy in general, and ASEAN-ISIS in particular, a number of issues have emerged which have implications for the future of unofficial diplomacy in the region. These cluster around questions regarding autonomy, the focus of the security discourse, and who participates in the channels.

Track 2 channels are too intertwined with governments in the region.
The linkage between Tracks 1 and 2 provides Track 2 diplomacy with access to
privileged information and a position from which it could directly influence official policy. At the same time, it affects Track 2’s potential for critical thinking and, consequently, the quality of analysis and discussion. This problem is becoming more evident as the distinction between tracks becomes increasingly blurred.

The partnership between ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS approximates the ideal complement between Tracks 1 and 2. The fact, however, that some of the new member-institutions of ASEAN-ISIS are government agencies, and therefore tend to behave like government representatives, creates the impression that Track 2 processes largely represents the views of foreign policy bureaucrats. A statement drafted by some members of ASEAN-ISIS and critical of the coup led by Hun Sen in Cambodia just prior to that country’s scheduled entry into ASEAN in 1997 was never released. Some members of ASEAN-ISIS opposed its dissemination, arguing that it violated the principle of non-interference. While the document made its way onto the desks of some ASEAN foreign ministers, it was never formally issued as an ASEAN-ISIS statement.

The blurring of what is official and non-official has also bedevilled CSCAP. One of the principal reasons behind its establishment had been to open a venue for engaging China multilaterally on issues of regional security concern. In particular, a Track 2 forum was thought to be a safe way to handle the issue of Taiwan and cross-strait relations. China, however, made it a condition for its participation in CSCAP that these issues would never be discussed. China also insisted that there should be no member-committee from Taiwan. In the CSCAP member-committees bowed before the demands of pragmatism and accepted China on the latter’s specified terms.

A further issue arises from the way that track one mechanisms such as the ARF have taken to organizing their own Track 2 activities. Such activities, including the publication of newsletters and books, have been extended financial and even political support by governments in the region as long as they reinforce government policies. Political exigencies can cause this support to be withdrawn.16

The trends in the Asia Pacific, including Southeast Asia, indicate that Track 2 is moving towards greater alignment with governments and their agenda. In this context, how far can Track 2 maintain its autonomy and provide effective support to Track 1? If these trends continue, Track 2’s role as a source of policy ideas will eventually diminish.17 As official processes and officially sponsored processes become more institutionalized, Track 2 activities will have a more passive and less important role “as information providers and analysts”.18

16 In 1998, Jusuf Wanandi threatened to close down CSIS when he felt that political support for the institute and its activities was diminishing in the wake of the financial crisis. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 February 1998, p. 12. For similar trends in CSCAP, see Ball (note 15 above), p. 306.
17 Harris (note 11 above), p. 151.
18 Stone (note 8 above), pp. 28–29.
**The security discourse in Southeast Asia is too narrow.**

Track 2 activities have been instrumental in the emergence of common understandings of security in the region (a shared discourse). The unofficial nature of Track 2 makes it the channel of choice for discussing sensitive security issues, which normally would never be brought up in official meetings. It is the forum where non-traditional perspectives in security can be introduced. Indeed, Track 2 has been credited with effecting changes in official perspectives on broad issues of security.

Yet in 1997, Track 2 processes dealing with security issues (especially ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP) showed that they were not equipped to deal with the security concerns created by the financial crisis. That crisis exposed the vulnerability of people’s lives to the effects of globalization, and traditional approaches to security do not adequately provide answers to such concerns. Despite avowed adherence to a comprehensive understanding of security, Southeast Asian governments have used a security discourse that is largely state-centric, and Track 2 networks have helped propagate this discourse. Consequently, Track 2 has not lived up to its potential for conveying new understanding of security.

ASEAN-ISIS has pushed the envelope of security in the region. The ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights held annually since 1994 is partially based on a broad framework of security. Also, 1994 the Asia Pacific Roundtable had a panel on non-traditional security (NTS) issues and a plenary session on human rights. Since 1996, ASEAN-ISIS (with special Canadian support) has included a session on gender and international security.

These NTS issues, however, remain on the margins of security discourse in the region. The great majority of Track 2 activities are about mainstream security issues, with their focus on state security. The meetings on NTS issues focus mostly on the relationship between economics and security (even prior to the 1997–1998 financial crisis). Even there, little attention is given to how regional economic relations affect people’s lives.19

ASEAN has to go beyond a state-centric security frame if it is to address the objectives stipulated in its “Vision 2020.”20 Track 2 institutions like ASEAN-ISIS need to work on the substance behind the idea of equitable and just societies. These issues go to the heart of maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of Track 2 processes in the region.21

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**Track 2 is an exclusive club.**

Pluralism and consequent hypotheses about an incipient regional civil society\(^{22}\) assume that Track 2 activities are open to various groups participating and articulating their security concerns. In reality, Track 2 involves a select number of groups and individuals discussing security issues that concern governing elites.\(^ {23}\) Inclusivity is not based on incorporating the concerns of marginalized groups. It is more about involving non-governmental actors in debates on issues defined by governments with little consideration for alternative perspectives.\(^ {24}\)

Track 2 processes have been accused of promoting a form of “group-think” when they gather individuals with similar professional or academic backgrounds (with their own specialized jargon) as part of consensus building apart from the rest of civil society. In fact, despite efforts to make public the ideas presented and discussed in Track 2 for a (such as the publication of proceedings), these have not had much influence on public opinion in the region.\(^ {25}\) This situation is exacerbated when participation is subject to gate keeping. Track 2 activities are noted for the great regularity with which certain people are invited to different meeting while others are excluded.\(^ {26}\) On the other hand, many NGOs are hesitant about involving themselves in Track 2 processes even when invited to participate. They question whether these activities (particularly those organized by ASEAN-ISIS) have substantive agendas for change, of whether their own participation will only help legitimize the status quo.\(^ {27}\)

The misgivings of NGOs indicate that Track 2 falls short of its potential as a forum for broad participation. The security discourse in the region is pre-set, with the locus still on traditional concerns regarding state interests and security. With little incentive to rock the status quo, the implementation of the principle of inclusivity merely preserves the established order.

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26 Desmond Ball has also noted this in CSCAP. See Ball (note 15 above), p. 306.
27 Interviews conducted in Southeast Asia, January-February 1999.
Track 2 is nothing more than a talk shop.
The tendency of Track 2 activities to focus on dialogue as an end in itself has been frustrating for those concerned with policymaking. The importance of the slow, deliberate, and consensus-seeking approaches utilized by ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS is lost on most of their critics. Others concede the need for it, but think that it should be taken to the next level of more substantive dialogue. The lack of appreciation or patience for the process again goes back to the need to further open up participation.

At the same time, the lack of appreciation for dialogue as an end for Track 2 is itself indicative of the lack of understanding of what Track 2 is all about. It is mistakenly assumed that the most difficult issues confronting states should be left to unofficial diplomatic mechanisms. Track 2 is not a substitute for Track 1 activities; otherwise it loses the advantage of its non-official status. Nonetheless, there is a clear need to see more of the discussions in Track 2 activities turn into meaningful proposals for policy coordination and cooperation.

The infrastructure of Track 2 in the region is fragile.
The financial crisis brought into the open the financial concerns of many of the institutes involved in Track 2 mechanisms. By 1998, the support for these activities coming from foundations and governments had been reduced. This was in part due to the crisis pushing the member-states of ASEAN to be more inward-looking.

Human resource issues constitute another element in the maintenance of Track 2 networks in the region. A new generation of scholars committed to the continuity of ASEAN-ISIS and Track 2 processes is needed. The ASEAN-ISIS institutes have had varying degrees of success at recruiting new blood. Some have been able to attract young scholars who have blended into their activities. Others, however, have either lost their personnel or been unable to attract new ones. This disparity in the success experienced by its different member-institutes does not bode well for the future of ASEAN-ISIS. While financial and human resource constraints do not pose an immediate threat, they do have medium- and long-term implications for the network.

Track 3 Processes and Alternative Security Perspectives
Problems notwithstanding, the impact of ASEAN-ISIS and other Track 2 dialogue channels in the region has put into question traditional definitions of diplomacy


that emphasize only activities involving government representatives. The global system has become too complex to be seen only in terms of a system of states. Any study of diplomacy, particularly as it pertains to multilateral institutions, would have to look at the different levels at which outcomes on global and regional issues are influenced.

Non-state actor participation in diplomatic processes also contributes to the building of an incipient regional civil society in the Asia Pacific. Then foreign minister of South Korea Han Sung-Joo noted that unofficial diplomacy is essentially “people to people diplomacy undertaken by both individuals and private organizations”.30 Collaboration between non-governmental actors has contributed to the emergence of Track 3 dialogue channels. These channels include meetings and conferences that draw their participants mainly from non-governmental circles. Discussions are more academic and very informal, and the agendas generally tend to be critical of governments and their policies.

A number of NGOs and institutes, as well as independent scholars around the region, have been studying and addressing NTS issues. Their use of new communications technology and their increasing savvy in winning public sympathy for their causes have gained them international influence out of proportion to the material resources they control.

In 1994, a network known as Peace, Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia Pacific (PDSAP) convened a conference in Manila with the theme “From the Cold War to the 21st Century: Towards a New Era in the Asia Pacific”. The group built upon initial meetings held in Tokyo in 1992 and upon bilateral Philippines-Japan inter-parliamentary dialogues. The conference itself was intended to expand the PDSAP network to include academics, NGOs and “concerned parliamentarians” from around the Asia-Pacific region. It opened up questions of peace, security, and living standards in the context of a development discourse critical of unfettered globalization.

In 1997, these issues were taken up in a conference organized by Focus on Global South, a group attached to the Social Research Institute of Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University, in association with Forum Asia, the Peace Research Institute of Tokyo’s International Christian University, and Berkeley’s Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. The conference was entitled “Alternative Security Systems in the Asia Pacific” and took place on 27–30 March in Bangkok. Among its objectives was “to move the understanding of security from a traditional concept to a more comprehensive and pro-active view that addresses the causes of conflict, including socio-economic and gender inequalities, environmental degradation, and lack of political participation”.31 A second conference held in Manila on 22–24 July

30 Yamamoto (note 22 above), p. 23.
1998 examined how to conceptualize an alternative security perspective that would incorporate these concerns.

The focus on this alternative frame for security, more commonly called “human security,” allowed national and regional NGOs involved in Track 3 to include concerns such as economic development and human rights in the security discourse in the Asia Pacific. The People’s Forum (and, from 1997 onwards, the APEC People’s Assembly), an international agglomeration of NGOs, people’s organizations and individual academics opposed to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), held parallel conferences coinciding with APEC Summits held in Osaka (1995), Manila (1996), Vancouver (1997), Kuala Lumpur (1998), and different cities in New Zealand (1999). The principal goal of these organizations is to communicate information that challenges the idea that globalization is the only path to economic progress. The media was their principal target, not government representatives and policymakers. Nonetheless, they influenced legislators across the region who have raised these views in parliamentary debates and discussions.

At another level, but working within the same framework articulated by the People’s Forum, are regional networks that have been organizing around specific human rights issues. They have done this even as they challenged the security framework underlying the human rights approach of many regimes in power within the region. In Southeast Asia, the participants in the Asia Pacific Conferences on East Timor (APCET) and members of the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (AltSEAN) have taken ASEAN and its member-states to task for their policy of non-interference on the issue of human rights of East Timor and Burma. APCET held three conferences on the issue of East Timor between 1994 and 1997; these attracted international attention because of the harassment that conference organizers experienced at the hands of the governments of the host countries or organizations associated with the governments. A fourth conference, which will look into the transition process towards full independence of East Timor, will be held in Dili in September 2000.

By pursuing objectives that are clearly critical of mainstream security and development frameworks, the efforts of PDSAP, Focus on Global South, People’s Forum, APCET and AltSEAN show the fundamental aspects of Track 3 channels. These have a clearly activist nature. Track 3 mechanisms are more adversarial in their approach than Track 2 and Track 1.5. Track 3 is intent on instituting change from the margins of national and regional politics. The conferences and meetings held in Track 3 propose not only policy recommendations for governments but also a programme of action for the participants themselves.

A second aspect is the focus on non-traditional and alternative approaches to security. The NGOs and people’s organizations involved in these mechanisms argue that existing multilateral security systems are inadequate for the needs of the post-Cold War era. A more lasting framework for peace and stability can only be attained through “people-centred security systems” rather than the predominant
framework based on state-centric structures. International collaboration and networking among NGOs have been important in advocating issues and approaches that would otherwise have remained outside the public sphere.

The emergence of Track 3 activities—the very fact that these meetings are tolerated despite their anti-government stance—emphasizes the effects of increasing democratization in the region. Track 3 involves groups that are largely marginalized by the dominant discourse on security in the region. It seeks to “build constituencies for peace which can question conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to official government position.” Track 3 activities are symptomatic of the post-Cold War spread of democracy that was given further impetus by the 1997–1998 financial crisis.

At the same time, it points to the limitations of Track 2 in providing critical for a regional security and political affairs. Key personalities in ASEAN-ISIS such as Mohamed Jawhar Hassan of ISIS, Malaysia, and Carolina Hernandez of ISDS, the Philippines, have pointed to the potential contribution of Track 3 to security in the region. Hernandez believes that a meeting between Track 2 and Track 3 adherents in Southeast Asia would generate new ideas and the impetus for furthering participation in the political-security in the region. ASEAN-ISIS has taken up this idea and is looking up into a possibility of a meeting in November 2000. Marzuki Darusman, the Attorney-General of Indonesia and a regular at ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights, also recommended a “third track human rights mechanism for the region that would involve civil society.”

In spite of their advantages, there are clear issues regarding the longer term feasibility of Track 3 channels. Their deliberately critical view of government policies and their insistence on structural change in the existing order limit their capacity to influence government behaviour. The advantage of Track 3 participants in “being able to speak their mind” is offset by the lack of an audience that is able and willing to do something about what they talk about.

Equally important is the inadequacy of the human infrastructure needed to sustain these mechanisms. There are few civil society institutions and NGOs outside of mainstream Track 2 groups involved in security. A result is the lack of conceptual clarity of the human security framework advocated by Track 3 groups. This and the deficiency of expertise on security matters limit the credibility of Track 3 meetings in policy circles. Consequently, participants in these channels rarely manage to shape debate outside their own networks.

The most serious problem faced by Track 3 networks is the inability of participating groups to agree on priorities. This points to the conceptual difficulties with “human security”, but even more so it is symptomatic of activities involving issue-oriented and cause-oriented groups. Well versed in their respective concerns, they have little to contribute (and little desire to do so) to anything outside of these concerns. Under the best conditions, Track 3 meetings can introduce very interesting and original ideas. Unfortunately, in-fighting and splits within the NGO community in the region have more often than not led to short life-spans for Track 3 networks.

These problems, however, are not unresolvable. Collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 could be a way out of these. The proposal made by Hernandez to get Tracks 2 and 3 people together is intended to bring their respective strengths into the same forum. This kind of collaboration will allow Track 2 institutes to act as a conduit between Track 3 and Track 1 mechanisms. In return, cooperating with Track 3 could pave the way for more independent thinking and research within Track 2 processes, and could serve to sustain its credibility and legitimacy.

Conclusion
The experience of ASEAN-ISIS illustrates the dilemma faced by Track 2 diplomacy. The dilemma is largely a function of the close relationship ASEAN-ISIS has with governments in the region. These linkages provide its comparative advantage as non-governmental Track 2 participants are placed in a position to influence government thinking. Yet, the need to maintain good relations with state institutions and officials hampers its potential for critical contributions to dialogue processes.

The growth of Track 3 networks is one of the results of this dilemma. These networks provide the critical thinking that Track 2 seems to shy away from, with Track 3 acting as a forum where marginalized groups can articulate concerns that are largely ignored in the elitist structure of Track 2 mechanisms. Theoretical and practical issues, however, limit Track 3’s contribution to the regional security discourse.

Collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 networks can bring their respective strengths together in one forum. Given the problems associated with Track 2 in general, it is doubtful whether these issues can be addressed from within its current structure. ASEAN-ISIS, in particular, is subject to limitations imposed by the inclusion of government-based institutions in its membership. Ironically, for ASEAN-ISIS to maintain its credibility, it may be necessary for some of its member-institutes to undertake more activities outside its ambit. This is where comparative opportunities with Track 3 can be explored.

Certainly, collaboration faces structural and theoretical obstacles. The inclusion of government-based institutions in ASEAN-ISIS makes it difficult to accommodate the critical perspective that Track 3 participants bring into any forum. Secondly, Tracks 2 and 3 work at cross-purposes with one another. Track 2 seeks to help
government agencies in policymaking while Track 3 seeks to galvanize public support against governments and their policies. Again, these issues can be negotiated between the two sets of networks.

The revitalization of Track 2 is necessary for the reinvigoration of new thinking on security in the region. The importance of Track 2 as an intellectual springboard for this discourse remains a vital component of the process of diplomatic activities in the region. It must be allowed to perform this function, with as little constraint from government interests as possible. It should not be too dependent on national governments, otherwise it will fall into the trap of being beholden to the interests involved in the domestic political environment of the ASEAN states.

Postscript, 2009: A Continuing Saga
On 16 November 2009 at the 32nd CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting, the representatives of CSCAP China presented the procedures and conditions for the participation of scholars from Taiwan to the CSCAP General Conference held every two years. It largely reflected the same conditions for the participation of Taiwanese scholars in the different CSCAP study groups. These conditions include a pre-approved list of Taiwanese scholars who can participate in CSCAP activities, and the non-use of any name reflecting a separate CSCAP committee from Taiwan. The conditions in and of themselves are perhaps not so unusual considering that China and its representatives have always been sensitive about the application of the “One-China policy”. Admittedly, the concessions regarding the participation of scholars from Taiwan in the General Conference indicates progress in the direction of CSCAP’s expressed goal of being inclusive of all states and territories that constitute part of the Asia Pacific. It nonetheless shows how much the “autonomy dilemma” of Track 2 networks continues to operate in the region. The continuing importance of the need to keep China engaged in security dialogue, and enmeshed in multilateral arrangements (which is primarily a Track 1 concern) illustrates, in fairly stark terms, the increased institutionalization and accommodation of the limitations that emerge from the need to keep CSCAP, a Track 2 network, relevant to a public dominated by the official community of decision- and opinion-makers on regional security of which the ARF, a Track 1 network, remains one of the most important.

It should be noted, however, that this accommodation has borne fruit as there has been increasing cross-involvement at the technical level between CSCAP Study Groups (SGs) and ARF technical working groups. The reports of some CSCAP SGs have been given a prominent place in relevant ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group (ARF ISG) meetings. Cooperation between CSCAP and the ARF has in fact become

35 This has been particularly true of the CSCAP SGs on Preventive Diplomacy and on Weapons of Mass Destruction. There have been as well several memoranda produced by other CSCAP SGs that have become part of the background material that ARF ISGs have to work with.
more institutionalized in areas where the work of CSCAP SGs coincides directly with the agenda of ARF ISG meetings. The most prominent recognition of the contribution or possible contribution that CSCAP makes to the ARF was the suggestion in 2007 made by Indonesian officials (and supported by the representatives of other ARF member countries) that meetings between technical working groups of both CSCAP and ARF be held back to back to maximize opportunities for exchanges between Track 2 and Track 1.36 More importantly, perhaps, is the regularity with which CSCAP co-chairs have been invited to participate in ARF ISG meetings.

Even key personalities in CSCAP, however, concede that its work is compromised by structural limitations that only magnify the effects of the dilemma.37 They have noted the lack of comprehensiveness in its membership (with the Taiwan issue being one of the major concerns), the “capacity constraints” faced by many of the member committees of CSCAP, the poor Track 2 credentials of some member committees (with many of the member committees being led by organizations that are government institutes “in reality), and the consequent limited impact on regional security policy of CSCAP. All of these are reflective of the continuing effects of the dilemma on Track 2. And perhaps reflective of the process whereby the limitations created by the dilemma are implicitly accommodated by CSCAP, the curious response to these challenges revolves around the further intensification of CSCAP’s involvement with the ARF—in effect further institutionalizing the context within which the “autonomy dilemma” of Track 2 can operate. It appears then that even those within CSCAP who recognize the effects of the dilemma are willing to take the risk of working within the limitations it imposes. Perhaps, it is the only way to go and Track 2 must necessarily live with and accommodate the effects of its “autonomy dilemma”.

36 See Section 40 of Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF ISG CMBs & PD) held at Helsinki, Finland, on 28–30 March 2007.

PART 3
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON CSCAP, TRACK 2 AND REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

7. Track 2: Developments and Prospects
8. Security Architecture and Institutionalism in the Asia Pacific
10. The ASEAN Regional Forum: Moving Towards Preventive Diplomacy
11. CSCAP: Shaping the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum
12. From Epistemic to Learning Community
A

t the beginning of the 1990s, there was almost no multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. There was no region-wide mechanism for the discussion of security matters and the prospects for multilateralism looked very bleak. Multilateral endeavours were represented as being incompatible with fundamental aspects of Asia-Pacific strategic cultures, and damaging to the architecture of bilateral arrangements that had arguably served the region during the previous decades. The Asia Pacific was simply too large and diverse in terms of sizes, strengths, cultures, interests and threat perceptions of the constituent states, to support any region-wide security architecture. It soon turned out, however, that these “realities” were not immutable, at least insofar as they ruled out the institutionalization of an active, purposeful and productive regional security cooperation process. Indeed, two decades on, it is now the case that the term “architecture” has emerged as something of a catchphrase when referring to contemporary multilateral institutional developments in Asian security politics.1

Track 2 processes, such as CSCAP, provided much of the impetus required to drive this regional security cooperation process forward. And they did so from almost a standing start. As Paul Evans notes, “In 1989 there were only three or four channels for trans-Pacific discussion of political and security matters in a multilateral setting”.2 It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the infinitely more crowded institutional environment, which is now such a prominent feature of the Asia-Pacific security landscape two decades on, has, in many ways, made life more complicated and competitive for Track 2 organizations. This institutional landscape is dominated

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by influential and well-funded first track multilateral organizations. Often, these institutions elbow for attention by seizing upon the most pressing and fashionable security matters of the day. Regrettably, this process sometimes facilitates more than it ameliorates competitive processes among the region’s great powers as they seek to make their presence felt through those particular processes with which they have the most influence, or which are most closely aligned with their perceived national interests—Beijing through the ASEAN Plus 3 process and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Russia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Tokyo through the East Asia Summit; and Washington through the APEC process and the Shangri-la Dialogue.

Amid this institutional clutter and an often intensified sense of competition, it is becoming more and more difficult for much less well-funded Track 2 organizations such as CSCAP to make their presence felt or to even make themselves heard. Somewhat ironically, Track 2 processes have arguably become “victims of their own success” in this regard, to the extent that their pioneering efforts have proven conducive to the burgeoning in multilateral activity in the Asia Pacific. In seeking to address that dilemma, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first describes in greater detail the increasingly crowded nature of the Asia-Pacific institutional landscape. The second puts forward five recommendations for how CSCAP can, notwithstanding this challenge, position itself to better “stand out from the crowd” in Asia’s increasingly populous regional architecture.

An Increasingly Crowded Landscape

In a number of respects, the institutional landscape of the Asia Pacific has changed markedly since the days when CSCAP was established and few channels for security dialogue existed in this part of the world. The number of such channels at the Track 1 (or government-to-government) level, for example, has increased substantially. Apart from the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN)—which commenced in 1967—the foremost are the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, which was injected with a new security focus in the period immediately following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; the ASEAN Plus 3 process, which was institutionalized in 1999, largely as a response to the Asian Financial crisis of 1997–1998; the East Asia Summit, which held its first meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 and, despite its somewhat troubled beginnings, still has the potential over time to emerge as an influential regional security mechanism; and the relatively new ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) process. More ad hoc, but still substantial Track 1 security initiatives have also been employed towards specific issues, such as the Six Party Talks concerning security on the Korean Peninsula. Taken together, albeit a near dearth of available mechanisms to engage in security dialogue over often sensitive issues while in the early 1990s, there are now literally hundreds of such channels in existence at the government-to-government level.
While this can be seen as a positive development in terms of regional security more generally, it has also led to a gradual narrowing of the space in which Track 2 processes were initially operating. A clear case in point is the second track South China Sea workshop process, whose reason for existence became less apparent the more the countries of the South China Sea region found ways to talk to one another through official channels.

The volume of second track activities in the Asia Pacific has also risen exponentially during the period in question. According to one recent estimate, for instance, there are now more than 150 such channels in operation at the second track level alone. To be sure, this growth has been neither a steady nor a straightforward one. The 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, for example, imposed additional constraints on the already cash-strapped second track processes and created a temporary sense of disillusionment toward regional security more generally (occasioned largely by the region’s generally lacklustre response to that event). Yet there can be little dispute to the fact that regional security cooperation has since recovered well and that the general trend in second track activity during the decade-and-a-half, since CSCAP’s establishment, has been an upward one. Somewhat ironically, this dramatic burgeoning in second track activity creates a dilemma for established organizations such as CSCAP, to the extent that it has contributed to a further crowding of Asia’s institutional landscape. When the Network of East Asian Thinks Tanks (NEAT) was founded in 2003, for example, some commentators saw this as a direct challenge to CSCAP by virtue of the very similar raison d’être exhibited by each of these organizations.

In recent years, a new breed of quite exclusive, extremely well-funded and, in many respects, quite prestigious dialogue processes have emerged to compete for the ground traditionally occupied by second track processes. The prime example of this trend is the so-called Shangri-la Dialogue (SLD). Established in 2002 and run by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the SLD began as an academic conference with an aspiration to bring together—where others had tried and failed before—the region’s defence ministers. The SLD has certainly attracted its fair share of regional resentment, not least due to the fact that an essentially extra-regional organization—the IISS—is facilitating a process that was regarded by some in the region as a logical “next step” for the ARF. However, due in part to the substantial funding, it has been able to secure—both from the


4 For further reading, see Brendan Taylor, Anthony Milner & Desmond Ball, Track 2 Diplomacy in Asia: Australian and New Zealand Engagement, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 164 (Canberra, ACT: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2006), pp. 35–36.
governments of Australia, Japan and Singapore, and a number of private companies including BAE Systems, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, EADS, Keppel Corporation, Mitsubishi Corporation and Japanese newspaper *The Asahi Shimbun*—the IISS has been surprisingly successful in realizing what initially seemed a somewhat lofty aspiration. By the time it reached its fifth anniversary in 2006, for example, a total of 17 governments had sent their defence minister to the SLD. While not all participating governments are yet to be represented at ministerial level, the 2009 SLD constituted the largest gathering yet with 27 governments in attendance and more than 350 registered participants. Given its growing popularity, some commentators have characterized this relatively new forum as a direct competitor to long-standing second track processes, such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable.\(^5\)

A number of smaller and arguably more nimble second track processes have also emerged during the decade-and-a-half since the establishment of CSCAP. These typically take the form of bilateral and, increasingly, “minilateral” dialogues organized by think tanks such as the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, The Japan Center for International Exchange, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Lowy Institute for International Policy.\(^6\) At the bilateral level, for example, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has for several years run a series of what it terms “Track 1.5” strategic dialogues with defence and security experts from Japan, China, India and Indonesia. At the “minilateral” level—an increasingly popular form of security dialogue at both the Track 1 and the Track 2 level—a useful example is the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Dialogue. Held for the first time in December 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, this gathering was hosted by the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), in conjunction with a number of other think tanks and academic institutions from the region including, the Asia New Zealand Foundation, Asialink, the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Australian National University. Topics covered included the role of Australia and New Zealand in the region, the causes and security implications of the global financial crisis, and the security situation in Burma/Myanmar.

The period in question has also seen a significant burgeoning in “Track 3” diplo-

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\(^5\) The Asia-Pacific Roundtable is a major second track event in which over 250 scholars, journalists, and civilian and military officials meet to discuss regional peace and security matters. It is held annually in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

\(^6\) “Minilateralism” has been defined as “the self-selection of small subgroups of countries”. Such arrangements “tend to complement bilateralism and region-wide multilateralism” and can be used to seek “solutions to specific challenges where bilateralism is insufficient, but region-wide multilateralism is unwieldy (and where some players may find both bilateralism and all-inclusive multilateralism unwelcome)”. See Rory Medcalf, “Squaring the Triangle: An Australian Perspective on Asian Security Minilateralism”, *Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue* (The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2008), pp. 25–26.
matic processes—an umbrella term used to describe activities undertaken by NGOs, transnational networks and advocacy coalitions that claim to represent peoples and communities largely marginalized from the centre of power. Track 3 processes come in all shapes and sizes and cover a range of issue areas, including woman’s rights, the environment and anti-globalization. They are by far most active in the area of human rights. *The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development* (Forum Asia), for instance, is a leading network of human rights and development organizations in South and Southeast Asia. It seeks to facilitate greater cooperation and the sharing of expertise between these groups. The Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma is an equally prominent human rights organization, which organizes activities in support of democratization in Burma/Myanmar. Other prominent Track 3 processes in the Asia Pacific include Focus on the Global South, the Council for Alternative Security in the Asia Pacific, and Peace, Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia Pacific.7

Taken together, the influence and importance of Track 3 organizations and activities has grown in recent years, particularly in Southeast Asia. With reference to the business of regional security dialogue, purists might argue that this trend is an overwhelmingly positive one. According to that particular line of argument, there can simply never be such a thing as too much “talk” around any issue of pressing concern. Against the backdrop of Asia’s “institutional overcrowding” discussed earlier in this section, however, the exponential growth in Track 3 processes raises certain dilemmas for their second track counterparts, such as CSCAP. Advocates of Track 2 diplomacy might argue that this is partly a product of entrepreneurial role that second track processes have played in stimulating regional dialogue and that, hence, organizations such as CSCAP are essentially becoming victims of their own success. Critics, by contrast, might contend that the burgeoning in Track 3 processes is a reflection of some of the limitations of Track 2 diplomacy, to the extent that Track 2 processes have become too closely aligned with their Track 1 counterparts—unlike Track 3 processes, which typically adopt a more critical stance toward government and seek to influence policy more indirectly.8 Either way, it is difficult to avoid the question as to whether the increase in diplomatic activity at the Track 1, Track 2 and Track 3 level significantly limits the space available to established organizations such as CSCAP—or, alternatively, whether the increase opens up new opportunities for such organizations—as these competitor processes effectively seize the ground that was often their sole purview.

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How CSCAP can Stand Out from the Crowd

*CSCAP can serve as a useful “bridge” between first, second and third track activities in the region.*

Notwithstanding and perhaps precisely because of the increasingly crowded nature of Asia’s institutional landscape, the degree of interaction between the region’s various “tracks” of diplomatic activity is not particularly well developed or systematic. The relationship between Track 1 and Track 3 processes, for example, is next to non-existent. As See Seng Tan has recently observed, “regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has long remained the exclusive preserve of governments, while the engagement by civil society in that enterprise has been minimal despite the proliferation of Track 2 processes”.

As alluded to previously, this is partially due to a fear harboured by many Track 3 practitioners of being co-opted through too close an affiliation with the Track 1 level, which might inhibit their ability to represent those marginalized from and by centres of power. Likewise, some Asian governments regard Track 3 institutions and activities not as natural partners, but as a threat to regime stability given that they do often seek to represent otherwise alienated social groups. Albeit for different reasons, the relationship between second and third track processes is also relatively underdeveloped. Writing in 2003, for instance, Brian Job contended that “no groups representing civil society have been engaged in the Track 2 process”.

In the period since Job’s observation, at least two processes have been initiated which have successfully engaged representatives from the Track 1, Track 2 and Track 3 levels. Moreover, second track organizations have played a key role in facilitating these endeavours. The most prominent example is the ASEAN People’s Assemblies (APA)—an event organized by ASEAN-ISIS which brings together approximately 350 NGO leaders and representatives of grass-root organizations from throughout Southeast Asia and a small number of senior ASEAN officials. A further example is the “civil society summit”, which was first held on the sidelines of the inaugural East Asia Summit of December 2005. This civil society summit brought together representatives from four Track 2 and Track 3 communities—the APA, ASEAN-ISIS,

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the ASEAN International Parliamentary Organization and the so-called “Informal ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism” 12

Consistent with these embryonic efforts, scope exists for second track organizations such as CSCAP to perform a valuable “brokerage” role, by acting as a conduit between government, on the one hand, and a broad range of potentially useful Track 3 processes, NGOs, specialist organizations and academic institutions, on the other. Track 2 institutions and organizations that are consistently able to perform this function effectively will be valued at the first track level, partly because of their capacity to tap a wide range of expertise—to bring new voices, new ideas, new knowledge to the attention of government. One of the primary obstacles to realizing this “bridge” ideal, of course, remains the need to allay the concerns of Track 3 networks that this could result in their “co-option”. The undeniable increase in the volume and importance of Track 3 processes in the region, however, suggests that some innovative thinking is urgently required to overcome this potential impediment.

Further bilateral and “minilateral” dialogue should be conducted under CSCAP’s multilateral umbrella.

One of the prevailing trends in regional security dialogue is a move towards conducting bilateral and, increasingly, “minilateral” conversations under multilateral auspices. Thus far, this has tended to occur primarily at the Track 1 level. The most controversial example of this emerging trend occurred in May 2007, when senior officials from the so-called “Asian Quad” countries of Australia, India, Japan and the United States met on the sidelines of an ARF meeting in Manila. But the pattern of conducting bilateral and minilateral negotiations on the side-lines of multilateral gatherings has been a more enduring and, indeed, particularly attractive feature for policymakers attending the Shangri-La Dialogue. Indeed, at least a day of this three-day event is typically set aside for such meetings and in 2009 the first trilateral meeting between Japan, South Korea and the United States was held on the sidelines of the Shangri-la Dialogue to discuss the North Korean nuclear crisis. 13

Aside from the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)—a processes initiated by Professor Susan Shirk of the University of California in 1993 which, because it brings together officials and academics from China, Japan, North Korea (on occasion), Russia, South Korea and the United States, has gained renewed prominence in the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis—”minilateral” discussions have not tended to be such a feature of second track dialogues in the Asia-Pacific context. However, a wide variety of bilateral discussions are held throughout the region each year.

The Chinese experience is particularly instructive here. Many of China’s leading Chinese think tanks and policy institutes, such as the China Institute of International Studies, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, engage in a wide range of “unofficial” bilateral dialogues. The interlocutor of choice for many of these institutions are counterpart organizations in the United States. An early example of such a gathering was the annual “U.S.-China conference on arms control”, which was established in the late 1990s and sponsored by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, California. More recently, the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the U.S. Naval School and the Pacific Forum CSIS have co-sponsored an annual “U.S.-China strategic dialogue”. This dialogue is funded by the U.S. Department of Defense. It provides an opportunity for Chinese and American representatives to meet in their “private” capacities to discuss nuclear strategy, doctrine and crisis management. Chinese participants at this gathering typically comprise a mix of academics, think tank analysts and military officers.

China’s other primary interlocutors in such “unofficial” dialogue processes are Japan, Taiwan and Australia. The China Institute of International Studies, for instance, holds regular workshops with the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies in Beijing holds regular dialogues with counterpart institutions in Taiwan. Likewise, a range of Chinese institutes meet regularly to engage in dialogue with leading Australian think tanks. The China Institute for International Strategic Studies, for instance, holds an annual Track 1.5 dialogue with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

CSCAP has yet to fully maximize such opportunities for bilateral and minilateral dialogue under its essentially multilateral auspices. To be sure, CSCAP study group meetings have often provided policy experts from China and Taiwan with the opportunity to interact and exchange views in both formal and informal settings. In the process, it is assumed that they have gained a greater appreciation of each other’s respective national standpoints and have gradually begun to develop certain shared understandings. Similarly, the Australian Member Committee of CSCAP (with considerable financial backing from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) recently completed a collaborative project with CSCAP Indonesia that was designed to develop dialogue between Australians and Muslim scholars and spokespeople. A key product of this project was a major sourcebook on Islam in Southeast Asia.14 Widely perceived as a relatively non-threatening organization, CSCAP is ideally placed to undertake further bilateral and minilateral initiatives under its multilateral umbrella in a manner that is not always feasible for Track 1 multilateral institutions. Moreover, the bilateral and/or minilateral approach offers

14 Greg Fealy & Virginia Hooker (Eds.), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
the added advantage that it can afford CSCAP a greater level of procedural “nimbleness” on issues of pressing concern that has not always been regarded as a hallmark of all of its more multilaterally-minded endeavours.

A more systematic approach to nurturing the “next generation” of CSCAP participants is desirable and necessary.

The success and, indeed, the very existence of second track activities rely heavily upon the personal linkages and intellectual contributions that individual participants are willing and able to make. A number of prominent scholars have noted the role that a small group of individuals—all members of a so-called “Asia-Pacific Track 2 elite”—played in the formation of CSCAP itself.15 Perhaps because of the importance of personal linkages to the continued viability of second track processes, there is now within CSCAP a growing recognition of the need to expand that social capital by bringing younger scholars—the “next generation” of the Track 2 community—into the fold.

Consistent with this, a number of initiatives have been undertaken to expand the CSCAP network by involving younger participants. By far the most well developed amongst these is the “Young Leaders program” run by the Pacific Forum CSIS. Established five years ago, this program has thus far engaged more than 250 participants from over 20 countries. This program is not tied exclusively to CSCAP and runs a wide range of activities independent from it. However, participants from the Pacific Forum CSIS “Young leaders program” have regularly attended CSCAP study group meetings as observers and have engaged with senior CSCAP participants both formally and informally on the sidelines of CSCAP gatherings. Following modestly in the footsteps of the Pacific Forum CSIS, the Australian Member Committee of CSCAP (Aus-CSCAP) established its own “Young Leaders program” in 2008, with the assistance of sponsorship from a leading Australian defence company. Four members from this group—a journalist, an Australian Parliamentary researcher, a Police officer and an NGO staffer—attended the CSCAP Steering Committee meeting in June 2008 and went on to participate in the Asia-Pacific Roundtable. Under the auspices of the Wellington-based Asia New Zealand Foundation, a similar program has also recently been established in New Zealand.

As promising as such initiatives are, there is little evidence to suggest that the approach that CSCAP as an institution has thus far taken to this “next generation” issue has been a particularly systematic one. Further work could certainly be undertaken by CSCAP on the question of how best to identify the likely Track 2 leaders of the future and on how to provide them with an entrée into the second track com-

munity. Likewise, a study documenting and evaluating the range of “next generation” fora that already exist in the region would also seem to be a worthwhile exercise. Flowing from this, CSCAP might also consider initiating a “Young Leaders Conference” process which brings together participants from around the region belonging to these “next generation” initiatives, particularly those with a formal affiliation or strong affinity towards CSCAP. Finally, further work might also be undertaken to investigate how new technologies might be utilized to connect “Young leaders” from around the region on a more regular basis.16

“Strategic alliances” between CSCAP and media outlets should be encouraged.

Strengthening public awareness and appreciation regarding the importance of second track processes could potentially bolster support for CSCAP in many parts of the Asia-Pacific region. Media outlets have a key role to play in facilitating this process. The organizers of the Shangri-la Dialogue have already exploited this opportunity to particularly good effect. From the earliest days of that venture, the IISS has secured sponsorship support from the Japanese newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun. In return, Shangri-la Dialogue participants are asked to consider requests for interviews with the Asahi Shimbun “as warmly as they can”.17 A select number of journalists from a range of prominent media outlets are also invited to participate in the formal plenary sessions of the Shangri-la Dialogue, while the proceedings of these sessions are televised in nearby conference rooms, allowing members of the press gallery to view proceedings and report on them. A case can be made that such an approach has contributed towards the substantial level of media coverage that the Shangri-la Dialogue is able to generate each year.18 Albeit on a more modest scale, the potential for CSCAP to exploit similar opportunities was made apparent in mid-2008, when the Australian member Committee of CSCAP—which had been successful in the past in attracting senior members of the Australian media to regional conferences—actually sponsored the attendance of Diplomatic Editor of The Age newspaper, Daniel Flitton, as part of the aforementioned Aus-CSCAP Young Leaders program. Flitton went on to publish a number of newspaper articles based upon his participation in this program.19

16 The authors are particularly grateful to Brad Glosserman from U.S.-CSCAP for discussions around these issues.
18 See, for example, “Transparency and its Discontents”, Economist, 1 June 2009.
19 See, for example, Daniel Flitton, “Experts Offer Mixed Reviews of Ambitious Forum Plan”, The Age, 6 June 2008; and Daniel Flitton, “Think Big, but Talk First”, The Age, 13 June 2008.
In an increasingly crowded institutional landscape, there is an important role for CSCAP to play in terms of representing the under-represented. Notwithstanding the burgeoning in multilateral activity that has occurred in the Asia-Pacific region since the beginning of the 1990s, there is further irony attached to the fact that the representation of nations and peoples in this part of the world has not necessarily improved as a result. Indeed, given the significant financial costs associated with attending such a substantial number of meetings throughout the region each year, only the most affluent of countries are able to be represented at the vast majority of these. Many of the poorer countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, in particular, are simply unable to afford to send representatives. Others are either not invited or refuse to participate. Notwithstanding ongoing efforts on the part of groupings such as the NEACD and the Shangri-la Dialogue, for example, North Korean participation has been extraordinarily difficult to secure. This is not to mention the lack of engagement with third track processes that, as alluded to earlier in this chapter, continues to remain problematic.

CSCAP has an important role to play in encouraging participation of these often alienated actors and in terms of seeking additional financial means to facilitate that participation. To be sure, CSCAP itself is not a particularly affluent organization. However, participation in its events is generally more affordable relative to other exclusive, “high-end” events such as the Shangri-la Dialogue. CSCAP is also generally regarded as a less threatening process than others in many respects, which is one of the reasons for Beijing’s decision to begin its earliest experimentation with Asia-Pacific multilateralism by joining CSCAP in 1996. CSCAP should continue this valuable tradition of seeking to bring those often ostracized or unwilling interlocutors into the fold. For their future is just as intimately tied, if not more so, to the future of Asia-Pacific stability as those already inside the dialogue tent.

A Final Word
None of the above is to suggest that CSCAP should not continue striving to utilize its impressive and substantial base of expertise to think ambitiously in terms of developing practical proposals with the potential to create major policy impacts. The primary mandate of any leading Track 2 organization concerned with Asia-Pacific security matters should, after all, remain that of generating and testing new ideas—ideas that are often too sensitive or controversial to be discussed at the Track 1 level. As a recent report addressing Australia’s relationship with ASEAN and tabled by the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade concludes “to be effective the Track II leadership needs to be well aware of the Track I agenda, testing or debating new ideas relating to or extending that agenda… and in some circumstances might operate in areas where governments themselves are wary of operating.”

20 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), p. 25.
Often those ideas are best developed in relation to largely new or longer-term issue areas, upon which government agencies rarely have the time or the resources to quickly develop a substantial base of expertise. In this regard, second track processes can act as useful mechanisms for building capacity. That said, in Asia’s increasingly crowded institutional environment, second track processes such as CSCAP also need to be realistic about their own limitations and resource constraints, not least in terms of funding and their ability to make an impact relative to other more affluent and often more influential groupings. While it would clearly be mistake for CSCAP to step away completely from any aspirations to endeavour to shape the region’s emerging security architecture in positive ways, the various “niche” contributions outlined in this chapter thus offer additional approaches for doing that, through which CSCAP in the process might also effectively demonstrate its continued usefulness to regional governments.
Since the early 1990s, multilateral, inter-governmental security cooperation in the Asia Pacific—whether in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus 3, including China, Japan and South Korea (APT) or most recently, the East Asia Summit (EAS), which comprises ASEAN+3 plus Australia, India and New Zealand—has been driven by ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Although proposals on Asia-Pacific regionalism have arisen from time to time—the latest, the “Asia-Pacific Community”, was introduced by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd—most have not been well received so long as they rely on questionable choices where regional leadership is concerned. In the absence of an alternative acceptable to all participants, ASEAN, long held as the default option despite its faults, will likely continue to assume the leadership of the emerging institutional architecture, although it has to be said that ASEAN’s authority as the region’s leader is increasingly in doubt.

The security agenda of the Asia Pacific is today characterized by a curious and potentially combustible mix of old and new challenges. At no time in its history has the region been confronted, all at once, with a host of complex strategic and non-traditional security (NTS) threats such as those that confront its inhabitants today. The ASEAN-led institutions should therefore offer an opportunity for regional states to respond to these challenges and shape the contemporary Asia-Pacific region in ways that will best maintain its economic dynamism, enhance regional security, and preserve peace and stability among themselves. This begs the question, however, whether the ASEAN practice based on consensus, informality and minimalism is still relevant for meeting the region’s evolving interests. Broadly defined as the “ASEAN Way”, ASEAN’s brand of cooperation has emerged as the de facto diplomatic cum security convention on which regional arrangements model their institutional
practices. Not all are convinced, however, that this process-driven approach would amount to much, not least where the aim of achieving substantive progress in Asia-Pacific regionalism is concerned.

This chapter will first review the trends and driving forces in the current process of inter-governmental institutionalism in the Asia Pacific before focusing on the functions and relevance of the ARF and the EAS in this emerging regional security landscape. Created in 1994, the ARF remains the first and only inclusive security arrangement serving more or less the entire Asia Pacific. It continues to provide a diplomatic avenue to hold multilateral discussions on regional problems, to share information, promote confidence building and enhance the practice of transparency. Gathering representatives from 16 nations, the EAS was formed in December 2005 as a new grouping distinct from the APT and other institutional expressions in the region. The EAS was initially regarded as a venue where regional leaders could advocate and encourage progress on various issues before passing them on to other existing cooperative frameworks for their implementation. The inclusion of the two primary engines of economic growth in Asia—China and India—within the EAS immediately (if somewhat superficially) raised the profile of its inaugural summit.

Both the ARF and the EAS have lost momentum since their formation, however. The ARF is now often being criticized for being no more than a “talk shop”, unable


to respond to security developments in the Asia Pacific. On their part, the EAS participants have failed to meet on two occasions since 2005 due to political instability in hosting nations. Such developments raise doubts about the kind of institutional architecture being formed in the Asia Pacific today and the roles of the ARF and the EAS in that ensuing design.

Trends and Driving Forces in the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture

Some interesting trends characterize the multilateral architecture emerging in the Asia Pacific today, especially when examined from a security perspective. First, the region now accommodates a great variety of security structures, ranging from bilateral to multilateral arrangements. The nature of such arrangements varies from military alliances to institutional expressions of cooperative and comprehensive security.

Second, the Asia Pacific has seen the emergence of numerous new multilateral institutions since the end of the Cold War, such as the ARF and the EAS, as well as groupings operating at the Track 1.5 level such as the Shangri-la Dialogue and, at the Track 2 level, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The Asia-Pacific terrain has therefore evolved from being "dangerously under-institutionalized" to a relatively crowded landscape of overlapping multilateral arrangements.

Third, there has been a growing recognition of the close relationship between economics and security, particularly since the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis. The APT has sought, for example, to incorporate economic-security linkages as part of its cooperative structures. Likewise, ASEAN perceives the construction of security and economic communities in Southeast Asia as complementary and mutually rein-


forcing. Finally, existing institutions in the Asia Pacific have taken on “new” security roles since 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings. ASEAN, the ARF and even the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, originally formed to encourage trade and investment liberalization, have been accorded a role in the campaign against terrorism. (However, it remains to be seen whether the Obama Administration will continue with its predecessor’s policy of using APEC to address security issues.) Health concerns, transnational crimes and other issues are also increasingly discussed at the multilateral level among policy and epistemic communities in the region.9

Nevertheless, despite these developments and the presence of a growing number of overlapping structures, institutionalism in the Asia Pacific has continued to suffer from weak structural capacities that limit its ability to respond to security challenges.10 In that respect, some analysts have taken to arguing that the prevalence of “architectural” considerations in regional security discourse11—evidenced in incessant references to the regional security architecture—is as such misplaced.12 In their view, regional actors should instead focus on establishing and maintaining informal bargains founded upon common values and consistent patterns of strategic behaviour (in the form, say, of habits and practices) among regional powers, and less on mere “formalizing of the informal”, as

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9 Among others, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore is host to multilateral platforms on non-traditional security concerns, such as that Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (www.rsis-ntsasia.org).
it were.\textsuperscript{13} Notwithstanding the logic of that contention, the fact of the matter is that the regional process of institutionalization has become, for better or worse, an imperative which regional actors, not least ASEAN, are unlikely to give up.

The ARF has enjoyed some success in confidence building, but it remains questionable whether it will succeed in moving toward preventive diplomacy. The APT does not have the capabilities to address security challenges, and the complex relations between China and Japan may continue to undermine its effectiveness. However, the recent step taken by the APT to create a regional foreign reserve pool, known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), to aid needy economies in the region in dealing with the impact of the global economic recession is a key contribution, albeit indirect, to regional security.\textsuperscript{14} The EAS, in the short to medium term, would at best be a confidence-building exercise—an important one, it should be emphasized—although pressures on this “leaders-driven forum” to do more cannot be under-estimated.

In light of these trends, what will be the driving forces for change in Asia-Pacific institutionalism in the coming years? Three factors, among others, should be highlighted: the level of U.S. participation, the nature of China’s involvement, and the strength of regionalism in Southeast Asia.

The United States is likely to remain the preponderant Asia-Pacific power for years to come although its exercise of power and influence in the region will be affected by the rise of China. Consequently, the nature of the U.S. involvement in multilateral arrangements is crucial. The United States has generally been supportive of multilateral initiatives in the Asia Pacific, although it is not a member of the EAS. A disinterested United States would most likely weaken Asia-Pacific cooperation. The negative impact on the ARF of a non-active U.S. involvement was felt when then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, decided not to attend the ministerial meeting in Vientiane in July 2005. Dr. Rice’s participation the following year eased concerns over the possible diminishing U.S. commitment to existing institutionalized arrangements. Yet, she failed again to attend the following ministerial meeting in July 2007. Initial statements from the Obama Administration suggest, however, a renewed U.S. interest in Asia-Pacific institutionalism and an American willingness to move beyond the issues of terrorism and maritime security.\textsuperscript{15}


China has added a discernable activism to its growing economic and military growth. The Chinese “charm offensive” toward Southeast Asia, including the negotiation of a free trade area with ASEAN and its support for the EAS, is in contrast to China’s previous suspicion of multilateralism. Beijing’s activism with regard to the ASEAN-led institutions has been effective in not only changing the Southeast Asian perception of China but also in bringing new life to regional multilateral initiatives. The engagement between China and ASEAN is particularly impressive. These achievements need not be at the expense of the United States, however. Beijing’s gain must not be regarded as a loss for Washington. Nonetheless, uncertainties remain. One is related to the possibility of a damaging crisis between China and Japan or between China and the United States. Such a crisis would directly influence the process of institution building in the Asia Pacific. The nature of China’s future involvement is also uncertain. Will China adopt, for example, a more restrictive position on the agenda setting and/or push for a more exclusive approach in terms of membership? Washington would most likely refuse to be excluded from regional institution building.

Finally, the future of Asia-Pacific institutionalism will be influenced by the strength of regionalism in Southeast Asia. The sub-region has been undergoing political transformations and has faced a series of NTS challenges. Such changes in regional dynamics raise a significant question for institution building in Southeast Asia. Will the nature of the challenges facing the region lead to further institution building, as suggested by current efforts to develop an ASEAN Community? This question will have a direct impact on Asia-Pacific institutionalism. For more than a decade, ASEAN has been driving multilateral cooperation in the region. ASEAN’s assigned managerial role derives as much from its unparalleled though imperfect institutional experience as from the lack of an alternative source of leadership acceptable to all. As long as it succeeds in being innovative, ASEAN should play a leading role in institution building in the Asia Pacific.

But not all concur over ASEAN’s ostensible leadership role, not especially after a series of incidents that underscored the its apparent inability to influence crises within Southeast Asia (East Timor in 1999, Myanmar in 2007, etc). Moreover, following its fiasco in Pattaya, Thailand, in April 2009 due to civil unrest caused by former Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra’s red-shirted supporters, a prominent regional analyst from Indonesia pointedly noted that ASEAN is a “outmoded vehicle”. Qualifying that ASEAN is still significant in some respects to Southeast Asia, the analyst nonetheless argued that Indonesia “should not let itself be held hostage to ASEAN”, but move beyond ASEAN, “if it (Indonesia) wants to retain its relevance to the international

relations of the Asia-Pacific region”. Indonesia’s heft in sub-regional matters is duly acknowledged by its fellow members in ASEAN, and any sense that the epicentre of ASEAN may be losing faith in its own regional organization is not a positive sign for the latter. Moreover, the singling out of Indonesia, the only Southeast Asian member of the G-20, rather than ASEAN as a whole in the Australian premier’s vision of an Asia-Pacific community is perhaps noteworthy, as is Indonesia’s—and several other ASEAN members’—purported growing support for the idea or parts of it. While such developments in no way imply that ASEAN has thereby become irrelevant, they hint nonetheless at emerging concerns within ASEAN’s ranks over the prospect of leaving the future of the Asia-Pacific region’s security in ASEAN’s hands.

The Role of the ARF and the EAS in an Emerging Security Architecture

Active U.S. participation and an accommodative Chinese foreign policy combined with strong regionalism in Southeast Asia would constitute a positive scenario for Asia-Pacific institutionalism. Significantly, it could contribute to a stronger ARF and EAS. While both institutions are crucial to an emerging institutional security architecture, they are also equally in need of some new diplomatic momentum and sense of direction. Simply put, the ARF and EAS participants would be required to go beyond the “ASEAN Way” approach and move toward preventive diplomacy and functional cooperation.

ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF resulted from several motivations. It was regarded by ASEAN as a diplomatic instrument to promote a continuing U.S. involvement in the region and to encourage China into habits of good international behaviour. The ARF was thus viewed as a means to both socialize Beijing in a comprehensive fashion while keeping Washington engaged in the region. Furthermore, the creation of the ARF was meant to ensure the ongoing relevance of ASEAN. The latter hoped to consolidate its diplomatic position by further developing its stabilizing role in Southeast Asia and beyond. Fifteen years later, ASEAN’s original objectives—to institutionalize great power relations within a multilateral


framework—have arguably been achieved. The United States is still deeply involved in Asian security affairs while China has become an active participant in the process of institution building. Moreover, most regional actors continue to support ASEAN’s position of leadership in Asia-Pacific institutionalism.

Despite these successes, the ARF remains ill equipped to address a series of security issues in the Asia Pacific. The forum cannot influence the Taiwan, North Korean and Kashmiri issues in spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the region. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, the forum’s inefficacy in contrast to the intermittent progress achieved by the Six Party Talks has led to calls to establish a regional security mechanism specific to Northeast Asia. This is a prospect that ARF proponents find disconcerting for fear that its realization may side-line their forum in regional security matters. Moreover, the ARF suffers from structural limitations that affect its development. It has 27 members. Finding a general agreement on common objectives is a troubling matter, as deep divisions exist between the participants. Crucial differences also contrast Northeast Asian security relations from those in Southeast Asia. The territorial disputes in Southeast Asia cannot be compared to the complex security problems that persist in the Northeast for example. The United States, Japan and China also have different expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot implicitly be ignored by easy reference to the “ASEAN Way”.

How can the ARF find a new sense of direction and contribute to the emerging regional security architecture? One approach is to go back to its Concept Paper of 1995. The latter emphasized a gradual approach to security cooperation and conflict management. The ambition in 1995 was to move the ARF beyond confidence building by aiming, at least in the longer run, to prevent and even solve specific disputes. The ARF was therefore expected to progress over time through three stages of security cooperation: confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms. Today, the ARF remains primarily a confidence-building exercise. The initiative to move beyond the promotion of confidence-building measures has been painfully slow. Progress towards the second stage of development has been undermined by disagreements over the definition and scope of preventive diplomacy. Some

25 While a Cold War-era alliance structure continues to define Northeast Asia and security relations herein are primarily bilateral (with the Six Party Talks, an informal process focused on North Korean denuclearization, as a notable exception), Southeast Asia has had four decades of ASEAN regionalism that aims to build a regional community by 2020.
participants regard preventive diplomacy as a more threatening form of cooperative security, as it might in some instances touch on the issue of national sovereignty.

In that respect, the emerging regional practice to deploy the ARF for addressing NTS matters—on selected concerns such as disaster relief, maritime security, transnational crime and the like—is in one sense a not unreasonable way ahead. In light of the intractability that has long characterized the forum’s attempts to address traditional security concerns, some analysts have as such proposed that NTS issues offer the best hope for progress in regional security cooperation. As one analyst has it, “the ARF needs to move from an exchange of views to problem solving and concrete cooperation. A thematic approach which leads to a more focused exchange of views and building up of an agenda for cooperation on specific areas such as transnational crime, counterterrorism, etc, would be useful.” Fairly or otherwise, they regard NTS issues as comprising “low politics” concerns that are neither strictly inter-state nor military in nature, and hence more amenable to inter-state collaboration on a functional interest-specific basis. That said, it is not immediately evident that all ARF participants share the view that NTS concerns constitute “low politics”. As such, any future progress on functional collaboration on NTS issues within the ARF framework would hinge on the political will of participant countries to stay the course despite the potential for sovereignty concerns to arise.

Equally significant for the ARF is the perception that there might be competing conceptions of multilateralism and regionalism in the Asia Pacific today. This has come in the form of the EAS initiative. Indeed, it could be said of the institutional expressions discussed in this paper that they constitute competing visions of region as much as of regionalism. The goal of the EAS might indeed be the building of an

26 See Chairman’s Statement of the Fifteenth ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 24 July 2008.
28 This logic arguably accounted for China’s strong interest in NTS cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. See, for example, in Jian Xu, “Comparing Security Concepts of China and the USA”, in Suisheng Zhao (Ed.), China-U.S. Relations Transformed (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2008), pp. 75–84, see p. 77.
EAS community constituting the foundation of an alternate security architecture. It remains to be seen if the various institutional structures will succeed in complementing each other—as advocates of ASEAN-led institutionalism want to insist—or instead compete and cancel each other out.\(^{30}\)

What might we expect of the EAS, particularly as it is still in its infancy? Critics see little institutional change deriving from the EAS due to its inability to meet regularly and failure to agree on a roadmap and a set of collaborative issues. They may add that the only point of convergence among its 16 participants might well be their willingness to let ASEAN assume the leadership of this latest institutional form. It can be argued, however, that the relevance of the EAS to Asia’s stability will depend on two crucial factors.

First, the EAS should neither be regarded as a replacement for the ARF or the APT nor as an embryonic structure eventually constituting an alternative security architecture, excluding the United States. On the contrary, the summit ought to complement existing cooperative arrangements and contribute to the emerging security architecture defined by the trends and driving forces discussed above. Second, the EAS should be viewed not only as a confidence-building enterprise—a central feature of all forms of Asia-Pacific institutionalism—but also as a future venue for substantive cooperation. In other words, the EAS will need to graduate from a nascent institution for addressing broad concerns and generalized confidence building, to a regional mechanism armed with a thematic and problem-oriented agenda.

In its early stages, it is imperative that members of the EAS establish a level of comfort among themselves. While the ASEAN countries have had four decades of collective experience in regional reconciliation, such opportunities have not been extended to the Northeast Asian members of the EAS, whose relations with each other have largely been confined to bilateral ties and the Six Party Talks. Likewise, countries such as Australia, India and New Zealand also require time to establish confidence with their counterparts from East Asia. Needless to say, institutions with no other aim in sight other than confidence building do not go far. It is therefore imperative that the EAS move forward in due course to substantive collaboration on the complex issues and challenges that affect the region. The EAS will therefore at some stage have to redefine itself in functional and issue-specific terms. Issues of interest and great urgency would include terrorism, maritime security, energy challenges and climate change, as well as health security. Importantly, such initiatives should be undertaken in greater complementation with the ARF in an effort toward more effective regional security cooperation.

Conclusion

In a crucial sense, the state of security architecture and institutionalism in the Asia Pacific is largely a reflection of the region itself. Just as the region is coloured by features displaying both change and continuity, so too, it might be said, of the regional architecture and its institutional arrangements. That said, lofty aspirations and impressive action plans aside, Asia-Pacific regionalism progresses to the extent allowed by regional actors, often though not only in response to perceived regional crisis. This essay has argued the need for inter-governmental arrangements, particularly but not exclusively the ARF and EAS, to enhance functional issue-based cooperation among regional countries and to grow an institutional culture of preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. Needless to say, the constraints against change are many, not least the “ASEAN Way”, whose express commitment to sovereignty norms have all too often provided regional countries with a convenient pretext, as and when they lack the requisite will and/or capabilities to extend and deepen cooperation and integration.

At the same time, functionally defined arrangements have facilitated regional cooperation through temporarily “shelving” concerns over perceived challenges to national sovereignty and interference in one another’s domestic affairs. Yet this is no “done deal” since it incessantly requires states and societies to exercise restraint and sustained commitment in keeping faith with their regional counterparts. To the extent that the ARF and EAS provide the appropriate instrumental and normative frameworks and incentives to move its participants beyond confidence building towards substantive forms of cooperation, no meaningful change will likely be possible.

There is room for cautious optimism, however. Though still the default “driver” of security institutionalism and regionalism in the Asia Pacific, ASEAN risks being side-lined so long as it is defined, fairly or otherwise, by complacency and discord. That this perception has grown despite steps undertaken by ASEAN, half-hearted in the view of some observers, to strengthen itself—the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Community vision, etc.—suggests considerably more can and needs to be done. The emerging trilateral enterprise comprising the “+3” countries (China, Japan and South Korea) at Daizafu is possibly one indication that the non-ASEAN powers are slowly but surely moving to take decisions with widespread political and economic implications for the Asia Pacific, with or without ASEAN’s approval. Notwithstanding their continued rhetorical support for the “ASEAN Way”, their actions—and, to a certain extent, those of Southeast Asian countries as well—are, in a fashion, gradually redefining regional conventions and practices. In that sense, it is not inconceivable that we may see, hopefully in the not too distant future, a qualitatively different “ASEAN Way” than the extant version informing regional cooperation in the ARF and the EAS.
Over the last decade, the regional security environment in East Asia has changed dramatically. The hope of a more stable and peaceful Asia after the end of the Cold War, premised on the expectations that the geopolitical and security tensions brought on by the Cold War overlay would finally come to pass, were short-lived. Instead, the region is confronted with new security challenges that are proving to be more severe and more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of inter-state wars and conflicts.

These newly emerging threats are referred to as non-traditional security (NTS) threats, and they are defined as challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime. Moreover, these NTS threats have common characteristics. They are mainly non-military in nature, transnational in scope—neither domestic nor purely interstate, come with very short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and the communication revolution. As such, national solutions are rendered inadequate and would require comprehensive (political, economic and social) responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.

This definition of non-traditional security (NTS) has been adopted as the working definition by the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia, otherwise known as NTS-Asia. For more details, see the NTS-Asia website at www.rsis-nts.org.

See, for example, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers & Amitav Acharya (Eds.), Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation (London: Ashgate, 2006).

This is a revised and updated version of an earlier paper on “Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture?,” Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, June 2007.
To be sure, NTS issues have direct implications on the overall security of states and societies in the region. The gravity of the problem can be seen in the way these transnational threats are now increasingly discussed not only in academic circles but also among policymakers in East Asia. These issues are also portrayed by officials as posing threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, as well as to the well-being of their respective societies. As a consequence, policymakers in the region have had to rethink their security agendas and find new and innovative ways to address these new security challenges. These, in turn, have had profound implications for regional security cooperation in the region.

Against this new security environment, it is therefore timely to examine how Asia—particularly the East Asian region—is addressing the emerging security challenges through its various regional institutions, mechanisms and relevant security arrangements. The argument put forward in this chapter is that the trans-border nature of these NTS threats is pushing states in the region to work together to mitigate the impact of these new challenges. And, despite drawbacks arising from issues of sovereignty and non-interference, the lack of state capacity to respond to an array of complex NTS threats make for a compelling case for enhancing multilateral regional security cooperation in Asia.

NTS and the Changing Regional Institutional Landscape

Over the last decade, perceptible trends can be observed in East Asia, particularly in the way regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Plus 3 (APT), and even the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have responded to new security challenges. These significant developments can be briefly described as follows:

First, despite the perceived inertia of regional institutions in responding to security challenges, particularly during the period of the Asian financial crisis (1997–1999), the picture has drastically changed, given that institutions like ASEAN have since embarked on a number of ad hoc mechanisms to address a host of transnational threats that have confronted the region, post the 1997 crisis. These include regional mechanisms that address the threats of infectious diseases, transnational crimes and terrorism, natural disasters, and environmental pollution or haze.

Second, the varieties of regional mechanisms that have in turn led to the creation of new institutional configurations such as the APT and, more recently, the East Asia Summit (EAS). These new institutional configurations have also generated different layers of regional efforts going beyond bilateral and plurilateral arrangements which had, until quite recently, been largely sub-regional in nature. This has significantly altered the contours of regional institutional architecture in Asia.

Third, while these regional efforts are aimed at building regional capacity to address different security challenges, the kinds of measures being adopted have gone beyond the usual process-oriented, confidence-building measures. Instead, many of
the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem-solving mechanisms to address NTS threats. Thus, despite the perceived lack of institutional capacity of these regional institutions, the plethora of regional cooperative arrangements that have emerged appear to support the idea that multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is robust, as member states have responded to a wide range of new security threats.

**Key NTS Issues and Challenges**

Against the significant changes that are taking place in the region’s institutional architecture, the key question that we need to examine is whether the current regional arrangements are indeed able to mitigate the new attendant instabilities and security challenges facing the region. The following analysis of four recent case studies will enable us to assess whether these new configurations of (regional) multilateral arrangements are adequate to address these new security challenges.

**Climate change**

A global consensus on how to collectively combat climate change has not been reached yet. However, the urgency to accomplish a worldwide frame of action has been aptly reflected in the release of reports detailing the gloomy implications climate change could bring to mankind, if no concrete action is taken. Such consequences include the rise of health-related problems, increased incidences of natural disasters, impact on food and water security, which could bring in the follow-on effects such as forced migration and sharpening of inter- and intra-state conflicts, especially those over resource issues. Southeast Asia, in particular, is one of the most vulnerable regions, as identified in a recently published climate change vulnerability mapping report. In 2007, the Expert Group Report on Climate Change and Sustainable Development identified five likely outcomes that would be most pertinent, as far as Southeast Asian security is concerned. They include the rise in sea levels, which could submerge low-lying coastal plains and river deltas, consequently affecting the livelihood of coastal communities in particular; more intense summer monsoons resulting in intensified degrees and frequencies of destructive flows and soil erosion; major loss of mangroves and coral reefs that would impact on fish stocks, which are heavily depended on in Southeast Asia as major source of protein; melting of the Himalayan mountain glaciers that would add stress on water

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3 In this report, all the regions of the Philippines; the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam; almost all regions of Cambodia; North and East Lao PDR; the Bangkok region of Thailand; and West and South Sumatra, West and East Java of Indonesia are assessed to be among the most vulnerable regions in Southeast Asia. See Arief Anshory Yusuf & Herminia Francisco, *Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia*, Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), January 2009.
resources; and, lastly, greater uncertainty associated with water supply management in the midst of population growth.  

Clearly, if no strong actions are being taken, the adverse effects of climate change could potentially reverse the many decades of hard work undertaken by Southeast Asian governments to create an economically vibrant and promising region. Also, climate change could well derail regional efforts to eradicate poverty and accomplish the Millennium Development Goals, since the poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. A point to note is that Southeast Asia produces 12 per cent of the world’s greenhouse gases and this share is likely to increase if a “business as usual” attitude continues in the region.  

More importantly, Southeast Asia is also among the regions with the greatest potential for mitigating carbon emissions by reducing deforestation and improving land management practices. What is needed is not just action at the national level, but also coordinated, committed actions among ASEAN governments and with the wider Asia region. The inclusion of non-state actors (e.g. NGOs, civil societies, etc.) would have to be considered in order to comprehensively adapt to and mitigate climate change.

At the ASEAN level, there has been general recognition of the potential security risks posed by climate change to the region. On 13 December 2007, ASEAN environment ministers met during the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali discussed regional efforts to address climate change, and agreed to encourage efforts to develop an ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI) to further strengthen regional coordination and cooperation against climate change, as well as undertake concrete actions to respond to its adverse impacts. Despite such efforts, more work clearly needs to be done. As part of the fight against climate change, efforts to prevent burning of peatlands—a major source of carbon emissions and the cause of trans-boundary haze problems prevalent in the region—are crucial, yet beset with problems. Much of the carbon emissions in developing countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia especially, result from the burning of peatlands. Notwithstanding the introduction by ASEAN of the Regional Haze Action Plan in 1997, which outlined prevention, mitigation and monitoring, the mitigation part played by Indonesia has been poor. Moreover,

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5 Read, The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Overview, Asian Development Bank, April 2009.

6 Ibid.


8 57 per cent of land clearing method is done by forest fires, see Executive Summary: Indonesia and Climate Change – Working Paper on Current Status and Policies, March 2007, DFID and World Bank, p. 3.
Indonesia to date still refuses to sign the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, thereby limiting collective ASEAN action against the problem. The issue of peatlands aside, however, ASEAN managed to attempt addressing issues related to climate change, such as sustainable development, in other separate agreements and plans of action, such as the ASEAN Vientiane Action Program (VAP) 2004–2010.

Gradual, incremental steps towards closer regional cooperation to combat climate change have been taken by ASEAN countries, the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment adopted on 21 November 2007 being a noteworthy example, whereby ASEAN countries affirm their commitment towards an effective approach to inter-related challenges of climate change, energy, environmental and health problems, in the context of sustainable development. In July 2008, the inaugural ASEC Brown Bag Series forum was launched by the ASEAN Secretariat to raise awareness of ASEAN’s initiatives among its staff, government officials and the public at large; most notably, climate change tops the list of issues being discussed. In fact, the first of the Brown Bag Series had been titled “Climate Change and Deforestation: What Role for the New ASEAN?”, which was organized by ASEAN in cooperation with the German Regional Forest Program (ReFOP).

As far as wider Asian cooperation beyond ASEAN is concerned, there are some initiatives being taken. One of these, which might have signalled closer regional harmonization of plans to mitigate and adapt to climate change, is the East Asian Summit (EAS) Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security, signed in Cebu, Philippines on 15 January 2007. This calls for a new approach linking climate change with the need to develop new, cleaner sources of energy. Goals outlined under this scheme include ways to improve efficiency and environmental performance of fossil fuel use; reduce dependence on conservational fuels through intensified energy efficiency and conservation programme, hydropower, expansion of renewable energy systems, and biofuel production/utilization and for interested parties, civilian use of nuclear power, and mitigating greenhouse gas emission through effective policies and measures—thus contributing to global climate change abatements, for instance.

Clearly, more work has to be done to promote policy coordination among ASEAN member states and with neighbouring Asian countries. Initiatives, such as ACCI, agreed upon need to be implemented in earnest in order for effective measures to be taken against climate change. As the ASEAN trans-boundary haze issues

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10 The objective of this first of the series has been to reach a better understanding of the kind of policy coordination and integration that will be required in both the forest and the environment policies in order to mitigate the risks of climate change. See “Secretary-General of ASEAN Launches ASEC Brown Bag Series”, US Fed News, 8 July 2008; and “ASEAN Forum Raises Awareness on Initiatives”, That News Service, 8 July 2008.
have shown, regional cooperation would be more effective only if all countries in the region play an active role. There is room for optimism, since ASEAN countries recognize the threats posed by climate change, and had pledged serious efforts to combat the adverse consequences. A recent initiative, the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change and Food Security, which envisages an integrated framework to facilitate intra-regional responses to climate change and related food security issues, would soon be endorsed. In fact, the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change: Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry towards Food Security (AFCC) had already been finalized by representatives of the Senior Official Meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry at a workshop held in September 2009. Still, whether these regional initiatives will be duly implemented by individual signatories remains to be seen.

Health-related risks
Since the Asia-wide outbreak of the SARS virus in 2003, health-related risks appear to have become more severe. As the SARS experience has shown in this era of globalization and regionalization, such types of infectious diseases have the capacity to detrimentally affect the security and well-being of all members of society and all aspects of the economy. This point was well highlighted in the *Global Risks 2009* report published by the World Economic Forum (WEF). While the report did not extensively discuss health-related risks, it did acknowledge chronic disease, infectious disease and pandemics as remaining high on the assessment, particularly in terms of potential severity in economic and loss of life indices. Chronic disease, as the report highlighted, is particularly prominent in no small part due to its centrality on its strong linkages to food prices and infectious diseases.

11 The overall goal of the AFCC is to contribute to food security through sustainable, efficient and effective use of land, forest, water and aquatic resources by minimizing the risks and impacts of climate change. It pursues a cross-sectoral approach for effective policymaking and implementation, and provides an arena for ASEAN members to better coordinate support from its partners, such as dialogue partners China, Japan and South Korea. See ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change and Food Security*, 11 September 2009, available at www.aseansec.org/Bulletin-Sep-09.htm#Article-5.


Given that Asia has had a history of being the breeding ground for pandemics, infectious and chronic diseases, the WEF report has therefore come at a critical time when an abundance of policy statements, studies, and other reports have been written, amid a flurry of official and non-official meetings, which have altogether raised the urgency within and outside the region to finding a common approach to prevent the outbreak of a new and devastating pandemic. To be sure, the threat of pandemics and diseases is not a local problem, but a global concern. I argue therefore that for many developing states in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, the burden of these health-related risks has reached a critical stage where innovation is needed to strengthen the capacity of public health management in the region.

Notably in East Asia, much of the information about pandemic preparedness, response, and capability of countries in the region is sketchy. As shown in recent experience with the SARS crisis, while Singapore and Hong Kong were able to deal with the health crisis in a reasonably effective manner, other countries like China and Vietnam experienced a range of challenges in coping with the problem. Aside from the complex problems faced by states at the national level, such as the lack of contingency planning and coordination among state agencies, there has also been very little institutionalized regional cooperation in the area of public health policy. It was really only after the SARS outbreak that some regional cooperative initiatives and mechanisms were proposed. At the ASEAN and the APT level, these key initiatives include:

- the ASEAN Expert Group on Communicable Diseases
- the ASEAN Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Task Force
- the ASEAN + 3 Emerging Infectious Diseases Program
- the Regional Framework for Control and Eradication of HPAI

Many of these collaborative programmes focus on strengthening the national and regional capacity for disease surveillance and early response and strengthening the capacity to prepare for any pandemic. There are also other collaborative programmes organized under the framework of the wider fora in the region—APEC and the EAS. Most of the measures outlined in these collaborative programmes focus on, among others, strengthening of institutional capacities at national and regional levels to ensure effective and efficient implementation of avian influenza prevention, putting in place disease control programmes and pandemic preparedness and response plans, and enhancing capacity building in coping with a pandemic influenza. Other measures also include establishing information-sharing protocols.

among countries and multilateral organizations, and effective, timely, and meaningful communication before or during a pandemic influenza outbreak.\textsuperscript{15}

The nature of pandemic threats, however, has compelled ASEAN and other countries within and outside the region to get involved in order to effectively address the complexities of the problem. Hence, outside the East Asian regional framework, other dialogue partners of ASEAN have been encouraged to provide more assistance in preventing the possibility of a pandemic outbreak. The United States, for instance, has been one of the major external actors that has taken a keen interest in this issue. It was one of the largest donors to the global avian flu fund that was set up at the 2006 Beijing conference, having pledged a total of US$392 million to the total fund of US$1.9 billion. Much of these funds had been allocated to the development of stockpiles of health supplies and international research.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, through the APEC framework, the United States has initiated the establishment of a Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Center, in partnership with Singapore. Formally launched in 2003 after the SARS outbreak, REDI would assist Asian countries in “tracking, controlling, and researching emerging infections with appropriate resources and expertise”.\textsuperscript{17} It is envisaged that the REDI Center would be open to participation by other countries in the Asia Pacific.

Despite the keen interest on pandemics in the region, one should note, however, that many of these proposed measures from ASEAN, the APT, the EAS, and the APEC still need to be implemented. Hence, it would be premature to give a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of these new regional mechanisms to address this NTS threat. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight some of the challenges faced by countries in the region in responding to a regional/global problem. Among the most obvious is the lack of resources allocated to improving public health systems at the domestic level. Given the prevalent condition of poor health infrastructure in many parts of the region, the national and regional capacities to respond to transnational health crises remain inadequate. In this regard, the region needs to consider a broader and more comprehensive strategy to prevent and contain the outbreak of infectious diseases. These would include, among others, focusing on key issues such as building credible and effective regional surveillance systems for monitoring infectious diseases, improving the poor state of health infrastructure in

\textsuperscript{15} See for example, \textit{APEC Action Plan on the Prevention and Response to Avian and Influenza Pandemics}, 2006/AIPMM/014; and \textit{East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response}, available at www.aseansec.org/18101.htm.


less-developed countries, and addressing the politics of crisis health management in the region.\(^{18}\)

Take the first issue of building regional surveillance and disease control. It has been noted that since national capacities are still quite weak, more efforts should be made to improve national and regional preparedness in containing pandemic outbreaks. A critical step in this direction is creating mechanisms for effective production and distribution of vaccines and other medicines. In this regard, it is worth noting that within ASEAN steps to develop a region-wide mechanism in rapid diseases control has begun with the first PanStop I exercise held in Cambodia in late March 2007.\(^{19}\) In March of the following year, PanStop II was held, which involved the Philippines, as part of a series of WHO exercises undertaken with various national governments to ensure the ability to implement rapid response and containment of pandemics.\(^{20}\) In May 2009, the APT health ministers reached an agreement during a meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, to coordinate their responses and to increase their stockpiles of medicines against swine flu.\(^{21}\) This move came even though the region has been relatively unscathed by the H1N1 influenza.

What all these developments have shown is that while there are several regional initiatives from different regional frameworks to address a pressing NTS issue like infectious diseases, it is often more effective if implementation starts at the sub-regional level. Where the bigger regional frameworks can work better is when efforts are streamlined and where complementarities can be built with other regional bodies in order for gaps to be identified and more inter-regional coordination can be undertaken.

Natural disasters

Asia is a region where major natural disasters often occur. The December 2004 tsunami, and even more recently, Typhoon Ketsana in late September 2009 and the huge


\(^{19}\) The exercise, PanStop I, was coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat with the help of the World Health Organization, together with the Japanese government and the Japan International Cooperation System. This simulation exercise, which involved test procedures to rush antiviral drugs and equipment to infected areas within a short time, was to be the first in the series of tests to be conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. See “WHO, Asian Partners to Simulate Bird Flu Outbreak to Test Readiness to Contain Pandemic”, *International Herald Tribune*, 27 March 2007.


Sumatra earthquake in early October 2009, illustrated the kind of devastation that natural disasters cause, and the immensity of the tasks involved in undertaking disaster relief operations and in providing humanitarian assistance and post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation. Natural disasters generate complex emergencies that require urgent and coordinated responses from a broad range of state and non-state actors.

Unfortunately, many states in Asia are least prepared to cope with these complex humanitarian emergencies. This gap was vividly revealed in the region’s experience with the 2004 tsunami. The disaster certainly reflected the lack of any regional capacity to respond to disasters and to provide emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Were it not for the humanitarian assistance provided by external partners like the United States, European Union, Australia and Japan, plus a number of international aid agencies, the impact of the humanitarian emergency could have been far more catastrophic.

Hence, in the aftermath of the tsunami, Southeast Asian countries held a number of meetings and agreed to enhance cooperation in disaster relief, including prevention and mitigation.22 Specifically, ASEAN members agreed to mobilize additional resources to meet the emergency needs of tsunami victims. They also called upon the international community through the United Nations to convene an international pledging conference for sustainable humanitarian relief efforts and to explore the establishment of “standby arrangements” for other humanitarian relief efforts. ASEAN also called on donor countries—the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other financial institutions—to provide the necessary funds to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in disaster-stricken areas. On 26 July 2005, ASEAN acceded to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), signed in Vientiane. This document is a legally binding agreement that promotes regional cooperation and collaboration in reducing disaster losses and intensifying joint emergency response.

But, post tsunami is the region doing enough to protect the security of its people? Aside from these demonstrations of regional solidarity, one could argue that the region needs to do more in the areas of prevention and mitigation by developing a more effective regional early warning system. It also needs to examine whether there is a shift in thinking in institutionalizing regional cooperation in disaster management. So far, there is the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX-05), which commenced in 2005.23 Most recently, as seen in the


23 The simulation exercise is envisioned to be an annual exercise, bringing together several personnel and mobilizing light-to-medium equipment geared toward providing immediate humanitarian assistance to affected countries in times of natural disaster. See ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Vientiane, 26 July 2005, available at www.aseansec.org/17579.htm.
aftermath of Typhoon Ketsana, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), which is supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, went into action, putting on standby the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team for deployment to affected areas.24

Beyond ASEAN, there are also other ad hoc exercises in disaster management being undertaken within the ARF framework. After the tsunami disaster in December 2004, the ARF ministers have decided to work together in emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as prevention and mitigation efforts in addressing natural disasters.25 More significantly, at the July 2006 ARF Ministerial Meeting, officials from ARF countries, which include the big powers like the United States, China, and Russia, discussed the possibility of developing guidelines in improving civilian and military cooperation in humanitarian operations—i.e. natural disasters. This would involve developing standard operating procedures on civilian-military cooperation in disaster relief operations and drawing up a database of military assets of ARF members for disaster relief.26 APEC, on the other hand, has established the Task Force for Emergency Preparedness (TFEP), originally known as the Virtual Task Force (VTF) on Emergency Preparedness, in 2005 to deal with disasters.27 Further developments came in November 2008 when the APEC-wide Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Asia Pacific Region 2009–2015 was unveiled. Among its objectives, the strategy aims to identify a suite of practical mechanisms, instruments and communication measures to be implemented at the community level.28

As with other new measures that are being adopted to address new threats, it remains to be seen if and when many of these new regional mechanisms can be implemented; whether the existing ad hoc arrangements can indeed be sustained;

25 See “Chairman’s Statement of the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)”, Vientiane, 29 July 2005.
27 The TFEP is intended to strengthen coordination efforts in disaster relief and improve regional emergency and natural disaster management capability. For more information, refer to the official site detailing TFEP, available at www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_committee_on_economic/som_special_task_groups/emergency_preparedness.html.
and whether other preventive measures, especially at the domestic level, can be included. Nonetheless, recent decisive moves by ASEAN members, under the ADDMER auspices, in response to Typhoon Ketsana, for instance, would appear to be an optimistic outcome of regional cooperation. Still, one could argue for instance that states in the region need not wait for calamity to strike before national and regional responses are switched to emergency mode. While regional efforts are being considered to improve disaster management, attention also needs be focused on improving capacity at the national level. One could suggest therefore that countries in the region would need to examine their own capacity and perhaps rethink their own national strategies for disaster mitigation or risk reduction.\textsuperscript{29}

Energy security

Asia is projected as a major growth region in the foreseeable future, with the emergence of economic giants China and India, alongside established economic behemoths such as Japan, and to a lesser extent (but no less important) South Korea. With a projected rise in population and the demand for higher standards of living, energy consumption needs in Asia would also correspondingly grow. Therefore, energy security becomes a crucial factor in determining a positive trajectory of continued socioeconomic development in Asia. However, energy security is not just about ensuring supply to meet rising demands, but also inter-related to the pressing issue of climate change. Sustainable development, as discussed earlier on with respect to climate change, constitutes the central component of Asia’s efforts to combat climate change yet not compromising on the bid towards continual socioeconomic growth. Some of the energy security initiatives, in considering the effects of climate change, would be to introduce regional measures towards energy efficiency, since Asia is a major emitter of greenhouse gases. Notwithstanding efforts to promote energy efficiency through the development of clean energy sources, Asia on the whole would still largely be reliant on fossil fuels for most part of its overall energy mix even if new and renewable energy (NRE) sources come to be incorporated, albeit incrementally. In the area of energy security cooperation among Asian countries, some notable instances could be observed. At the core of such collaborations to ensure and enhance energy security in the era of uncertainty, ASEAN plays a pivotal role in the region.

Within ASEAN, there has been general acknowledgement of the need to ensure energy security in order to sustain socioeconomic growth in the region. Cooperation is essential and would not just involve ASEAN member countries, but the external partners as well. As a follow on to the ASEAN Plan of Action on Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2004–2009, the APAEC for the period 2010–2015 has been adopted

\textsuperscript{29} For more on this, see Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Will Asia Heed Warning of Jakarta’s Katrina”, \textit{Today}, 7 February 2007, available at www.todayonline.com/articles/170454.
during the 27th ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting (AMEM) held in Mandalay, Myanmar, on 29 July 2009. In the Plan of Action, ASEAN members reaffirmed the need for a cleaner, efficient and sustainable energy community in order to facilitate the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015, and they pledged to strengthen cooperation to ensure greater energy security and sustainability through diversification, development and conservation of resources, continuity of supply, and efficient energy usage.\(^{30}\) The APAEC 2010–2015 encompasses seven programmes, some of which were incorporated in the earlier Plan of Action, such as the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). Worth mentioning is the latter project, which had begun in the 1990s but sadly met with not much progress, largely due to cost, legal and policy coordination issues.\(^{31}\) The APG, however, was met with slightly greater success; some inter-connections have already been achieved among countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. Still, more work is clearly required in order to complete the APG and TAGP projects, which would lead to the eventual realization of a Trans-ASEAN Energy Network.

Included in APAEC 2010–2015, notably, is the component on civilian nuclear energy projects. However, efforts are required in order to strengthen cooperation in this area. For one thing, not all countries that had professed intentions to develop nuclear energy had enjoyed progress, since only Vietnam to date had advanced concrete action on how to realize its national nuclear project. Due to close inter-dependence, the security ramifications of nuclear power, such as the problems of radioactive waste management and nuclear proliferation, could have immense trans-national impact. For a start, information sharing is required in order to facilitate confidence building among ASEAN countries in the regional nuclear renaissance. However, this area of cooperation has been found wanting, given the recent alleged Burmese nuclear weapons programme. Such problems of accountability and transparency could pose serious challenges to regional nuclear energy cooperation. While nuclear energy cooperation remains a nascent, hitherto unexplored area for ASEAN, cooperation in the area of petroleum has met with greater success. In March 2009, ASEAN signed a petroleum security agreement that envisaged short, medium and long term guidelines to prevent potential supply disruptions, such as the coordination of emergency response measures.

In recent years, there has been progress made beyond ASEAN. Energy cooperation between ASEAN and its dialogue partners—China, Japan and South Korea—has been emphasized. In late June 2009, ASEAN countries reached an agreement with the three dialogue partners during working-level energy talks in Japan to initiate


respective countries’ oil stockpiling plans. Such synchronization of energy-related policies at the APT level, rather than ASEAN, is certainly beneficial for not just ASEAN but the wider East Asia as a whole. Even though oil stockpiling is only a portion of energy security policy, this development is significant. Japan and South Korea possess relatively advanced oil reserve systems, and their active support could go a long way to assist ASEAN to establish individual national oil reserves for use in times of emergencies. This could have positive spillovers to the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement (APSA) signed among the 10 ASEAN member countries in March 2009. In addition, on a broader scheme of things, this benefit Asian energy security, since the roles played by economic giants China, Japan and South Korea are crucial. This move would intensify linkages between ASEAN and major Asian economies as far as energy security is concerned.

It is relatively evident that energy security is a promising area for broader regional cooperation, due to the economic inter-dependence among countries in Asia. ASEAN has been a driving force behind regional energy security collaborations, as indicated in the numerous initiatives introduced by ASEAN to date. However, it must still be said that further efforts are required in order to speed up implementation, though it is often hindered by costs, legal and policy coordination issues. ASEAN countries and their partners are keenly aware of the importance of energy security, while not forgetting the importance also of climate change issues. In the quest for sustainable development, there had been broad attempts, albeit more at the declaratory level, to pledge commitment to such endeavours. In the area of NRE development, practical issues remain, thus impeding ASEAN’s aim of becoming a “Green OPEC” despite the huge potentials, such as existence of relevant natural resources for biofuels, for instance. Civilian nuclear energy cooperation up to this point remains rather limited due to the paucity of information sharing and lack of transparency by various nuclear aspirants in Southeast Asia.

However, energy cooperation appears to carry even greater prospects if dialogue partners are included, since more benefits could potentially be reaped. The APT could well become a driving force for energy cooperation within ASEAN and beyond. A crucial facet of this level of cooperation has been the active involvement of the three dialogue partners, whose economic clout meant a considerable stake in

33 Mr. Paolo Frankl, Head of the International Energy Agency’s Renewable Energy Division, explained that an integrated approach which looks at the management of natural resources in the most efficient manner possible should be undertaken by ASEAN countries. With this statement, Mr. Frankl appeared to affirm the fact that sustainable development efforts made by ASEAN require more improvements in order for ASEAN to becoming a green energy export hub. See Nachanok Wongsamuth, “Rocky Road Ahead to ‘Green Opec’”, Bangkok Post, 21 September 2009.
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regional energy security. Furthermore, the APT could help propel NRE development forward in ASEAN, since Japan and South Korea are relatively further ahead in this field; not to also forget the vast potential in China for NRE development. Through the APT, energy cooperation in the area of fossil fuels had seen progress, evident in the oil reserves agreement. Asia might witness more cooperation in energy security matters, in the foreseeable future, as driven by ASEAN and even as importantly, in the context of the APT level.

Looking Ahead

The preceding discussion set out to examine how regional institutions in East Asia have dealt with emerging regional security challenges, referred to as NTS issues. As discussed, these innovative institutional responses have led to an evolving regional architecture that presents significant characteristics. These are summarized as follows:

• First, the variety of regional mechanisms that were established to address a number of transnational NTS threats, albeit ad hoc in some cases, have led to the creation of new institutional configurations in East Asia, such as the APT and, more recently, the EAS.

• Second, whether conceived within ASEAN or ASEAN-initiated arrangements like the APT and the EAS, the robustness of these multi-layer/multi-level initiatives can be seen in the plethora of cooperative efforts that have emerged—mostly geared toward addressing different NTS threats such as infectious diseases, natural disasters, among others. These sub-regional or minilateral arrangements have added new layers of regional institution and, in the process, have significantly altered the contours of the regional institutional architecture in Asia.

• Third, the extent to which these new regional structures fit, complement, or compete with one another remains to be seen, although it should be noted that in some areas, sub-regional responses either by ASEAN or the APT may be more effective in terms of response time to address specific challenges. This is largely due to the fact that, when compared with bigger regional frameworks like the ARF and APEC, these sub-regional bodies are also more institutionalized. For instance, it was much easier to galvanize regional efforts in responding to health threats through ASEAN and the APT rather than through the ARF.

• Fourth, while these regional efforts are aimed at building regional capacity to address different security challenges, the kinds of measures being adopted have gone beyond the usual process-oriented, confidence-building measures. Instead, many of the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem-solving, involving sharing of information; developing certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and natural disasters; and providing relief in
disaster management, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Although these problem-solving efforts are at an inchoate stage and would require some time before any definite assessment can be made as to whether these new regional modalities are able to show concrete results, the fact is that these institutions are being built in response to new challenges.

In sum, the institutional developments in East Asia, particularly at ASEAN and the APT, reflect a more qualitative change in inter-state cooperation. These are not only seen in the widening of areas of functional cooperation but also in deepening the nature of existing regional modalities. Against these trends, what does it mean for the future of security cooperation in Asia?

Looking ahead, there are a number of significant developments that could define not just the shape but more importantly the substance of multilateral security cooperation in Asia as different actors—both state and non-state—respond to new security challenges.

One of these challenges is the potential for more intrusive types of regional modalities. In the case of instituting a regional disease surveillance mechanism within the APT framework, it appears that ASEAN member states, as well as China, South Korea and Japan, are prepared to adopt more intrusive arrangements when certain issues threaten the security of states and societies. This is a significant development, albeit limited, given that the regional norm, at least until the emergence of new transnational security threats, has always been for non-intrusive forms of regional arrangements that allow member states to cooperate while being able to protect domestic interests and maintain regime legitimacy. We can thus observe that with the onset of NTS threats, ASEAN—and to some extent the ARF and APEC—have been prepared to adopt some form of intrusive regional cooperative mechanisms if the issues at stake threaten regional security and when certain problems remain intractable. Despite the perceived lack of institutional capacity, as member states respond to a wide range of new security threats, current institutional developments geared toward capacity-building support and multilateral security cooperation in Asia.

On the other hand, against the exuberance brought on by robust regional efforts is the salient issue of efficacy, especially when viewed against the multiple layers of institutional arrangements that have emerged. For example, in the previous discussions on the number of regional efforts that have been established to respond to threats of pandemics and natural disasters, we note that the various ministerial and other meetings of officials at the ASEAN, ARF, and APEC levels revealed striking similarities or even duplication of initiatives. Unless progress is made by these regional bodies in coordinating their efforts, much within their respective initiatives could be superfluous. Thus, to ensure that these different pieces of regional efforts are not consigned to drawing boards and annual declarations, the importance of subsidiarity may need to be emphasized if only to achieve more coherence and focused implementation of many of these initiatives.
Nevertheless, while an East Asian or Asian initiative may prove to be a logical approach in addressing some NTS issues, the importance of maintaining a more inclusive multilateral security cooperation remains critical. This means that when and where external help and expertise are required, this has allowed the participation and involvement of other countries outside the region. As the preceding discussion has shown, grave security threats like pandemics, natural disasters, etc., require multilateral approaches, which inevitably brings in the involvement of extra-regional powers like the United States and the European Union that not only have the resources but whose security interests are compatible with the region. Given that many NTS issues are transnational and trans-regional, regional efforts in addressing NTS issues would need to be complemented with multi-dimensional, multi-level, and multi-sectoral initiatives. The involvement of different actors would, in turn, have significant repercussions not only on regional security cooperation but more importantly, on regional governance as well.

Finally, with the growing emphasis on NTS challenges, one could argue that the new, robust regionalism in East Asia has raised the human and comprehensive security agenda right in the heart of each member’s national policies. This could give rise to competing national priorities since addressing certain types of NTS challenges also demand a certain level of consensus on certain values and norms, which could potentially raise tensions among members of regional institutions as the push for new normative frameworks gains momentum. Multilateral security cooperation in Asia has reached a critical point where new security challenges require collective will. As such, declarations of intents and soft commitments have to give way to more common action in solving common problems. This would also mean more binding commitments and credible enforcement by member countries of the regional agreements or modalities that have been adopted to address different types of NTS challenges.
If the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) did not exist, I would be among those calling for its creation, just as I and many of my Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) colleagues called, at CSCAP’s inception in 1993, for a Track I official multilateral dialogue to address the region’s many security challenges and concerns. The region is better off having the ARF.

I say this to put my remaining comments in context. While the ARF has come a long way in the past 15 years, I believe there is considerable room for additional improvement. The point of this chapter is neither to praise nor bury the ARF, but to offer suggestions on how an already useful organization can make an even more important contribution to regional peace and security. Many of my recommendations grow out of the work that CSCAP and my own organization, the Pacific Forum CSIS (which serves as the U.S. secretariat for CSCAP), have done to help revitalize the ARF.

As background, the ARF was formed in 1994 with the goal of sustaining and enhancing the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region by enhancing dialogue on political and security cooperation. The 27-member ARF brings together foreign ministers from the 10 ASEAN states plus Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, New Zealand and the United States, plus Pakistan (since 2004) and most recently Timor-Leste (2005), Bangladesh (2006) and Sri Lanka (2007), for annual security-oriented discussions.

Looking more directly at the ARF’s current and anticipated mission, it was envisioned that the ARF would achieve its goal of sustaining and enhancing the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region through a gradual evolutionary approach encompassing three stages—Stage I: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs); Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) Mechanisms; and Stage III: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms. To date, the ARF has concentrated mainly on Stage I and to a lesser extent, concurrently, on Stage II measures.

Various ARF study groups (called Inter-sessional Support Groups or ISGs) have provided the vehicle for moving the multilateral process along in areas such
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as preventive diplomacy, enhanced confidence building, counter-proliferation, and maritime (including search and rescue) cooperation, all of which help promote greater transparency and military-to-military cooperation. Most importantly, since 11 september 2001, the ARF has helped focus regional attention on, and has served as an important vehicle for practical cooperation in, fighting terrorism and in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Generally speaking, the ARF seems well-suited to serve as the consolidating and validating instrument behind many security initiatives proposed by governments and at non-official gatherings, and has become a useful vehicle in the war on terrorism. But its contribution to the regional security order remains somewhat constrained. Many of the region’s most sensitive or potentially explosive security issues do not find their way to the ARF’s agenda or receive very short notice if and when discussed.

Few expect the ARF to solve the region’s problems or even to move rapidly or pro-actively to undertake that mission. The agreement to “move at a pace comfortable to all participants” was aimed at tempering the desire of more Western-oriented members for immediate results in favour of the “evolutionary” approach preferred by the ASEAN states, which all too often seems to see the process as being as (or more) important as its eventual substantive products. The Asian preference for “non-interference in internal affairs” also has traditionally placed some important topics essentially off limits, although this may be changing (witness ASEAN’s increased willingness to comment on Myanmar’s domestic politics). Nonetheless, the evolution of the ARF from a CBM “talk shop” to a true preventive diplomacy mechanism (as called for in its 1995 Concept Paper) will be a long and difficult one. This may come as it tiptoes toward embracing a preventive diplomacy role, but it is clearly not there yet.

This is not necessarily a condemnation of the organization. It has made efforts to build confidence among its members and to raise awareness of the challenges that confront the region and the world. It has made important declarations regarding countering the proliferation of WMD and appears set to create a new Intersessional Support Meeting (ISM) aimed at further addressing this subject. But it has not sought (nor been offered) a role in dealing with North Korea denuclearization, cross-strait tensions, earlier Sino-Japan tensions, Kashmir, or other long-standing security challenges. It has also side-stepped the South China Sea issue and has not had any role to play vis-à-vis Myanmar, other than to offer generally watered down suggestions that the regime there do more to honour its own commitments to move down the “road toward democracy”.

A number of initiatives have been established within the ARF to increase transparency and to encourage the exchange of information between ARF member states. Chief among these have been the ARF ISG on CBMs (which has since become the ISG on CBMs and PD). Other ISMs have also been conducted to promote the sharing of expertise and discussion in such areas as Search and Rescue Coordination
and Cooperation, Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief, among others. Seminars and expert group meetings have also been organized on such areas as de-mining, transnational crime, terrorist financing and prevention, marine security challenges among others, and a number of military to military meetings and exchanges have also been held. It is worth noting that the CBMs undertaken by the ARF are predominantly declaratory in nature, with very few, if any, being the more constructive (but difficult to obtain) constraining mechanisms.

Despite the stated intention of the ARF to enhance security in the region through preventive diplomacy, there has been considerable controversy and debate and a clear divergence in attitudes regarding how (or even if) to go down this road. In its initial stages, this divergence was clearly seen between countries that were active advocates for developing concrete preventive diplomacy mechanisms and those that were reluctant to move the ARF forward to a preventive diplomacy stage. The activist countries stressed the need to implement concrete preventive diplomacy measures such as early warning systems, fact-finding missions and an enhanced good offices role of the ARF Chair that would have an active role in mediating in disputes. The more reluctant countries were keen to establish a clear definition of preventive diplomacy before studying specific measures that could be implemented. They also strongly adhered to the principles of non-interference and feared that applying preventive diplomacy to inter-state (let alone intra-state) conflicts would justify interference in the internal affairs of member states.

Continued discussions within the ARF as well as within three CSCAP workshops on preventive diplomacy-led to the development of a working definition and “statement of principles on PD”, which was adopted at the Eighth ARF meeting in Hanoi in 2001. Preventive diplomacy was defined as:

Consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties to help:
1. prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between states that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability;
2. prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and
3. minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region.

The “statement of principles” adopted by the ARF outlined the key principles of preventive diplomacy, as drawn from the CSCAP discussions, noting that the principles guiding preventive diplomacy drew on the approach that had been successful for ASEAN, including “the non use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, pragmatism, flexibility, consensus, consultation and accommodation”. The eight key principles of preventive diplomacy that were outlined were:

- *Diplomacy*: It relies on diplomatic and peaceful methods;
- *Non-Coercive*: Military action and the use of force is not part of preventive diplomacy;
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While the ARF has not yet formally entered into preventive diplomacy activities, it has established a number of mechanisms that can serve as building blocks to facilitate the performance of a preventive diplomacy function. These are summarized as follows, along with a few ASEAN mechanisms that might also serve to support the ARF PD effort.

- **ASEAN Troika**
  The ASEAN Troika is comprised of the foreign ministers of the present, past and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), which would rotate in accordance with the ASC Chairmanship. However, if the situation warrants, the composition of the ASEAN Troika could be adjusted upon the consensus of the ASEAN foreign ministers. The purpose of the ASEAN Troika is to enable ASEAN to address in a timely manner urgent and important regional political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb regional peace and harmony. This standing preventive diplomacy mechanism could serve as a model for the ARF or even expand its mandate to help perform an ARF PD function.

- **Friends of the Chair**
  The Friends of the ARF Chair (FOC) assists the ARF Chair. The FOC is an ad-hoc group, constituted for a specific task by the ARF Chair as and when the situation warrants, including instances where emergencies and crisis situations arise, which have the likelihood of disturbing regional peace and stability. The Friends of the Chair is a troika composed of the following: (a) foreign minister of the incoming ARF chairing country; (b) the foreign minister of a non-ASEAN ARF Country; and (c) the foreign minister of the immediate past ARF chairing country. The membership
overlap with the ASEAN Troika should facilitate close cooperation and interaction between the two groups. The preventive diplomacy role of the FOC remains to be fully developed and articulated.

- **Expert and Eminent Persons Group**
  The experts and eminent persons are nominated and registered by each ARF participant country. The EEPs provide non-binding and professional views or policy recommendations to the ARF through the ARF Chair, or to serve as resource persons to the ARF on issues of relevance to their expertise. EEPs focus on issues and subjects that are relevant to the interests and concerns of the ARF, which are not being adequately addressed elsewhere, and to which their expertise is directly applicable. EEPs would not only be available for fact-finding missions but could also play a more active “good offices” role by assisting in mediating disputes and offering practical solutions. The EEPG could also play an early warning role in advising the ARF of potential conflicts that might merit preventive diplomacy measures.

- **ARF Unit**
  The ARF Unit’s role and functions are: to support the enhanced role of the ARF Chair, including interaction with other regional and international organizations, defence officials dialogue and Track 2 organizations; to function as depository of ARF documents/papers; to manage a database/registry; and to provide secretarial works and administrative support, including serving as the ARF’s institutional memory. The current manning level makes even these tasks difficult. An expanded ARF Unit seems essential if the ARF is to transition into a preventive diplomacy role.

- **Annual Security Outlook (ASO)**
  The ASO is a voluntarily produced document that lays out security concerns of ARF members. It is compiled without editing by the ARF Chair. There is no standard format and reporting is inconsistent. There is also no review process and no opportunity to follow up or gain insight into the thinking that went into these reports. This severely limits the current utility of the ASO as a preventive diplomacy or early warning mechanism.

- **Regional Risk Reduction Centre (RRRC)**
  Although it has not been established, several concept papers produced for the ARF have recommended this type of centre to monitor crises and provide an early warning system. While some of its functions could initially be accomplished by the other above-referenced preventive diplomacy mechanisms or could initially be out-sourced to Track 2 mechanisms such as CSCAP, a serious preventive diplomacy effort by the ARF will eventually require some type of adequately staffed, funded, and empowered RRRC.
ARF Secretariat and Secretary General

At some point, an expanded ARF Unit could become a more institutionalized and more broadly-manned secretariat, headed by a secretary general whose duties should mirror those of the ASEAN Secretary General, but with greater preventive diplomacy focus and authority.

Recommendations

The key question is not where has the ARF been or where is it now, however, but where should it go from here. Let me preface my more specific recommendations with a more general observation. For preventive diplomacy to be effective, there must be expressed commitment on the part of the organization and its members to peaceful settlement of disputes, and an acknowledgment that the organization has a legitimate role to play in bringing this about. Ultimately, preventing conflict emerges from the political will to assist people in the face of a perceived wrong. The challenge for the ARF, therefore, is to create a normative framework to define those perceived wrongs, establish mechanisms to respond to violators of those norms, and create local capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully.

To this end and, again, drawing heavily from the work of the CSCAP Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy that I have had the pleasure of co-chairing, I would offer the following additional specific recommendations for advancing the implementation of a successful preventive diplomacy programme within the ARF.

1. Create an organizational vision statement that articulates ARF goals and aspirations for promoting peace and serving as an institution for preventing, mitigating, and resolving conflict in the region. Specific preventive diplomacy-related objectives should be included in this document. This effort should eventually include benchmarks for specified goals and capacities. Developing an ARF mission statement or statement of objectives could serve as a useful first step in this process.

2. Broaden the current working definition and statement of principles of preventive diplomacy to acknowledge that preventive diplomacy mechanisms can be applied within as well as between and among states, provided there is mutual consent of all the directly involved parties.

3. Clearly define the scope of the ARF’s PD effort: Will internal ASEAN disputes be addressed by the ARF or only by ASEAN? Will the focus be on East Asia or will the inclusion of South Asia states in the ARF broaden its preventive diplomacy mandate? Will ARF good offices be offered or extended beyond its membership or extra-regionally?

4. Create an institutional capacity for early warning and monitoring of emerging security challenges. Over the long term, the establishment of a RRRC that serves as a clearing-house for existing CBMs with expanded responsibilities to gather, store, analyse, and disseminate information and issue warnings of impending crises can provide basis for establishing a
credible and reliable source of information. The centre could also play an important role in organizing and providing a regional response capability for disaster assistance.

5. Enhance and articulate the preventive diplomacy role of the Expert and Eminent Persons Group and the Friends of the ARF Chair. Cataloguing qualifications, creating an advisory council, and encouraging the use of these resources by member countries can be the first step to creating a credible and respected group of individuals that can be relied on to lead fact-finding and goodwill missions and provide timely and accurate assistance to the ARF in response to emerging crises.

6. Standardize the ASO and create a review and feedback mechanism, possibly involving the EEPG, to enhance its role as an early warning tool.

7. Strengthen and expand the ARF Unit with an eye to the creation of an ARF Secretariat to include a General Secretary with a clearly defined role and mission. While the various organizations examined in this study provide a variety of mechanisms for filling the secretarial role, having a senior official who is generally recognized as having both institutional and personal credibility among the leaders of the member states has proven critical to the success of special envoy and operational preventive diplomacy activities. In the interim, develop a mutually supportive relationship between the ARF Unit and the ASEAN Secretary General.

8. Identify non-traditional security challenges that might lend themselves to the application of preventive diplomacy. These could include transnational environmental issues (Southeast Asia haze and Northeast Asia yellow dust), health issues (combating bird flu), and history issues (development of common textbooks), etc. The pursuit of NTS issues should not be used as an excuse for ignoring traditional concerns, such as conflicting territorial claims, which could benefit from outside mediation.

9. Develop procedures and mechanisms that can allow the ARF and/or its various preventive diplomacy mechanisms to be more responsive to impending or actual emergency situations in order to perform its preventive diplomacy role in a timely and effective manner.

To accomplish this requires leadership and a willingness of ARF members to put words into action and move down their own self-prescribed path from CBMs to PD. This requires greater effort and better performance from ASEAN, which remains in the ARF “driver’s seat”. Simply put, if you want people/countries to climb (and stay) on board, you have to tell them where you plan on driving or ask them where they would like to go. What is ASEAN’s vision for the ARF? Where does it want it to go? How much energy is it prepared to commit to moving it in that direction? Does it have an adequate roadmap to find the way? And, who is really in the driver’s seat? The ASEAN Secretary General? Or are all 10 somehow steering, in the “ASEAN Way”. Is it possible to steer a steady course with 10 sets of hands on the wheel? Can
you move forward when there are more feet reaching for the brakes than the accelerator?

These are the questions ASEAN must deal with, if it is to play a constructive role. Bangkok’s efforts to develop the “ARF Vision 2020 Statement” is a significant step in this direction. But the challenge is two-fold. One is articulating the vision. The second will be implementing it. If ASEAN is not prepared to do both, then it may find it useful to share the driving responsibilities, once the ultimate destination is agreed upon.
CSCAP
Shaping the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum

The world is witnessing the rise of new regional powers, in particular China and India. In the twenty-first century, alongside the United States, these emerging powers will increasingly participate in and shape global institutions and discourse. Just as global institutions will be influenced by the rise of Asia, countries in the Asia Pacific will have to adapt to the norms, values and practices of global society as well. Regional multilateral institutions will play a significant role in creating such a new international consensus, especially if both regional states as well as extra-regional powers with a global presence such as the United States are represented in those institutions. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) could play this role because of the inclusive approach on the issue of membership.

The Asia-Pacific region has been relatively stable since the end of the Cold War. A combination of engagement and enmeshment strategies of ASEAN states, and the willingness of major powers to respond to ASEAN’s overtures have made the prospects for regional amity and stability much more promising. However, today’s peaceful order cannot be taken for granted. The rise of great powers and the challenge they pose to the existing hegemon may lead to political and economic uncertainties across the region. If regional states can manage and reconcile differences in their views, outlook and objectives well to the extent that Asian norms and values can stand alongside those of Western societies, peaceful transitions in the Asia Pacific will continue to be the trend in the decade ahead. The search is therefore on

1 An earlier version of this chapter, which focused on Jusuf Wanandi’s role in the evolution of CSCAP, was published in a festschrift dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi on his 70th birthday. See Barry Desker, “CSCAP: Beyond the First Decade – Regional Challenges and Track Two Responses”, in Hadi Soesastro & Clara Joewono (Eds.), The Inclusive Regionalist A Festschrift Dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), pp. 62–71.
for the creation of institutional networks that will facilitate greater understanding and cooperation among states with divergent norms and values.\(^2\)

**Implications for CSCAP/ARF**

A major concern for countries in the Asia Pacific is whether regional multilateral fora and institutions can play a more active role in shaping international and regional politics. It is generally acknowledged that ASEAN, ASEAN Plus 3, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asian Summit (EAS), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) are building blocks in an emerging regional security architecture. By contrast, the ARF—a process focusing on building mutual trust and confidence, and which aims to develop norms through confidence-building measures (CBMs)—is often seen as a “talk shop” with little substance. Such critical perceptions also affect the credibility of CSCAP—a pioneer in promoting a Track 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. The problem is compounded by the linkage between the ARF and CSCAP as Track 1 and Track 2 institutions respectively, with CSCAP serving as an institutional mechanism for the non-official discussion of issues on the ARF agenda.

CSCAP was founded in Kuala Lumpur on 8 June 1993. Jusuf Wanandi of Indonesia and Amos Jordan of the United States were appointed as the founding co-chairs. Jusuf served for a term of three years while Jordan was appointed for a two-year term, thus ensuring that there was an overlap when a change occurred in either the ASEAN or non-ASEAN co-chair.\(^3\) From CSCAP’s creation, founding institutions in the region emphasized that CSCAP was established as an independent non-governmental institution, although it included participants with close ties to their governments. Representing a pioneering effort in second track diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, CSCAP aimed at serving as a non-official partner proposing initiatives on regional security issues for the consideration of the ARF establishment.

Due to the evolving security environment, the challenges facing CSCAP and the ARF will be enormous. Unless fundamental changes are made that will lead to renewed vigour in CSCAP and the ARF, they will risk being side-lined in the years ahead.

The aims of this chapter therefore are two-fold—firstly, to demonstrate that

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\(^3\) For a succinct summary of the establishment of CSCAP, see Desmond Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture”, in Bunn Nagara & Cheah Siew Ean (Eds.), *Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1996), pp. 289–325. Also see www.cscap.org/ for information on CSCAP.
CSCAP and the ARF still matter in shaping regional security dynamics; and, secondly, to fill the gaps in the contemporary CSCAP/ARF understanding and practice. It will open with a discussion of the emergence of Track 2 security diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. It will then discuss the current challenges facing CSCAP and the ARF. The essay will conclude by outlining eight proposals aimed at ensuring that CSCAP and the ARF remain relevant in the decade ahead.

The Origins of Track 2 Security Dialogues

The concept of Track 2 diplomacy had its origins in the Asia-Pacific region. It emerged with the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) following a seminal conference hosted by Sir John Crawford at the Australian National University in September 1980. The novel idea of regular meetings of academics, think tank analysts, journalists, former policymakers as well as currently serving officials participating in their private capacities resulted in a series of sparkling discussions. Such dialogues were enlivened by the cross-fertilization of ideas among a group of disparate individuals who usually interacted with colleagues from the same profession. However, these policy intellectuals often had similar backgrounds, but seldom exchanged views with a wider range of opinion makers, especially if they came from other countries.

As a participant in the 1980 conference, one of the constant refrains I heard was the challenge posed by the diverse backgrounds of the participants. For the ASEAN participants, it raised questions whether the quest for an ASEAN identity and the already difficult path of ASEAN economic integration would be derailed by the opportunities now available for participation in a larger economic framework. By contrast, for the non-ASEAN participants, a perplexing issue was the ASEAN principle of non-interference with respect to internal affairs. They were also puzzled by ASEAN’s wariness of participation in a new institution in which ASEAN representatives were perceived to lack the skills and capacity to respond effectively to new initiatives or to develop new proposals.

The under-current that permeated discussions was the issue of Japanese dominance of the region and whether such a multilateral initiative would constrain Japan or whether it would be a vehicle for the exercise of Japanese regional domination. By contrast, there was very little discussion at that time of possible initiatives aimed at promoting a security dialogue at the Track 2 level within the Asia Pacific, as the world was pre-occupied by the Cold War. Instead, the focus was on Track 1 diplomacy involving conferences at an inter-governmental level.

The concept of informal diplomacy was later exemplified by Indonesia’s “cock-
tail party” diplomacy. In the late 1980s, Indonesia began an informal dialogue with Vietnam on the question of Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia. This initiative led to a series of informal meetings attended by government officials of ASEAN states, Vietnam, Laos and the Cambodian factions, which culminated in the Paris Peace conference on Cambodia in 1989. This event resulted in the realization that in the post-Cold War strategic environment, inter-state tensions could be limited through informal interactions among policymakers, and that there was the desire for new frameworks to promote regional multilateral security cooperation. These factors led think-tank institutions in the Asia Pacific to embark on the groundwork for the establishment of CSCAP.5

In this context, the role played by Jusuf Wanandi in conceptualizing CSCAP in its initial years deserves some mention. Jusuf had been on the fringes of policymaking on regional security issues during the 1980s when there was no institutional regional vehicle for the articulation of imaginative proposals and path-breaking ideas on the development of a regional security dialogue. Through a series of bilateral dialogues organized by the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Jakarta), he had articulated his views on a range of issues. However, with the establishment of CSCAP in 1993, Jusuf had the opportunity to reach out to key policymakers in the region to make the idea of regional security dialogue widely known. He was able to support the drafting of CSCAP memoranda that addressed issues of concern to policymakers within the region. Unquestionably, Jusuf’s activities laid the foundation for the groundbreaking role of CSCAP in promoting Track 2 dialogue later on.

Successes and Weaknesses of CSCAP
Since the beginning of CSCAP Steering Committee meetings, CSCAP participants have adopted a self-congratulatory perspective on the institutionalization of the organization, while retaining a critical attitude towards its achievements. In his 2000 study of CSCAP’s record and prospects, Desmond Ball observed, “CSCAP is a very exciting endeavour. It is one of the most important attempts to construct a pan-regional security dialogue and consultation institution in the Asia-Pacific region”6. He noted some serious problems within CSCAP, including tensions within the organization relating to motivations, objectives and operating principles. While Ball regarded the conceptualization/policy balance as undetermined, an alternative view is that it would be more fruitful to regard the relative importance of conceptualization and policy analysis as unlikely to be static.

It would reflect the participation in CSCAP of different mixes of academics, think-tank analysts and former policymakers at the range of meetings held since 1993. CSCAP’s policy advocacy role from its inception reflected the participation of think-tank analysts among the initial promoters of CSCAP. Borrowing from the policy orientation of American think tanks, Asian think tanks such as the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta led by Jusuf Wanandi; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in Kuala Lumpur led by Noordin Sopiee; and the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) in Manila led by Carolina Hernandez had sought to provide policy inputs and to shape government policy. They saw the establishment of CSCAP and the emergence of a regional security dialogue as an opportunity to develop a new constituency.

At its general conferences held every two years in Jakarta since 2003, CSCAP celebrated the high level participation of ministers and senior government officials as well as an active exchange of views on a range of issues. Again, Jusuf and his colleagues in CSCAP had a key role in the revival of the general conferences. Participants of these conferences do not make any decisions. Rather, they focus on free exchanges between participants and discuss current and emerging issues on the Asia-Pacific security agenda. However, the general conferences have not become a major forum for assessing the state of regional security dialogues such as the ARF.

Another weakness of the general conference is that some CSCAP members have not included non-CSCAP representatives or policymakers from their countries among their participants, and have been lukewarm on the idea of regular CSCAP general conferences. While CSCAP was the primary avenue at the Track 2 level for interactions between representatives of ASEAN and those of the ARF when it was established in 1993, other institutional structures have since emerged. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-la Dialogue held in Singapore in June each year, the conferences organized by the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) and the Boao Forum hosted in Hainan each year now attract more significant participation. However, CSCAP is the only non-governmental Track 2 structure among these parallel institutions that has ASEAN in the co-driver’s seat within the organization. NEAT and the Boao Forum tend to be dominated by the Chinese representatives while the Shangri-la Dialogue is led by IISS and sometimes appears as a reminder of the extent to which Asia-Pacific security remains an issue of concern to Europe. In other words, CSCAP is still valuable as far as ASEAN is concerned.

Nevertheless, the emergence of alternative Track 2 dialogues (or even Track 1.5 dialogues with a mixture of government and non-official participants such as the Shangri-la Dialogue and the Boao Forum) highlights the challenge for CSCAP in the years ahead. Similarly, the proliferation of Track 1 institutions in the Asia Pacific

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7 For more on these fora, see www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue, www.neat.org.cn/, www.boaoforum.org/Html/.
has raised questions about the utility and effectiveness of the ARF. At the Track 1 level, China’s focus is on the ASEAN Plus 3 process in which China interacts with the 10 ASEAN countries as well as Japan and South Korea, while playing a less active role in the ARF. As a rising China seeks to shape regional institutions, CSCAP and its commitment to the ARF will be regarded as an anomaly. As China is not in the driver’s seat of CSCAP, it would prefer that regional institutions like NEAT, in which Chinese think tank and academic institutions dominate, supersede CSCAP. These developments are therefore a reminder that CSCAP needs to break new ground if it is to be a major factor in regional multilateral diplomacy at the Track 2 level.

Two competing visions of appropriate regional security architectures appear to be emerging. First, a Chinese-led view that Asian security is primarily to be determined by states within the region and that the focus of such arrangements should be East Asia. This view emphasizes the role of regional powers and promotes the exclusion of the United States, in particular, from regional institutions. Second is an Indonesian-led perspective that regional security should be an inclusive process that recognizes the important stabilizing role played by the United States, especially in East Asia, amid the challenge posed by the emergence of new nuclear powers such as North Korea, the rise of India, and the uncertainties resulting from competition between Japan and China. These divergent conceptions of the future regional architecture necessitate that CSCAP re-think its directions or risk being marginalized.

**Issues in the CSCAP/ARF Relationship**

The most useful role that CSCAP could play would be to speak truth to power, to come forward with innovative proposals for presentation to the ARF aimed at enhancing regional security and cooperation. In practice, CSCAP’s record is mixed. CSCAP has played a useful role as it is inclusive and has drawn adversaries such as the United States and North Korea to discuss global and regional issues across the table. CSCAP has also encouraged India and Pakistan to normalize their relationship and provided opportunities for these neighbours to discuss issues in a non-confrontational manner. CSCAP has also discussed critical issues on the regional agenda, such as maritime security and responses to humanitarian disasters, and presented analytical policy reports for the consideration of Asia-Pacific governments. Some of these reports contain solid analysis, forward-looking policy proposals and target the interests and concerns of policymakers engaged in Track 1 discussions.

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However, more could have been done and CSCAP should have been a leader of regional trends rather than followed in the wake of Track 1 policymakers. CSCAP was prevented from engaging in a discussion of South China Sea issues because of objections within its membership. But the ASEAN Regional Forum took up this issue, leading eventually to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed by the Governments of ASEAN and China in 2002. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, while CSCAP debated the root causes of terrorism as well as the ideational and identity issues involved, governments developed practical measures to address the threat posed by terrorism in the region. Significantly, the ARF had more substantive discussions on the issue than CSCAP. Although governments were initially reluctant to cooperate across borders, there has been a growing recognition, backed by action, that such issues can only be addressed by coordinated operations on a transnational basis. Some CSCAP members have represented the thinking of their governments a decade or more ago, while the more innovative analyses have been made by younger officials at the Track 1 level, a reversal of expected roles.

One difficulty in relating to the ARF process is that CSCAP participants also tend increasingly to draft CSCAP memoranda to be submitted to the ARF in the language of the social sciences accompanied by the scholarly apparatus of academic research. Hence, the impression is left that the intention is to ensure publication in peer-reviewed journals rather than to reach out to a larger audience to get their messages widely discussed. If CSCAP is to get attention, it must address issues of interest to the regional and international community. If the purpose of CSCAP memoranda is to address not only governments but also the public, simple language and a clear writing/speaking style is a must. The language and style of writing of The Economist magazine is probably more effective than that of complex social science tomes. It is also appropriate to perceive international relations theory as a policymaker’s toolbox—policy choices dependent on time and space—rather than any attachment to a particular set of worldviews. CSCAP should thus facilitate full participation of scholars with a variety of persuasions such as liberal institutionalism, realism, constructivism, post-modernism and post-structuralism. The aim is to draw from the intellectual resources of contemporary international relations literature, while speaking and writing clearly to a wider audience.9

The role of the ARF and the challenges facing it are worth further attention, since the ARF process will shape the CSCAP response. It is often forgotten that the ARF was conceived in 1994 as a process, not an institution. It focused on build-

9 I made a point on the need to close the gap between scholars and policymakers in an earlier article. See Barry Desker, “Creating a Dialogue: Are Scholars from Mars and Policy-Makers from Venus?”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 269–274.
ing mutual trust and confidence and sought to develop norms through CBMs.\textsuperscript{10} The objective was to create a more predictable and stable pattern of relationships between major powers and Southeast Asia. The strength of the ARF is that it is the only regional forum led by states in Southeast Asia, involving both the states of Southeast Asia as well as major extra-regional powers, which discusses sensitive regional issues. It has even begun to discuss sensitive domestic issues. While there has been little progress with regard to discussions on Myanmar, a process has begun, which would have been unthinkable a decade ago. As the ARF guarantees a stake for all, it has helped build comfort levels and created an atmosphere conducive to joint security initiatives in Southeast Asia—a region which is not used to cooperation on security-related questions.

Furthermore, the ARF has facilitated the reduction of tension and the management of regional relationships. Although it has not resolved disputes nor prevented the outbreak of conflicts, it could be used to minimize the impact of differing perceptions and interests. It has begun the process of creating predictable and stable relationships among the regional states. It has engendered an increasing awareness of regional norms among the major powers. Meanwhile, it has alerted the regional states to the changing values and perspectives arising from today’s globalized environment.

However, unless a new role is found for the ARF, it will be side-lined in the years ahead. As a Foreign Ministry-led institution, the ARF does not command equivalent attention in an environment in which heads of government are increasingly involved in the alphabet soup of regional diplomacy through ASEAN, ASEAN Plus 3, APEC, the EAS, SAARC and SCO. As new regional institutions have developed, the ARF is facing the challenge of demonstrating its relevance today. Due to its focus on confidence building and the lack of movement on preventive diplomacy, the ARF is often seen as a “talk shop”. This perception can be altered as there is a growing recognition among the ASEAN states that the ARF must move from confidence building to embarking on practical cooperation. The ARF has had an encouraging response to the publication of the Annual Security Outlook (ASO) of its members, which promotes transparency and builds mutual confidence. On the other hand, it is unlikely that there will be scope for significant movement by the ARF in areas of traditional security policy such as the prevention of military build-ups.

Needless to say, the weaknesses of the ARF structure impose constraints on CSCAP. While new institutions have captured attention of government leaders, the ARF finds itself increasingly neglected. There is indeed a need for “fresh” thinking about the new roles of CSCAP and the ARF communities. At the same time, CSCAP must break out of the stranglehold that its established agenda has on its ability to address new issues, take up fresh ideas and adopt forward-looking policies. In the

light of these considerations, I would like to make several proposals aimed at ensuring that CSCAP and the ARF will remain relevant in the decade ahead.

Four Proposals for CSCAP

First, CSCAP should maximize the impact of its networking with Track 1 during inter-sessional meetings. In this context, CSCAP should consider proposing alternative preventive diplomacy (PD) mechanisms in general and early warning (EW) mechanisms in particular. CSCAP could also examine the development of approaches to the prevention of conflicts as well as the elaboration of a “road map” for the resolution of conflicts. Compared to other Track 2 institutions in the Asia Pacific that interact with Track 1 counterparts such as the ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings/ASEAN-ISIS relationship, the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum/Pacific Economic Cooperation Council dialogue and the ASEAN Plus Three/Network of East Asian Think Tanks linkage, CSCAP has had minimal interactions with the ARF.

Second, CSCAP should actively engage Track 3 participants who represent non-government organizations and civil society groups. As a Track 2 grouping, CSCAP can bring Track 3 views and concerns to the attention of the Track 1 ARF process. In particular, CSCAP can include the Asia-Pacific representatives of NGOs recognized by the UN Economic and Social Council as participants at relevant Working Group (WG) and Study Group (SG) meetings. CSCAP should welcome testimony provided by experts from such groups when it is discussing issues where they can provide useful insights. The critical issue is the need to establish a balanced and calibrated relationship between CSCAP and its key stakeholders. Just as CSCAP should reach out to policymakers in Track 1, CSCAP should also reach out to NGOs/civil society organizations in Track 3. In this regard, CSCAP can benefit from the successful initiative of the ASEAN-ISIS to reach out to civil society organizations in ASEAN states through the establishment of the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly, which meets annually.

Indeed, the growing role of civil society activists and non-government organizations is a striking change from the environment when CSCAP was established nearly two decades ago. The world has acknowledged that issues are inter-linked and that there is a need to address them collectively and comprehensively. Non-traditional security (NTS) matters such as pandemics, energy security, climate change, water scarcity, environment, transnational crime and terrorism, for example, are now part of the global, regional and national security agenda. The networking of non-state

12 For more on the ASEAN People’s Assembly, see www.asean-isis-aseanpeoplesassembly.net/
assessing track 2 diplomacy in the asia-pacific region a cscap reader

actors impacts on governments’ perspectives and their responses to security matters. While devising a holistic approach to new security challenges, CSCAP must reflect such a fundamental change in mindset, and at the same time encourage diverse views and outlooks. It is therefore critical that CSCAP should invite Track 3 representatives to its biennial conferences and welcome their participation in CSCAP WGs where they possess specialized expertise or represent key constituencies.

Third, CSCAP should give greater attention to intra-state conflicts. CSCAP has focused on the development of cooperative security and CBMs within the framework of inter-state relations and the creation of regional order. There have been tentative attempts to discuss domestic issues, exemplified best by the briefings by Indonesian participants at its meetings following the onset of the regional financial and economic crisis, and the ouster of President Suharto in 1997–1998. Since 2001, there has been an extensive discussion of the domestic and transnational aspects of terrorism. CSCAP discussions have drawn our attention to the significance of intra-state conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. These exchanges reminded CSCAP members that civil conflict is the primary focus of attention of states in the region, as it can lead to political instability and chaos within states and across borders. Although ASEAN was earlier wedded to the belief that non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and non-interference were cardinal principles, there has been a shift in ASEAN’s thinking in recent years. There are now more flexible approaches to intra-state conflicts.

Fourth, CSCAP should concentrate on the new security agenda in the Asia Pacific. NTS issues have hit the headlines in Asia—SARS, avian flu, human trafficking, pan-Asian illegal immigration, the environment, transnational crime and terrorist links to the illegal drug trade, to name but a few. There is increasing attention to how such issues have come to be treated as security issues and whether and how such “securitization” enables policymakers to make a more effective and appropriate response. Once an issue becomes “securitized” and flagged as a security problem or threat, then governments may seek to employ a number of emergency or extraordinary measures to counter the threat. This may range from laying exclusive claim to resources, the suspension of civil liberties or even the use of military means, all in the name of national security. Attention to non-state actors is at an all-time high and states are learning the importance of addressing both the hard and soft aspects of security. This recognition goes beyond the conventional understanding of security.

These new areas of concerns have made CSCAP’s role even more important. See Japan Centre for International Exchange, Towards Community Building in East Asia, Dialogue and Research Monitor, Overview Report, 2004, accessed on 19 April 2007, at www.jcie.or.jp/drm/jan2004/overview.html. The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies is also in the forefront of research in the NTS area. See www.rsis-ntsasia.org/ and booklet produced by the RSIS Non-Traditional Security Program entitled Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia.
defined as defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity from overt military aggression. The new understanding of security in the region is dominated by the unconventional challenges of terrorism sponsored by non-state actors against states, the globalization of religious radicalism and resultant identity/ethnic politics, and the challenges of rebuilding war-torn failed states. CSCAP should be at the forefront of building a regional institutional capacity to analyse and support regional efforts aimed at supporting a multilateral response to meet these new challenges.

CSCAP should play a more active role in promoting the institutionalization of ARF. Specifically, CSCAP should initiate proposals for the establishment of an ARF secretariat, co-located with the APEC Secretariat. Such co-location would facilitate an integration of the economic and security dimensions of the Asia-Pacific regional institutional architecture. In addition, CSCAP should push for an ARF summit back-to-back with the APEC Leaders Meetings when APEC Leaders Meetings are hosted by an ARF member. In an era of Asia-Pacific summitry, when the APEC Leaders Meeting, ASEAN Plus 3 Summit, the East Asian Summit and the ASEAN Summit are held regularly, there is a need for a higher profile for the ARF at the heads of government level. The broad representation within the ARF facilitates its role as an open, inclusive forum laying the groundwork for an Asia-Pacific security community. While some might question whether it would be appropriate to have such summits back-to-back, the overlapping memberships of most ARF and APEC members makes this an eminently desirable opportunity. The concept of variable geometry would apply. The Latin American states would only attend APEC while the South Asians would join when the ARF summit was held immediately thereafter.

Four Proposals for the ARF
First, as far as confidence and security building and preventive diplomacy are concerned, the ARF needs to transform itself into a problem-solving institution. While attempting to mitigate differing perceptions and positions on regional security issues among member countries, the ARF should add substance to the forms of cooperation by focusing on concrete areas of cooperation such as disaster relief, humanitarian operations, maritime security and the combating of transnational crime. The ARF should consider various approaches aimed at resolving or ameliorating conflicts that may impact on the security and prosperity of the region. One such possibility is increased attention to an enhanced role for the ARF Chair and the deployment of Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs) appointed by the ARF foreign ministers.

Second, de-linking the chairmanship of ARF from that of ASEAN will be a step in the right direction. As the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) is being hosted by different states rotating on an annual basis, the task of chairing meetings of the ASEAN Standing Committee, hosting the AMM, followed by the Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) and then the ARF is a major challenge for a number of ASEAN countries. If Myanmar chairs the AMM and the PMC, then Thailand could host the ARF. Any member that is not up to hosting the forum could
forgo the opportunity. Furthermore, ASEAN should take the lead in strengthening commitment to the ARF by proposing that the co-chair of ARF Foreign Ministers Meetings would be a non-ASEAN member. This initiative will extend one of the existing principles as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) are already being co-chaired by an external member. The effect will be not only to lock in the participation of external powers but to give them a bigger stake in the ARF process as well. Ensuring the continued involvement of external powers is vital to the peace and security of the region. By de-synchronizing the ARF and ASEAN chairs, the ARF can reinforce and strengthen the sense of commitment, while promoting better understanding of its evolving character among member countries.

Third, the establishment of an ARF Secretariat is necessary, preferably co-located with the APEC Secretariat. A first step has already been taken, with the establishment of an ARF Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat to assist the Chairman. The ARF Unit, among others, updates the ARF Register of Confidence Building Measures, while serving as a repository of ARF documents. As the ARF embarks on concrete cooperation on a range of issues impacting the entire Asia-Pacific region, it is essential that an autonomous secretariat staffed by officials from its member states handle these issues.

Fourth, broadening the scope of defence participation is inevitable in ensuring an inclusive structure for the ARF. There are already meetings of defence officials during the ARF meetings. However, the scope of defence involvement in the ARF process is limited. The ARF should consider convening meetings of defence ministers in addition to the current practice of holding meetings of foreign ministers. The increasing exposure of defence officials to cooperative security norms and their engagement in dialogue will enhance their awareness of the changing global and regional security environment. By broadening the scope of defence participation, the ARF eventually will be able to reduce the possibility of misperception or misjudgement while creating the momentum for cooperative security endeavours.

Creating an ARF/APEC Symbiosis
The co-location of the ARF Secretariat with the APEC Secretariat will encourage an increasingly symbiotic relationship between these two key institutions for cooperative regional security and regional economic integration. As part of the process of committing the external ARF members to the ARF process, the Secretariat can be chaired alternately by an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN member.

If a more synergistic relationship between APEC and the ARF can be developed, it will be beneficial to hold back-to-back meetings of the APEC and ARF summits. APEC has continued to gain importance in recent years, relegating the ARF to the sidelines in terms of attention paid by governments. APEC has edged its way into ARF territory and now discusses issues beyond its mandate as an economic forum. APEC has discussed East Timor (1999), terrorism (since 2001), appointed directors
The vision, which should undergird our efforts to re-think the role of the ARF, is that there is a critical need for an institution that will bind the United States, the sole superpower, and rising powers such as China and India, within a framework that allows representation and participation by medium powers and smaller states in the region. One of the strengths of the ARF is that its practices have been shaped by the norms and values of its ASEAN founders which have emphasized consultation, consensus decision-making and an inclusive approach to regional institution-building. The opportunities for informal exchanges and consensual decision-making in the ARF could help to ensure that the concerns of both Western as well as Asian states are reflected in the evolving regional order. We need to recognize that there are divergent norms and values present in international society and that those differences could lead to possible conflict. Inclusive institutions such as the ARF could serve as harbingers of cooperation on a larger scale. From a global perspective, the strengthening of global institutions through the broadening of these institutions so that they are representative of East and West is critical. In the twenty-first century, global institutions need to derive their norms, values and practices from global society, not just Atlantic perspectives. Instead of the victors of World War II shaping global political and economic security, global institutions should reflect the emergence of newer powers and serve as the basis of a new global consensus.
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was established in the aftermath of the Cold War when a group of policy institutions assessed that there was a “need for more structured processes for regional confidence building and security cooperation”.¹ We believed that the end of the Cold War had enhanced prospects for a new era in confidence building and prospects for an Asia-Pacific security dialogue. We were aware that the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference meeting with the foreign affairs ministers of the other Asia-Pacific countries and the European Community was moving into a new phase of multilateralization of their political-security dialogue, and wanted to contribute towards this building of regional confidence building and enhancing regional security by establishing a “second-track” for dialogues, consultations and co-operation to support the official ASEAN Regional Forum “Track 1.”²

Cooperation in an Emerging Asian Renaissance

We believed that more political-security confidence and trust was needed to underpin the rapid economic growth that we were experiencing. Deng Xiaping’s policies to “reform and open” (gaige kaifang) the Chinese economy from central planning to foreign investments and trade on a scale unprecedented since 1949 was taking off. China was recording unprecedented growth together with Japan and what was known as “the four little dragons”—Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. Within ASEAN, not only Singapore but also Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were high-performing economies. The World Bank entitled its September 1993 “World Bank Policy Research Report” *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. Some of us in CSCAP perceived a complex inter-dependence between this economic “miracle” and political confidence and trust in each other, with economic growth being a necessary condition for improving political confidence and trust in

¹ Article II.1 of *The CSCAP Charter*. See Annex 2 of this volume.
² See Desmond Ball, “CSCAP’s Foundation and Achievements”, Chapter 2 of this volume.
each other, and the corollary absence of political trust and confidence undermining economic growth.

Within this vision of an emerging Asian Renaissance, CSCAP established a series of Working Groups (WGs) to explore, develop and promote an awareness of how our securities are inter-dependent and its issues resolved through dialogue and cooperation between states. CSCAP emphasized that its evolving concept of “cooperative security” and its proposed practice was different from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s practice of “common security” and the older concept of “collective security”. Guided by its ASEAN core leadership, CSCAP promoted the extension of the ASEAN model of regional security, or what has come to be known as “the ASEAN Way”. We believed that with bipolarity or tripolarity of the Cold War and its strategies of deterrence and balances of power behind us, we could move to put in place a multilateral process and framework for reassurance, confidence and trust in each other.

Unstated and assumed in this vision at both and Track 1 ARF and Track 2 CSCAP is a policy process driven by rational choice of selecting the optimal policy option to maximize benefits. Assuming that the other actors in the policy process are also rational in desiring to optimize their actions, then we can with some confidence forecast our futures. Also assumed is that we are prepared to trust the other actors in the policy process and be open in discussing our priorities and interests in the policy issue. Some CSCAP members perceived their contribution to be the how to promote norms that will guide policy decisions and actions in an optimal direction. For example, what kind of norms of confidence and security building with respect to weapons proliferation, arms modernization and transparency are acceptable or applicable in the Asia-Pacific region? Some of us perceived CSCAP as an “epistemic community” of domain experts providing expert advice to Track 1 officials on what should be their subjects for consideration.

Pitfalls in a World of Unknowns

But these hopes that our Asia-Pacific partners in building a cooperative security regime in the region can be expected to make rational choices of optimal actions rapidly collapsed in the 1997 financial crisis. In hindsight, we could and should have anticipated the 1997 financial contagion. However, the political crises that followed the financial crisis were a different category of surprises. In contrast to the financial contagion which we could somehow have taken into account, but could not work out the impact and consequences of, the political crises was unexpected and unpredictable. It was what has been termed a “Black Swan”, an outlier event that completely changes the structure of our world. The financial contagion dragged us into a new complex world where the cause and effect of the financial crisis were coherent in

3 The work of the Working Groups is summarized by Desmond Ball in Chapter 2 above.
retrospect and so enabled us to put in place measures to manage the crisis, which enabled us to move forward and rebuild. The World Bank entitled their 1998 report *East Asia: The Road to Recovery*. But the political crises enmeshed us into a very different chaotic and turbulent world in which cause and effect were unconnected and pushed us into crisis management. The 9/11 transnational terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the ensuing U.S. intervention in Afghanistan further enmeshed us in a world of “unknown-unknowns” as former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld infamously termed it.

The challenge for CSCAP in this increasingly uncertain and chaotic world of rapid change is for how much longer can CSCAP continue to be a beacon radiating the norms of regional security cooperation and advocating what is best practice? Extending Rumsfeld’s paradigm, CSCAP has since its inception worked comfortably within the realm of the “known-knowns”, where cause and effect relations are

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**Figure 12.1**

**Knowledge management for sense-making**

*(based on David Snowden’s “Cynefin domains”)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPLEX</th>
<th>KNOWABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Cause and effect are only coherent in retrospect and do no repeat</td>
<td>• Cause and effect separated over time and space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Informal/Interdependent learning networks</td>
<td>• Expert/Professional response/advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pattern management</td>
<td>• Analytical/Reductionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Probe – Sense - Respond</td>
<td>• Sense – Analyse – Respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Unknown-Knowns)</em></td>
<td><em>(Known-Unknowns)</em></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAOS</th>
<th>KNOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• No cause and effect relationship perceivable</td>
<td>• Cause and effect predictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Innovative/Temporary communities/networks</td>
<td>• Structured/Bureaucratic response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stability-focused intervention</td>
<td>• Best Practice/Standard operating procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crisis Management</td>
<td>• Categorize – Respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Act – Sense – Respond</td>
<td><em>(Known-Knowns)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| *(Unknown-Unknowns)* | }
perceivable and predictable, underpinning the making of rational choice policy recommendations in its various memorandums of what are best practices in confidence and security building measures for enhancing transparency and trust to optimize regional security cooperation. As an “epistemic community” of experts and “old hands” in the field of regional security, CSCAP also attempted to move into the field of what are “known-unknowns,” where cause and effect of problems and issues, although separated over time and space, could be forecast and policy attention drawn to possible challenges to regional security cooperation (see Figure 12.1).

Awareness that its WGs meeting four times over two years or more on a specific regional security issue may render the council irrelevant in an increasingly rapidly changing and transforming world prompted the council in 2004 to “sunset” its WGs for a new series of Study Groups (SGs) with a shorter life-span and specific deliverables. A new series of SGs have produced a number of policy memorandums, which have found their way up to the ARF Senior Officials. ARF recognition of CSCAP’s contribution to its policy deliberations has come by way of invitations to the CSCAP co-chairs to brief its meetings on CSCAP work. But much of CSCAP’s work continues to be in the realm of the “known-knowns” with some forays into the “known-unknowns”.

The CSCAP Study Group on Energy and Security: Lessons Learnt

The CSCAP Study Group on Energy and Security, which CSCAP-India and CSCAP-Singapore co-chaired from 2006 to 2008, started in the realm of what we know about energy as a security issue. The underlying intentions of the SG were, first, to inquire how energy and security were being linked, and specifically why we were making supplies of energy a security issue; second, the SG aimed to determine how energy supplies were being defined and linked with security concerns; and, third, the SG hoped to examine the responses and policy options being proposed to ensure the security of energy supplies. The SG’s examination of policy options assumed that the instinct of many states and their national governments would be to reach out to control and confine their supplies of energy and accept that challenges, and that competition and possibly conflict with other states is a consequence of this imperative to control and confine energy supplies. However, CSCAP, as its names indicates, is biased towards strategies which promote cooperation and coordination of our securities over our energy supplies, and its deliberations was thus oriented towards framing policy arguments for cooperation and coordination of our energy supplies to avoid possible conflict. It is with this ultimate intent that the SG tried

to work towards how to frame the policy options that would enhance coordination and cooperation on our energy needs.

However, the SG’s deliberations fairly quickly moved from what we know and fear about the security of our energy supplies to what we know we don’t know. Underlying much of our SG discussions was therefore a series of implicit and never explicitly articulated assumptions about the world around us. To the extent that most of us believed that our demand for fossil fuels will increase as we taxi to economic take-off, and global reserves of fossil fuels are finite, then the policy instinct will be to move to secure and lock up supplies. Further, if we perceive that the sea lanes of communications, along which all our oil moves, and our gas pipelines are vulnerable to a series of threats from piracy and terrorism to blockages by hostile groups and rival powers, then the security of our energy supplies becomes an existential threat. This matrix of implicit and deeply held assumptions about our world then leads us to scan our horizons for weak signals of impending threats to either the supplies or movement of our energy supplies and put in place contingency plans to pre-empt any threat to the supply of our energy supplies. In the Royal Dutch Shell Company strategic planning, this is the “scramble scenario.”

However, a different series of implicit assumptions about our globalized world being more inter-dependent and cooperative than irreconcilable and combative could lead to a rather different linkage of energy supplies and security. This is our vision of a globalized and inter-dependent world that should be working for cooperative strategies to coordinate their energy needs. For the Royal Dutch Shell Company, this is the “blueprint scenario” of energy security. Complexifying these two scenarios is a growing awareness of the impact of carbon emissions from our soaring energy consumption on our environment and how this then creates a new set of non-traditional security (NTS) threats from climate change. Much of the SG’s deliberations centred around making sense of how members were responding to the need to secure and lock up oil supplies versus being prepared to entrust their energy security needs to some kind of regional futures market for oil and natural gas that could stabilize our energy supplies, and concerns about the impact on the environment of our carbon emissions and thus the need for more sustainable alternative to our dependence upon carbon fuels. But the SG participants also recognized that this advocacy of market mechanisms, as a solution to a more stable delivery of regional energy resources, is challenged by short-term market instability and therefore the need for some forms of market governance.

Further, it appears that few governments are prepared to rely on market mechanisms entirely for a reliable, adequate and affordable supply of energy, and continue

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6 Ibid.
to perceive energy supplies as a strategic resource that the state must intervene to protect. The easy policy recommendation would be to recommend techno-science of alternative energy sources as the solution to our insecurities of our energy supply. But the more fundamental issue is the risk in relying on these new technologies. Unfortunately this issue of what is to be considered acceptable risk in depending upon technology to resolve our growing energy needs was not discussed by the SG. As with other issues of technology (for example, genetically modified food), is “acceptable risk” an issue of quantitative measurement of probability of success of the new technology, or is it a more qualitative perception of the uncertainty and, therefore, fear of the new technology and its possible unanticipated consequences? Framed this way, the issue then becomes who decides what is acceptable risk? Is it society that has to bear the consequences of possible failure of the technology, or the unintended effects of the technology? Or, is it governments who shape and regulate the criteria of what is acceptable risk? In the 1950s, the issue of nuclear energy and its acceptability was the purview of technical experts and government regulators. But with public awareness of the potential dangers of nuclear energy from the 1970s onwards, the issue became an issue of governance; how do governments convince the public that nuclear energy is an acceptable risk? This issue of the risk inherent in the policy options we in CSCAP have recommended may need to be addressed in future.

The SG’s efforts to derive a set of concrete and specific policy recommendations were challenged by the uncertainties of an increasingly globalized world creating more open and complex futures in which, as the *Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050* stresses, “there are no ideal answers”. The strategic planning of policy based on projecting a past trend into the future no longer holds when the present leads into multiple possible futures. Our geopolitical vision of the future of energy supplies, leading us to attempt to lock up supply-side levers and unlock demand-side policies for economic growth, is creating unintended consequences for our environment and leading us into new unplanned futures. But the alternative globalized future of an integrated Asian Energy Market that the SG envisioned has been challenged by market failures and thumped by geopolitical imperatives to act unilaterally and compete for favourable terms of supply. However the need for simplicity in policy analysis and recommendations led members of the SG to confine their deliberations to the realm of our “known-knowns” predictable world.

Within this predictable and ordered world, the Policy Memorandum on Energy and Security we attempted to draft recognized the need to first, make sense of the incoming data on our soaring energy needs on our security; second, categorize our responses as concern about the security of our energy supplies, attempting to stabilize our needs for energy, and plan for a more sustainable energy future; and, third, respond on how to move ahead. Within the confines of how to respond within a predictable and ordered world, the SG responded by recommending better cooperation between energy suppliers and consumers across the region. Recognizing the challenges confronting the development of an Asian oil and gas market led the SG to recommend
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the need for industry and market reforms, more information sharing for greater transparency so as to enhance market stability and confidence building. Restated, the SG’s recommendations were improvements to what is considered “Best Practice”.

In confining its deliberations to the realm of predictable “known-knowns”, the SG did not take up the challenge of attempting to evaluate the consequences of its proposed solutions. Thus, its recommendation for a more sustainable energy future is to continue with the development of renewable forms of energy, such as biofuels, solar and hydroelectric energy, and to harness them with the energy mix. This is improvement to what is currently “Best Practice”. But is it also “Good Practice”? What are the consequences of the technologies we are recommending on our future? These are the “known-unknown” outcomes and consequences of processing oil sands and shale or developing hydroelectric projects like the Greater Mekong River Project on our environment.

Moving out of the Comfort Zone

The experience of the CSCAP Energy Security Group suggests that increasingly CSCAP SGs may have to move out of working in the comfort zone of “known-knowns” and “knowable-unknowns” into an increasingly uncertain and complex world where the priority is not so much to categorize and analyse the policy issue but to make sense of why and how it is a policy issue. This is especially so with the non-traditional threats of energy and security, environment and climate change or food and water security or pandemics. The techno-science to support a clear policy option is often equivocal and imperfect.

CSCAP will also have to contend with an expanding realm of “unknown-un-knowns” dominated by “Black Swans”. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb has argued, we are living in a world of “Black Swans”? In natural history, the sighting of a Black Swan invalidated millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans. Taleb would like to extend this metaphor of a Black Swan to human affairs where a rare and hard or impossible to predict event, which when it occurs, has a huge impact and changes the way we think of our world. The implosion of the Soviet Union was in this sense a Black Swan. It was a cataclysmic crisis that challenged and undermined our Cold War world. States, especially superpowers, are not supposed to implode; they are expected to decline, like the British Empire, over several decades after World War I. Post 1992, we are experiencing the emergence of a new world in which the policymaker may not be in control. It is a more complex, unpredictable and uncertain world in which an increasingly networked world is driven by the emerging technologies of information processing and transmission. The 1997 financial crisis and the political fallout in Thailand, and especially Indonesia, the SARS pandemic and the consequences of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center were crises we did not,

and could not anticipate. The speed at which these crises developed challenged our response time. Policymakers are challenged to plan and control this unpredictable and uncertain world. How do policy institutions and their networks react to support policymakers in responding to this unpredictable and uncertain world?

The challenge to policymaking in the future is how to make sense of an increasingly complex world in which cause and effect are coherent only in hindsight and as such difficult to predict for a planned intervention to alter the effect.8 Emerging work by analysts working in the field of knowledge management like David Snowden9, Max Boisot, and Chun Wei Choo on how we are creating, structuring and sharing knowledge to make sense of our world and shape our futures may help.10 The start point of policy is not necessarily the past leading into the known present and from here to then work towards the knowable future. Rather, the more useful start point may be the multiple futures that a crisis could lead to and probing for whether there are patterns among them which can then be worked back to our present. In a complex and chaos world, there is not one future we are working towards, but multiple futures we need to probe, make sense of and then respond to.

Traditional data processing, as Max Boisot and Bill McKelvey have argued, is hierarchic, in which the mountains of data is processed upwards through the layers of a pyramid of “experts” into a set of concrete policy recommendations.11 For a complex world, this pyramid has to be inverted in a search for patterns by networks of “experts” who are not necessarily in the policy community. Predictive warning may then be more a process of socializing the policymaker into understanding and accepting that there are multiple futures, the “dots” of which can be connected into various patterns that could form probable futures or scenarios, which the analyst and policymaker then needs to keep in view as they work out of their present into their preferred future.

The challenge for CSCAP and other policy institutes is whether we can make the transformation from “epistemic communities” of subject and domain experts and “old policy hands” providing normative advice to policymakers on how they should be making decisions to becoming more a “learning” community of not only regional security domain experts, but also other advocacy and NGO groups, to probe, share and learn how we are making sense of our uncertain, complex and chaotic world, to understand how policymakers are making decisions. Learning, understanding and describing how others are making sense of the world and decisions about it, could then becomes the basis of a more prescriptive approach to policymaking grounded on shared knowledge.
PART 4
CONCLUSIONS

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CONCLUSIONS
Assessing CSCAP and its Prospects

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is a very exciting endeavour. It is one of the most important attempts to construct a pan-regional security dialogue and consultation institution in the Asia-Pacific region since such efforts were obstructed by the ideological divide of the Cold War. Its establishment augured “a new era in confidence-building,” based on the novel concept of a “second track” process.¹ It is a case study in liberal institution-building being undertaken by realists, designed to promote security in an international system in which national interests and power politics remain dominant, and constructed in a fashion which accords with the prevailing realities. It confronts immense difficulties in promoting multilateral security cooperation in a world in which national interests count for more than the common good and power politics ultimately prevail. With 21 member committees and around 1,000 individual members, including most of the leading international scholars of Asia-Pacific security affairs and officials (retired and current) with great practical experience in international affairs involving the Asia-Pacific region, it has enormous potential to shape the regional security architecture.

As described in Chapters 2 and 3, CSCAP is on the verge of a new phase of its development. Its formative phase, from 1992–1993 to about 1996, was primarily measured in terms of its own institutionalization. Its second phase, from the late 1990s into the early 2000s, primarily involved negotiation of informal linkages with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and reforms in its structure and activities to more closely align with ARF processes. CSCAP’s third phase, from the mid-2000s, involved the actual institutionalization of CSCAP-ARF linkages—including arrangements for Study Group (SG) activities to accord with ARF schedules, organization of back-to-back meetings of SGs with the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Groups (ISGs) on a regular basis, reciprocal attendance of the co-chairs of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF ISG on CBMs and PD) or their

representatives at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings, and, since 2009, attendance of the CSCAP co-chairs at the ARF Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOMs).

However, CSCAP’s success in formalizing relations with the ARF notwithstanding, it faces serious problems. There are tensions within the organization with respect to motivations, objectives and operating principles. The issue of the conceptual/policy balance remains undetermined. When the Steering Committee’s Planning Group considered the issue in 1996, it found that: “It has become clear that CSCAP’s utility is greatest in the area of ‘policy relevant’ research.” It noted that the key measure of CSCAP’s effectiveness was its utility to the ARF. However, it provided no guidance to the Steering Committee about the desirable balance within CSCAP’s activities between conceptual studies and work directly relevant to the ARF. It did not consider the possibility that the ARF might lose momentum or might be challenged by competing regional architectures—such as ASEAN Plus 3 (APT), the East Asian Summit (EAS), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China’s focus is on the APT process in which it interacts with the 10 ASEAN countries as well as Japan and South Korea, but from which the United States is excluded, rather than the ARF. Hence, as Barry Desker notes in Chapter 11, “as a rising China seeks to shape regional institutions, CSCAP and its commitment to the ARF will be regarded as an anomaly”. Desker warns that “unless fundamental changes are made that will lead to renewed vigour in CSCAP and the ARF, they will risk being side-lined”. And as Taylor and Milner point out, there is now a multitude of other Track 2 organizations in the region, many of them potentially capable of performing substantial parts of CSCAP’s roles to greater or lesser extents. More generally, CSCAP lacks the public profile that its capabilities and activities warrant.

CSCAP’s prospects depend on many factors, some of which are beyond its own ability to affect (including some of the most important features of the evolving regional security environment). But there are many things that CSCAP can do. It can begin by scrutinizing its own domestic affairs, resolving debilitating tensions, and reforming its own organization and working practices. It can develop procedures and agendas intended to promote vigorous and intellectually stimulating discourse. It can improve the quality of its research and analyses. It can make greater effort to extend its deliberations to ensure that the policy implications are clear and policy recommendations are formulated. It can consider measures to improve its public profile. And it can enhance its ability to anticipate regional security developments, both to demonstrate its extraordinary capacities and, more substantively, to influence the direction and character of some of the more disturbing security developments.

**Assessing CSCAP**

Assessment of CSCAP’s achievements is extremely difficult. To begin with, many of the conceptual variables are quite intangible, such a “confidence”, “trust”, “transparency”, and even some of the more elastic concepts of “security” itself. Then, the standards of measurement are problematic: they are conceptually undeveloped,
inconstant, and, indeed, are at least in part a function of the variable being measured (i.e. the cooperative achievements).

The simplest yardstick of CSCAP’s achievements is the SG activity as measured in terms of numbers of meetings and publications. According to the quantitative measurements, some groups have been more active than others. Over the first decade, the Working Group (WG) on CSBMs had many more meetings than any of the others, but the WG on Maritime Cooperation and the WG on concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security published the most books. However, there were important differences in the analytical qualities of the published works, while the disparate conceptual and practical approaches defy comparative evaluation. Since the SGs were instituted in 2004, the SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific has had 10 meetings, while a succession of groups concerned with maritime cooperation and multilateral security in Northeast Asia have had six to seven meetings on their respective themes; most of the others have held only one to three meetings in accordance with their delimited tenures.

A much more demanding standard would be the structure and systemic tendencies of the regional security architecture: i.e. to what extent are the cooperative ventures (CSCAP and the ARF) keeping abreast of the changing components and configurations of security relations, and of the systemic propensities for conflict or peace in the region? How might these propensities be measured and compared? To what extent are CSCAP and the ARF able to manage the growing influence of China and its interest in alternative institutions? As Brian Job asks in Chapter 5, what are the prospects for CSCAP for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation? Are these prospects commensurate with the increasing challenges?

The difficulty is greatly compounded by the lack of any conceptual framework for addressing the interaction of institutionalized cooperation and geostrategic developments based upon power politics and national self-interest. The theoretical literature is essentially bi-focussed on liberal institutionalism and extreme realism, whereas most international political activity, and certainly some of the most critical activity in the security field in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War, involves the confluence of cooperative modalities and power relationships.

The institutionalization of dialogue, as exemplified in both the ARF and CSCAP, was a necessary building block for enhanced security cooperation, but it was also easier to emplace than other “blocks” (such as preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and arms control). As I noted in 2000, there was no guarantee that laying the foundation would lead to any further (and harder) construction.2

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Sheldon Simon, in his critique in 2002 reproduced as Chapter 4 herein, put forward four criteria for evaluating CSCAP performance: (i) production of new concepts and proposals, (ii) gaining the attention of decision-makers, (iii) sparking interest in an international attentive public, and (iv) demonstrating “enough shelf-life that some of the principal concepts and proposals remain part of the international dialogue”. Overall, his assessment was mixed. He noted that CSCAP as a Track 2 “epistemic community” had played a significant positive role. However, he also observed that “the most important CSCAP shortcomings echo the ARF’s limitations”, especially in its failure to have grappled with the significant security tension spots in the region such as the Taiwan Straits or to have ameliorated the militarization of Northeast Asia. A decade later, in his Postscript in Chapter 4, he notes that CSCAP has over the past several years worked particularly closely with the ARF on non-traditional security (NTS) and that “the attention the Forum has devoted in recent years to non-traditional security seems to have breathed new life into the organization”. He concludes that “the Track 1–Track 2 nexus continues to prove its worth”, but cautions that “for the ARF to remain useful to the security needs of its members, the Forum must engage more fully in Preventive Diplomacy”.

Objective tensions
The various strategic-studies institutes that comprise the foundation and working core of CSCAP have different backgrounds, interests, purposes and functions, and relations with government. The CSCAP process itself inherently contains tensions with respect to motivations, functions and operating principles. These tensions are unavoidable, and require the institution of informal arrangements and practices to satisfactorily manage them. The goodwill and “give and take” that have characterized CSCAP developments to date augur well for the future.

The most significant tension concerns the implicit diversity of functions. CSCAP is intended to play several roles, both activist and facilitative, and academic and policy-oriented—to encourage and itself undertake conceptual studies and analyses (for example, the concepts of cooperative, comprehensive and human security), and to explore new ideas, as well as to “provide policy recommendations” and to support official mechanisms such as the ARF.

Not all conceptual study is conducive to policy recommendations, and much policy development has little conceptual interest. Compromises are needed in some areas, if only because of resource constraints (and, most particularly, the relatively small number of WGs that CSCAP can support).

On the other hand, neither theoretical work nor good scholarship is incompatible with policy relevance. Indeed, within the structured context provided by CSCAP, they could well have a symbiotic relationship. To begin with, the academic analysts and the policymaker share many of the same concerns—the increasing fluidity and uncertainty of the emergent regional security environment, the arms acquisition programmes, the nature and import of territorial conflicts, the mari-
time issues, and the general objective of enhanced regional security—although they might have different explanations for and solutions to the matters of concern. The policy-related activity of CSCAP should identify the most troublesome concerns, as well as articulate the practical and operational possibilities and constraints that should inform conceptual study. On the other hand, the conceptual activity should broaden the discourse, expose fundamental linkages (such as between economic and environmental matters, political stability, and regional security), and explore possible approaches to the resolution of fundamental security issues rather than current and more particular or transient concerns. They will, of course, be judged by different criteria—excellence of analysis and policy utility—but not ones that defy optimization.

Relations with officialdom: The autonomy dilemma
The appropriate relationship between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies is always a complex, delicate and difficult matter. As Lawrence Woods has noted, in order to contribute to the processes of regional dialogue and cooperation, NGOs "need to attract and maintain state interest, state support and state involvement", but they must also preserve their independence and avoid state control if they wish to further advance these processes. On the one hand, the contribution which NGOs can make to the processes of regional cooperation depends on their ability to secure official appreciation of the value and practicability of their efforts. On the other hand, there is a real concern that connections with government might be inversely related to intellectual independence, and that too close an involvement with official processes and activities risks the loss or at least severe impairment of some of the most important attributes of NGO activity—objectivity, pan-regional perspectives, unfettered thinking, and more stimulating and imaginative research agendas.

The problem is somewhat exacerbated in the case of CSCAP because it is interested not just in developing and disseminating ideas and stimulating discussion, but also in directly supporting official arrangements and processes. Some disturbing possibilities were noted by Ball when CSCAP was established:

In some countries, governments have unabashedly linked the extent of their financial support and participation to their degree of control over their respective committees. Although very short-sighted, their position is quite understandable—why provide official support (including funds) to a process which is of problematic "reliability" in terms of bureaucratic or national interests? The corollary is also a major concern: it is likely that the strongest member committees will be those that toe their official

government lines most closely. Unless great care is taken, the Member Committee structure might tend to entrench particular national political positions rather than provide a mechanism for frank and open dialogue, including dissentient views, about regional issues.4

The “autonomy dilemma” has been most rigorously explored by Herman Kraft in his article reproduced as Chapter 6 in this volume, where he argued that the “increasingly blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis, and that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3. In his Postscript in Chapter 6, he argues that the “autonomy dilemma” of Track 2 networks continues to operate in the region. In particular, he argues that “the continuing importance of the need to keep China engaged in security dialogue, and enmeshed in multilateral arrangements (which is primarily a Track 1 concern) illustrates in fairly stark terms the increased institutionalization and accommodation of the limitations that emerge from the need to keep CSCAP ... relevant to the ARF”. He notes that “the curious response to [the dilemma] revolves around the further intensification of CSCAP’s involvement with the ARF—in effect further institutionalizing the context within which the “autonomy dilemma” of Track 2 can operate”.

Brian Job and Avery Poole also argue, in their Postscript in Chapter 5, that regional Track 2 institutions, including CSCAP, have become “to a considerable degree ... hostage to their Track 1 counterparts”. Moreover, the data that they present show a palpable increase since 2000 in Track 1.5 events, which are hosted/organized/sponsored by governments, have their agendas established by officials, and/or are populated largely by government officials and bureaucrats, and which accounted for between 20 and 25 per cent of so-called Track 2 events in 2006. They argue that Track 1.5 often sacrifices “the freedom to set agendas, invite and debate with non-likeminded, and to consider options not under official consideration”, and that, “in effect, Track 2’s ‘autonomy dilemma’ appears to be increasing rather than decreasing”.

Reforming CSCAP
CSCAP’s domestic affairs involve the whole organization of member committees, Steering Committee meetings, and SG structures and activities. These have been subject to numerous reforms over the past decade and a half, but undoubtedly still contain inefficiencies, outmoded working practises, and unnecessary impediments

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Conclusions: Assessing CSCAP and its Prospects

to CSCAP's own progress. It should be possible to be more efficient and more pro-
ductive while not discomforting those who prefer to move slowly.

Barry Desker, in Chapter 11, notes that CSCAP has too often “followed in the
wake of Track 1” rather than been a leader of regional trends, and argues that CSCAP
must “re-think its directions or risk being marginalized”. He makes four proposals
for CSCAP: first, CSCAP should maximize the impact of its networking with Track
1 during ISG meetings; second, CSCAP should actively engage Track 3 participants
who represent NGOs and civil society groups; third, CSCAP should give greater
attention to intra-state conflicts; and, fourth, CSCAP should concentrate on the new
security agenda, or NTS issues, in the Asia Pacific—pandemics, human trafficking,
pan-Asian illegal immigration, the environment, transnational crime and terrorist
links to the illegal drug trade.

CSCAP should also institutionalize a continuous process of internal review.
Otherwise, it risks ossification. Over the last couple of years, both the report by Jim
Veitch, the retiring Non-ASEAN co-chair, in May 2008, and the CSCAP Review in
2008–2009 have demonstrated the value of reflective internal reviews in generating
proposals for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of CSCAP activities. The
Veitch report argued, for example, that the CSCAP Secretariat should be upgraded to
give it “a greater role than now in collating study group reports and in ensuring that
study groups do undertake and complete the work that has been agreed and been
undertaken”, and “so that CSCAP can develop a more formalized liaison with the ARF
Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat”. It also suggested a variety of means for rejuvenating
the activities of some of the Member Committees. The CSCAP Review Committee
noted that “CSCAP should strive to be more relevant to the ARF”, proposed that
“the mandate of CSCAP Study Groups should be limited to one year or at most 18
months to avoid their self-perpetuation and to encourage faster decision-making”,
although “some flexibility could be accorded if they matched the on-going concerns
of ARF ISMs”, and stressed that “CSCAP Memoranda should be brief, straight to the
point and focused on policy recommendations”.

In addition, as Kwa Chong Guan argues in Chapter 12, CSCAP must be trans-
formed from an epistemic community of subject and domain experts and “old policy
hands” providing normative advice to policymakers on how they should be making
decisions to a “learning” community of not only regional security domain experts,
but also other advocacy and NGO groups, to probe, share, and learn in order to
make sense of our uncertain, complex and chaotic world. The challenge for CSCAP
in this rapidly changing and increasingly uncertain world is to shift its horizons
from the realm of the “known-knowns”, with occasional forays into the “known-
unknowns”, where cause and effect relations are perceivable and fairly predictable,
to an expanding realm of “unknown-unknowns”, where the critical priority is not so
much to categorize and analyse policy issues but to learn, understand and describe
how others are making sense of the world in order to make sense of why and how
they are policy issues.
The relationship with the ARF
CSCAP is a doubly dependent subject in the overall calculus of regional security. Its success depends on both its contribution to the first-track processes of regional security cooperation, and especially the ARF, and also on the extent to which the cooperative modalities are affecting the regional security architecture. Timely and superlative CSCAP reports to the ARF are useless if the ARF lacks the willingness or capacity to positively shape this architecture.

CSCAP has demonstrated its commitment and ability to support the ARF process. In CSCAP’s first decade, it produced several memoranda which the ARF found useful—such as the CSCAP Memorandum No. 2 on Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures produced by the WG on CSBMs in June 1995; Memorandum No. 3 on The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security produced by the WG on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in December 1995; and Memorandum No. 4 on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Corporation produced by the WG on Maritime Cooperation in December 1997. The most beneficial work was that of the WG on CSBMs on preventive diplomacy, undertaken in support of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building. This work was widely praised within the ARF process, and helped to promote further and more structured linkages between CSCAP and the ARF in the early 2000s.

The SGs now produce papers specifically designed to address matters of direct interest to the ARF and operate in close alignment with ARF SOM and ISG/ISM processes. Back-to-back meetings of SGs with ISGs and ISMs have become fairly regular. For example, the SG on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ARF organized a one-off meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 30–31 October 2007, back-to-back with a meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD; one of its recommendations was that “the ARF should consider developing a Vision 2020 Statement that would clarify the ARF’s objectives and provide specific benchmarks for its progress”. This suggestion was accepted by the ARF, and the resultant “ARF Vision 2020” was adopted at the 16th ARF meeting in July 2009 in Phuket. In June 2009, the SG on Countering the Proliferation of WMD organized a meeting back-to-back with the inaugural meeting of the ARF ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Beijing. By 2009, arrangements had been emplaced for reciprocal attendances by CSCAP co-chairs or their representatives at ISG meetings and by the co-chairs of the ARF ISG at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings, and for regular attendance of the CSCAP co-chairs at the ARF SOMs.

At the 32nd meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Jakarta on 16 November 2009, Dr. Suriya Chindawongse, on behalf of the ARF SOM, reviewed the development of the relationship between the ARF and CSCAP, including the contributions of the CSCAP SGs (particularly the work on countering proliferation

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of WMD), and outlined the ARF’s plans for implementing the Vision 2020 Statement. He suggested four “possible CSCAP contributions” to the ARF’s “next steps”: first, to explore how to best implement the ARF Vision Statement; second, to examine the scope of preventive diplomacy measures in the ARF; third, to help refine the future role of the defence track in the ARF; and, fourth, to review the role of the ARF in the evolving regional architecture. These are all subjects that warrant the formation of dedicated CSCAP SGs; each could be limited to a “scoping” or planning meeting and a one-off substantive meeting organized back-to-back with an ARF ISG or ISM meeting.

It is necessary to stress that support for the ARF process does not mean simply working to address the ARF’s current agendas. As the Steering Committee’s Planning Group reported in June 1996: “It is important that CSCAP activities move out in front of the topics summarized in the [ARF] Concept Paper [adopted in 1995].” And as the CSCAP Review Committee reported in 2009, “CSCAP should stay ahead of the curve by providing early warning of future threats and security concerns”. Indeed, CSCAP should be at the forefront of the discourse about regional security cooperation more generally. It should not wait to be invited by the ARF, but should initiate projects that it believes the ARF will appreciate. A useful initiative would be to develop a new draft concept paper for the ARF that would guide its activities over the next decade. In order to be at the forefront, CSCAP will have to accord more attention to the policy implications of so-called non-traditional or “new security agenda” subjects—such as economics and security, the environment and security, and the concept of human security.

More fundamentally, the ARF itself must be transformed. As See Seng Tan and Ralf Emmers argue in Chapter 8, the ARF has lost momentum and risks being sidelined, increasingly perceived, fairly or otherwise, as complacent and unwilling to exercise leadership in shaping regional architecture. They argue that the “ASEAN Way” has become an excuse for inaction, and that ASEAN-led regional institutionalism is unlikely to withstand the challenge of alternative multilateral institutions unless the concept is qualitatively changed.

In Chapter 11, Barry Desker makes four proposals for maintaining the ARF’s relevance. First, with respect to CSBM and preventive diplomacy, the ARF needs to transform itself into a “problem-solving institution”. Second, the chairmanship of the ARF should be de-linked from that of ASEAN, and, indeed, the ARF should have a non-ASEAN co-chair, “to lock in the participation of external powers [and] to give them a bigger stake in the ARF process as well”. Third, an ARF Secretariat should be established, building on the ARF Unit presently in the ASEAN Secretariat, and preferably co-located with the APEC Secretariat. And, fourth, to scope of Defence participation should be broadened to ensure an “inclusive structure for the ARF”.

Moreover, with the regional architecture containing an increasing range of multilateral institutions, many of them overlapping but some of them also com-
petitive, CSCAP must look beyond the ARF itself. It should consider, for example, developing some relationship with the new ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) process, through the ADMM SOM (ADSOM), especially as the prospective “ADMM-Plus” process evolves. It might also consider the potential for Track 2 support of the APT process. Barry Desker proposes creation of a “symbiotic relationship” between the ARF and APEC, the two key institutions for cooperative regional security and regional economic integration. This could start with the co-location of an ARF secretariat with the APEC Secretariat, but could later proceed to holding back-to-back meetings of the APEC and ARF summits. CSCAP should work with PECC to explore both the possibilities for promoting this evolution and the implications for Track 2 organizations.

Preventive diplomacy

CSCAP’s work on preventive diplomacy has been a model in terms of its contribution to the ARF. The exemplary initiative was the organization of the tenth meeting of the group in Bangkok, on 28 February–2 March 1999, immediately prior to the meeting of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building on 3–5 March 1999, most of the members of which also attended the CSCAP meeting. The most memorable achievement of this WG meeting, was the agreement that was reached on a “working definition” of preventive diplomacy, and an accompanying list of “key principles”, which were then forwarded to the ensuing ISG meeting. It was the basis for much of the subsequent work of the ARF on PD. More recently, as described above, the back-to-back meeting of the Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ISG on CBMs and PD in Brunei Darussalam on 30–31 October 2007 led to preparation of the ARF Vision 2020 Statement, which committed the ARF to “develop feasible preventive diplomacy through, amongst others, norm-building and enhanced channels of communication” and to “develop preventive diplomacy in priority areas that directly affect our peoples and that are insurmountable through our individual actions alone, namely those pertaining to non-traditional, transboundary and inter-state security challenges including working towards mutually acceptable early warning mechanisms”. As Dr. Suriya Chindawongse reported to the Steering Committee in November 2009, the ARF SOM would appreciate further work by CSCAP on practical PD measures.

In Chapter 10, Ralph Cossa, who has been continuously involved with CSCAP’s PD activities since the outset, makes nine “specific recommendations for advancing

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the implementation of a successful PD program within the ARF”. These included broadening the current working definition and statement of principles of preventive diplomacy to acknowledge that preventive diplomacy mechanisms can be applied within as well as between and among states (provided there is mutual consent of all the directly involved parties); more clearly defining the scope of the ARF’s preventive diplomacy effort; creating an institutional capacity for early warning and monitoring of emerging security challenges, involving, over the long term, the establishment of a Regional Risk Reduction Centre (RRRC); enhancing and articulating the preventive diplomacy role of the Expert and Eminent Persons Group (EEPG) and the Friends of the ARF Chair; standardizing the ASO and creating a review and feedback mechanism, possibly involving the EEPG, to enhance its role as an early warning tool; strengthening and expanding the ARF Unit with an eye to the creation of an ARF secretariat; identifying NTS challenges that might lend themselves to the application of preventive diplomacy, including transnational environmental and health issues; and developing procedures and mechanisms that can allow the ARF and/or its various preventive diplomacy mechanisms to be more responsive to impending or actual emergency situations in order to perform its preventive diplomacy role in a timely and effective manner.

Conflict resolution
Stage III of the ARF agenda adopted in 1995 concerns conflict resolution, but it is described in the ARF Concept Paper as “an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue”, and has received no attention to date. This is probably wise, for any official consideration is likely to generate suspicion and apprehension by some members, and impact negatively on current preventive diplomacy endeavours.

On the other hand, thinking about conflict resolution by Track 2 organizations should not be inhibited. This thinking should extend to consideration of possible institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution.

An essential precursory project would involve a study of the most likely characteristics of possible conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region—in terms of their scale, intensity, naval and air dimensions, level of technology, and sorts of casualties. There are some three dozen issues of potential conflict in East Asia involving competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy and territorial disputes. The spectrum of the conflict issues is much more extensive and the character of possible conflict much more variegated than in any other region. About two-thirds of the issues involve interstate disputes. Most of these are about maritime boundaries and offshore territorial claims, such as the competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. But many are about land borders, mostly involving disputes over colonial impositions, albeit some having much longer roots. Analysis of these conflict issues, including the types of forces likely to be employed, should inform thinking about conflict resolution.

Barry Desker, in Chapter 11, suggests that CSCAP could also examine the
development of approaches to the prevention of conflicts as well as the elaboration of a “roadmap” for the resolution of conflicts. He also argues that CSCAP should give greater attention to intra-state conflicts, noting that, in Southeast Asia at least, “civil conflict is the primary focus of attention of states in the region, as it can lead to political instability and chaos within states and across borders”.

The “defence track”

The desirability of substantial participation of defence personnel (both civilian and uniformed) in the ARF process was recognized by the ARF at the outset, and since 1996–1997 several concrete steps have been taken. These began at the SOM and ISG levels, but have more recently been extended to the ministerial level.

In 1997, the ARF SOM introduced an “informal luncheon” for defence officials attending the meeting to discuss defence-related matters. It was agreed in 1999–2000 that “participation in [the] Leaders Retreat at [the] ARF SOMs should continue to be [the] SOM leader plus one in order to accommodate participation by defence officials”.8 In July 2004, the ARF Foreign Ministers agreed at their Eleventh ARF meeting that an ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) should be convened back-to-back with the annual ARF SOM, and that it should include defence as well as Foreign Ministry officials. The first held ASPC was held in Beijing in November 2004, and the second in Vientiane in May 2005; the sixth was held in Phuket in May 2009.

At the ISG level, most of the delegations at the meetings of the ISG on Confidence Building in Honolulu in November 1998, and in Bangkok in March 1999 included defence officials. They “exchanged views and information on their respective defence policies, including defence conversion, and reviewed their political-military and defence dialogues, high-level defence contacts, joint training and personnel exchanges with fellow ARF participants”9 Subsequent ISG meetings have included a Defence Officials’ Lunch for informal discussions “on issues of common interest”.10 These gatherings are used to explore and promote practical cooperative measures. In 2002, Singapore produced a “Concept Paper on Defence Dialogue within the ARF”, which proposed institution of ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogues (ARF-DOD), and which was considered and endorsed at the Ninth ARF Ministerial meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in July 2002. The ARF-DODs are held twice a year, coincident with the annual ARF Ministerial meeting and an ISG meeting.

In July 2008, the 15th ARF Ministerial meeting in Singapore endorsed a pro-

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9 Ibid, pp. 1–2.
10 Co-Chairmen’s Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, held in Tokyo, Japan, on 13–14 November 1999, and in Singapore, 5–6 April 2000, para. 42.
posal by the Philippines and the United States to conduct an ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, called a Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR), to “demonstrate ARF national capabilities in response to an affected country’s request for assistance and build regional assistance capacity for major, multinational relief operations”. The ARF’s first “field exercise” was held in May 2009 and used a simulated scenario where Manila and Central Luzon were devastated by a super-typhoon, and regional countries contributed assets and personnel to assist relief operations.11

In 2005–2006, the ASEAN Secretariat produced a “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting”, which was the basis for the inaugural ADMM held in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006. The ASEAN Defence Ministers agreed at this meeting that “the ADMM should be an integral part of ASEAN, that it should add-value to and complement the overall ASEAN process, and that it should also be open, flexible and outward-looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners as well as ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF”. The Ministers also agreed that:

... the specific objectives of the ADMM would be (a) to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security; (b) to give guidance to existing senior defence and military officials dialogue and cooperation in the field of defence and security within ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners; (c) to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and (d) to contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC).12

The ministers also “expressed support for the ARF as the leading cooperative security process towards promoting peace and stability among countries in the Asia-Pacific region”, and agreed to establish an ADSOM to support the activities of the ADMM.13 The second ADMM was held in Singapore in November 2007 and the third meeting in Pattaya in February 2009. In addition, an ADMM retreat was held in Bangkok in November 2009.14 The second ADMM in Singapore approved

13 Ibid.
an “ADMM-Plus Concept Paper”, which “provides for the ADMM’s engagement and interactions with ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners”.

The CSCAP organization has not been very involved in supporting or promoting these defence activities, except for some particular member committees, such as Singapore and Australia, with respect to their respective defence ministries. In Ball’s review of CSCAP in 2000, he argued that “there has been a virtually complete absence of informed dialogue concerning the identification of the most appropriate and productive sorts of cooperative activities to be accorded priority” in the defence cooperation processes; he suggested that one possibility was “to conduct a half-day Map Exercise involving an accident by or hijacking of a vessel in some part of the region (such as the Malacca Straits) to demonstrate the cooperative aspects of the search and rescue practices involved”.

In November 2009, at the CSCAP Steering Committee in Jakarta, Dr. Suriya Chindawongse suggested that CSCAP might assist the ARF by studying “the future role of the ‘Defence Track’ in the ARF”. CSCAP should be able to contribute in several ways. It could enhance the discussion at the ASPC and ARF-DOD meetings by preparing background papers on selected relevant subjects. It could provide assistance to the ADSOM in similar fashion to its assistance to the ARF SOM. It could develop and refine proposals for both map and live exercises designed to strengthen practical defence cooperation. It could work on the development and implementation of the principles and modalities of the “ADMM-Plus” concept. It could also study the possibilities for closer alignment of the ARF and ADMM-Plus processes, including coincidental meetings at the SOM level and even at the ministerial level, with ARF foreign ministers and ADMM-Plus Defence Ministers meeting both separately and jointly at a common venue.

**Defence enhancement and arms control**

With respect to the future role of the defence track in the ARF, it is imperative that it focus, inter alia, on the robust defence enhancement programmes underway in the region and their implications for regional stability and security. Asia has now been involved in a sustained build-up of defence capabilities for two decades, hardly affected by economic tribulations. However, the character of the acquisition dynamics began to change around the end of the 1990s. Whereas the acquisitions in the first decade could be explained by and large in terms of modernization, they have in some places in the past decade involved substantial competitive elements. This

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combination of increasing capabilities and action-reaction is the essence of arms-racing. It may still not be the dominant driver of the acquisitions throughout the region, but it is playing an increasingly significant role in some sub-regions, most especially with respect to naval acquisitions in Northeast Asia. Even in Southeast Asia, arms-racing behaviour has been manifest in a couple of areas (fighter aircraft and submarines) in Singaporean and Malaysian acquisitions.\footnote{Desmond Ball, “Arms Modernization in Asia: An Emerging Complex Arms Race”, in Andrew T. H. Tan (Ed.), The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 30–51.}

It is likely that, over the next one to two decades, the role of arms-racing will continue to increase. Action-reaction generates its own momentum. Further, there are no arms control regimes whatsoever in Asia that might constrain or constrict acquisitions. Moreover, prospective regional security dynamics, including prospective arms racing, will be much more complex than those which were obtained in the old bipolar Cold War situation. There are none of the distinctive categories, milestones and firebreaks, which were carefully constructed during the Cold War to constrain escalatory processes and promote crisis stability. Now, there are also interactions between conventional weapons acquisition programmes on the one hand and developments with WMD and long-range delivery systems on the other hand. South Korea and Japan have responded to the development of ballistic missiles by China and North Korea by greatly enhancing their airborne intelligence collection and early warning capabilities, and their land- and sea-based theatre missile defence (TMD) capabilities. U.S. nuclear strategy has moved to permit virtually co-mutual employment of nuclear forces, precision conventional capabilities and information operations (IO), and to permit the use of nuclear weapons in otherwise non-nuclear situations. In this environment, with many parties and many levels and directions of interactions, the possibilities for calamity are high.

There is an urgent need for consideration of possible arms control agreements that might constrain arms racing and promote crisis stability. One possibility is to regenerate interest in a Regional Agreement on “Avoidance of Incidents at Sea”, as proposed by the CSCAP WG on Maritime Cooperation in CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation in December 1997. The Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific set up in 2009 should provide a basis for a broader inquiry into defence enhancements more generally.

Enhancing relations with Track 3

The need for CSCAP to enhance its relations with Track 3 has been reiterated in reviews of CSCAP for more than a decade now. Herman Kraft argued in 2000, in his article reproduced in this volume, that Track 3 contained more “critical thinking” than Track 2, less constrained than Track 2 by linkages with Track 1, and that greater collaboration with Tracks 3 provided a way of ameliorating Track 2’s “autonomy
dilemma”. Brian Job wrote in 2003 (Chapter 5 herein) that “Track 2 needs to develop more open and supple modalities that allow for the inclusion of Track 3 voices without their being marginalized or co-opted”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia-Pacific security order”. In his Postscript in Chapter 5, he reiterates the “need to integrate a broader range of expertise and the involvement of new players, including IOs [International Organizations] such as UN agencies and NGOs both regional and global”. CSCAP Barry Desker argues in Chapter 11 that CSCAP should “actively engage Track 3 participants who represent NGOs and civil society groups”, and that it is “critical that CSCAP should invite Track 3 representatives to its biennial conferences and welcome their participation in CSCAP WGs where they possess specialized expertise or represent key constituencies”.

Since the early 2000s, CSCAP has recognized the need to introduce the “next generation” of “young leaders” into its activities. The Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program has provided one way. In his report as the retiring Non-ASEAN co-chair in May 2008, Jim Veitch noted that “we urgently need a new generation to join us so that we can hand over both the vision and the work”, and that “we need the wisdom of the present membership plus the enthusiasm and expertise of a new generation to shape our way ahead”. The report of the CSCAP Review Committee adopted by the Steering Committee on 1 June 2009 also enjoined member committees to bring “the next generation of security professionals into the CSCAP process to enable regeneration”. In Chapter 7, Brendan Taylor and Anthony Milner suggest that CSCAP might consider initiating a “Young Leaders Conference” process that brings together participants from around the region belonging to various “next generation” initiatives. Track 3 is a much larger and more variegated repository of “young leaders” than strategic studies centres by themselves can provide.

Moreover, Track 3 contains much greater expertise with respect to NTS and Human Security issues than exists in most CSCAP member committees. Indeed, CSCAP will be unable to satisfactorily address the increasing challenges of NTS and Human Security without drawing more extensively on specialized expertise in Track 3. And as Kwa Chong Guan argues in Chapter 12, transforming CSCAP from an epistemic to a learning/probing community requires close cooperation with other advocacy and NGO groups, especially with respect to NTS threats.

**Non-traditional security**

CSCAP has had NTS on its agenda since its foundation. It was a primary focus of the WG on Concepts of Cooperative and Comprehensive Security, one of its original groups established in 1994. That group had meetings concerned with the themes of inter-dependence and security, and particularly the linkages between economic development, high levels of economic inter-dependence, and peace and security; the challenges to regional security posed by environmental degradation, food shortages and energy requirements; the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 and its
implications for the structure of regional security; the implications of globalization for security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region; and the challenges to human security in the Asia Pacific. The WG on Transnational Crime, set up in 1996, was concerned with an important element of NTS. Since 2005, CSCAP has had several SGs devoted to NTS subjects, including those on Human Trafficking, Countering International Terrorism, Energy Security, Transnational Organised Crime and the Security Implications of Climate Change. Counting the work on NTS done by other SGs (for example, the SG on Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits), NTS has amounted to at least one-third of CSCAPS’s efforts.

Mely Caballero-Anthony argues in Chapter 9 that NTS threats—disease pandemics, human trafficking and other transnational criminal activities, natural disasters, climate change, and energy security—are not only increasing but are “more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of inter-state wars and conflicts”. She also argues that the trans-border nature of these NTS threats is pushing states in the region to work together to mitigate the impact of these new challenges, that the lack of state capacity to respond to an array of complex NTS threats makes for a compelling case for enhancing multilateral regional security cooperation in Asia, and that the growing salience of NTS challenges has generated a robust functional regionalism in East Asia with greater emphasis on the Human Security and Comprehensive Security agendas.

With respect to climate change, the SG on the Security Implications of Climate Change set up in 2007 completed its work in 2009. However, there will be a need for periodic re-visits to the subject, both to determine whether changes in scientific evidence require reconsideration of the security implications, and also to assess the adequacy of measures being implemented to ameliorate the extent of climate change and to address its security consequences.

**Human Security**

Since the end of the Cold War, there has not only been a broadening of the concept of security to encompass the “new agenda” issues such as economic and environmental security; there has also been a questioning of the referent object of security, and, in particular, a reassertion of primacy of the individual as compared to the state (wherever these are inconsonant). “Human security”, which focuses on the individual as the referent object, has been described by Ramesh Thakur as follows:

Negatively, it refers to freedom from: from want, hunger, attack, torture, imprisonment without a free and fair trial, discrimination on spurious

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grounds, and so on. Positively, it means freedom to: the capacity and opportunity that allows each human being to enjoy life to the fullest without imposing constraints upon others engaged in the same pursuit. Putting the two together, human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life—demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on—is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life—economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment and so on—is an enhancement of human security.19

In April 2000, in his *Millennium Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations*, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that globalization was redefining state sovereignty and that human security—allowing everyone “to make their lives better”—should be the central endeavour. He said:

The benefits of globalization are obvious: faster growth, higher living standards, new opportunities. Yet a backlash has begun, because these benefits are so unequally distributed, and because the global market is not yet underpinned by rules based on shared social objectives .... In this new world, groups and individuals more and more often interact directly across frontiers, without involving the State. This has its dangers. Crime, narcotics, terrorism, pollution, disease, weapons, refugees and migrants: all move back and forth faster and in greater numbers than in the past. No shift in the way we think can be more critical than this: we must put people at the centre of everything we do. No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to make their lives better. Only when that begins to happen will we know that globalization is indeed becoming inclusive, allowing everyone to share its opportunities.20

The new thinking must be supported by new conceptual frameworks, constructed to suit particular regional environments. In the Asia-Pacific region, there are claims to distinctive Asian values, more acceptance of the primacy of societal over individual rights, and stronger commitments to essentially unqualified concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. In many countries in East Asia, standards of living (as measured inadequately by gross domestic product per capita) have doubled or tripled over the last few decades. But

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in many places, there are gross violations of human rights, state-sponsored killings, torture, extreme cruelty, injustice, exploitation of fellow human beings (including women and children), grinding poverty, and little hope for the future. CSCAP cannot truly claim to be promoting real security in the region, unless and until the human dimension becomes a central feature of its activities.

Following the UN’s adoption of the principle of “the responsibility to protect” in 2005–2006, CSCAP set up a Study Group to clarify the meaning of the principle in terms of its application to the Asia-Pacific region, and to explore possible mechanisms for its implementation in the region. The group has scheduled meetings into 2011. The Steering Committee should during 2010 consider how this work might be succeeded by further activity in core areas of human security.

**Conclusion**

Over the long term, CSCAP’s prospects will be determined by the dynamics of regional security developments. No matter how successfully CSCAP functions in organizational and intellectual terms, it will count for little if these developments engender an environment characterized by tension, conflict, arms races and a propensity to use force to resolve disputes. In order to influence and shape these developments to the extent that this is possible for any multilateral security organization, CSCAP must develop and institutionalize some capacity to anticipate regional security developments. CSCAP must also work together with the ARF and other institutions concerned with the enhancement of regional security to construct a regional security architecture in which cooperative modalities prevail over power politics.
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**Brendan Taylor**
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (CSCAP)

The ending of the Cold War and the fundamental transformation ensuing from the elimination of superpower rivalry have provoked a far-reaching re-evaluation of security arrangements in the Asia Pacific region.

Four institutions in the region, namely the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Pacific Forum/CSIS (Honolulu), and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, together with representatives of other research institutes from the region, have undertaken an in-depth examination of the security issues and challenges facing Asia Pacific today and in the future. This process has involved a series of conferences on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (SCAP) held in Honolulu (October 29-30, 1991), Bali (April 17-19, 1992), and Seoul (November 1-3, 1992). Participants from seventeen countries, including scholars as well as officials acting in their private capacities, have taken part in these meetings.

The discussions at these meetings have clearly shown the need for more structured processes for regional confidence building and security cooperation. The meetings welcomed the initiatives at the official level to develop a formal or informal inter-governmental regional forum for dialogue on political-security issues.

In particular, the meetings noted the concrete steps that have been taken by the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) at which the six ASEAN foreign ministers (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) meet annually with foreign ministers of other Asia Pacific countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States) and a representative of the European Community. The participants in the CSCAP process believe that the PMC makes a significant contribution to the development of a multilateral political-security dialogue for the Asia Pacific region. The participants support the multilateralisation of the ASEAN PMC process and the establishment of a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). The participants in the SCAP process believe that the ASEAN PMC process should be inclusive and welcome the early inclusion of other countries in the region.
The participants also welcomed initiatives for the establishment of other regional processes, such as the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue proposal. These initiatives can only strengthen the broader regional processes.

As representatives of non-governmental institutions concerned with the security, stability and peace of the region, we also feel that we have the responsibility to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultations and cooperation.

It is with this objective in mind that we are establishing a Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP). It will be open to all countries and territories in the region. The Council’s activities will be guided by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of non-governmental institutions in the region who are committed to the ideals of regional security cooperation.

Steering Committee members will seek to establish broad-based committees in each of their respective countries or territories. These committees should include government officials in their private capacities.

We also propose that CSCAP establish Working Groups that will be given the tasks of undertaking policy-oriented studies on specific regional political-security problems.

Initially the CSCAP Steering Committee will be co-chaired by Amos Jordan (Pacific Forum/CSIS) and Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS Jakarta). The Steering Committee will be served by a Secretariat. ISIS Malaysia has accepted this responsibility for the first two years.

The founding members of CSCAP are:
- Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Australia
- University of Toronto-York University Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Canada
- Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
- Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan
- The Seoul Forum for International Affairs, Republic of Korea
- Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia
- Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippine
- Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore
- Institute for Security and International Studies, Thailand
- Pacific Forum/CSIS, United States of America.

Kuala Lumpur, 8 June 1993
Editor’s Note: As amended in August 1998 and confirmed in December 1998.

CSCAP Charter

Article I: The Name of the Organisation
The name of the organisation shall be the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, henceforth to be referred to as CSCAP.

Article II: The Purpose and Functions of CSCAP
1. CSCAP is organised for the purpose of providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.
2. The functions of CSCAP are as follows:
   a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities;
   b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries and territories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;
   c. to organise various working groups to address security issues and challenges facing the region;
   d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies on political-security issues;
   e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
   f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation; and
   g. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes of the organisation.

Article III: Membership
1. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis and consists of Member Committees. Admission of new members into CSCAP shall require the unanimous agreement of the Steering Committee.
2. When evaluating an application for membership, consideration shall be given to whether or not the applicant:
   a. endorses the Kuala Lumpur Statement on the Establishment of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) of June 8, 1993;
b. has cooperated with other CSCAP members on various projects related to regional security; and
c. has established a broad-based Member Committee, with the capacity to participate actively in CSCAP.

3. a. applicants not fully meeting all the requirements for full membership may be accepted as Candidate Members pending fulfilment of the requirements.
   b. Candidate members are eligible to participate in all CSCAP activities except for membership of the Steering Committee.

Article IV: Associate Membership
1. Associate membership may be granted to institutions in a country or territory not represented in the Steering Committee and which have demonstrated interest and involvement in the stated objectives and activities of CSCAP.
2. a. Associate members may participate in CSCAP Working Group activities.
   b. Associate members may participate in the CSCAP General Meetings as observers.

Article V: Member Committees
1. Member Committee shall be formed for each country or territory represented in CSCAP.
2. The Member Committee shall be broad-based, composed of non-governmental and government affiliated institutions in political-security studies and/or individuals (including officials) in their private capacities.

Article VI: The Steering Committee
1. The Steering Committee shall be the highest decision-making body of CSCAP.
2. The Steering Committee shall be comprised of one formally designated representative from each Member Committee.
3. a. The Steering Committee normally shall be co-chaired by a member from an ASEAN Member Committee and a member from a non-ASEAN Member Committee.
   b. The term of the Co-Chairs shall be two years.
4. a. The Steering Committee may establish Sub-committees on membership, finance, and working groups, and other Sub-committees as deemed necessary.
   b. The Steering Committee shall meet at least twice a year.
5. a. The quorum for the Steering Committee shall be at least three quarters (3/4) of the total members.
b. Except for questions of membership, decisions of the Steering Committee shall be made by at least eighty per cent (80%) of the quorum.

Article VII: The Secretariat
1. The Steering Committee shall be served by a Secretariat.
2. The Secretariat shall be provided by the Member Committee which will host the General Meeting for the coming year.
3. The Secretariat shall perform the following duties:
   a. serve as the communication/liaison centre between the Member Committees;
   b. assist in the organisation of the Steering Committee and General Meetings;
   c. publish materials as directed by the Steering Committee; and
   d. undertake all other responsibilities given by the Steering Committee.
4. The Secretariat shall be funded by the CSCAP Fund for the following purposes:
   a. administrative expenses;
   b. publication of the CSCAP Newsletter; and
   c. other necessary expenses approved by the Steering Committee.

Article VIII: Working Groups
1. The Steering Committee shall establish Working Groups to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and sub-regional political-security problems.
2. The proposal to establish a Working Group shall come from a Member Committee or Committees that will also be responsible for the funding of the project.
3. Participation in the Working Group project shall be broad-based.

Article IX: General Meetings
1. CSCAP shall convene a General Meeting on a regular basis. The agenda, time and venue of the General Meeting shall be decided by the Steering Committee.
2. Each Member Committee shall bear the international travel and accommodation expenses of its participants while the host Member Committee shall bear all other local expenses.

Article X: Non-Member Participants in Working Groups
1. Organisations or individuals from member countries or territories with an interest in CSCAP activities may be invited through the Member Committees to participate in CSCAP Working Group activities.
2. Organisations and individuals from non-member countries or territories and international bodies may be invited to participate in working group activities by the Chair of the Working Group with the consent of the Co-Chairs of the Steering Committee.

Article XI: Observers and Guests at General Meetings
1. Associate Members shall be invited to participate at the General Meeting as observers.
2. a. Individuals and organisations from non-member countries or territories may be invited to attend General Meetings as guests.
   b. Invitation to such individuals and organisations will be issued by the Co-Chairs of the Steering Committee and the Chairperson of the host Member Committee.
3. Individuals and organisations attending CSCAP General Meetings as guests may speak at the meetings only upon invitation by the Steering Committee Co-Chairs.

Article XII: Funding
1. A CSCAP Fund shall be established with annual contributions from the Member Committees, Candidate members and Associate Members. Contributions shall be determined by a formula which will be agreed upon by the Steering Committee.
2. CSCAP shall seek other sources of funding.
3. A Sub-committee on Finance shall be established to propose and review the formula for annual contributions. The Sub-committee shall also manage the Fund.
4. The Steering Committee shall suspend a Member Committee from all CSCAP activities including membership in the Steering Committee if the Member Committee defaults on its annual contribution for two consecutive years.

Article XIII: The Amendment Process
Except for Article III (1) requiring unanimity of the Steering Committee, the CSCAP Charter may be amended by eighty per cent (80%) of the quorum of the Steering Committee provided that an intention to propose such amendment or amendments has been circulated by the Secretariat to all members of the Steering Committee sixty (60) days in advance of consideration.

Article XIV: Transitional Provisions
1. The founding Institutions of CSCAP are:
   a. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
   b. Institute of Security and International Studies, Thailand
c. Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, the Philippines

d. Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia

e. Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan

f. Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Canada

g. Pacific Forum/CSIS, United States of America

h. Seoul Forum for International Affairs, South Korea

i. Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore

j. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia

2. a. In the formative phase, the designated representatives of the founding institutions shall form the pro tem Steering Committee of CSCAP.

b. The CSCAP Steering Committee, composed of the designated representatives from each of the ten (10) Founding Member Committees, shall be established in June 1994.

c. The Steering Committee shall be co-chaired initially by Amos A. Jordan (Pacific Forum/CSIS, United States) and Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS, Indonesia) for terms of two and three years, respectively.

3. ISIS Malaysia will provide the Secretariat of CSCAP for the first two years.

4. The Asia Pacific region consists of the countries and territories of South-east Asia, Northeast Asia, South Pacific, Oceania, and North America.

Adopted in Lombok, Indonesia, 16 December 1993. Amendments to Article IV and the introduction of new Article XI were made on 7 August 1998 and confirmed in Manila, the Philippines, 14 December 1998.
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The COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (CSCAP) was established in 1992–1993 as a network of policy institutions to provide “a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature … to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation” in the region. This network of policy institutions constituting CSCAP has since become the premier second or Track 2 organization contributing to the discussion of security cooperation by government officials at the official Track 1 level.

This book is intended to provide a critical assessment of the role of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and, more specifically, of CSCAP. It describes CSCAP’s formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its declared Track 1 counterpart. It also identifies and analyses perceived weaknesses in CSCAP’s organization and failures in its processes, some of which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades.